WINTER 1964 95c.

DISSENT

THE ACADEMY

IRVING HOWE Universities and Intellectuals • ROBERT PAUL WOLFF The College as Rat-Race • MICHAEL WALZER Paul Goodman's Community of Scholars • DOUGLAS F. DOWD Veblen, Mills, and the Decline of Criticism • STAUGHTON LYND and ROBERTA YANCY Southern Negro Students • ROBERT J. POTTER Portrait of a Working-Class College • MICHAEL MACCOBY Government, Scientists, and the Priorities of Science • OSCAR GASS Professors in Washington • PHILIP GREEN Social Scientists and Nuclear Deterrence • T. J. ROSS Teaching Poetry in the Provinces • LEWIS COSER Some Reflections on Academic Freedom Today • RONALD GROSS Toward a Technology of Teaching • THOMAS HAYDEN Contra: In Loco Parentis

Plus a Special Report by Tom Kahn:

PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

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Douglas Dowd teaches in the Economics Department at Cornell. Washington Square Press is publishing his book, *Thorstein Veblen: the Relevance and Validity of His Ideas Today,* and he will have an essay on Veblen and Mills in a forthcoming collection to be published by Oxford this Spring, *The New Sociology*. . . . Oscar Gass is a consulting economist in Washington who has written extensively on domestic and international politics; his articles have appeared in *Commentary* and *The New Republic*. . . . Philip Green teaches politics at Haverford College. His articles have appeared in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and elsewhere; his most recent article in DISSENT was "The Politics of Oil" (Spring 1962). The article in this issue is part of a full-length study of deterrence on which is now engaged. . . . Tom Hayden, past president of Students for a Democratic Society, has published articles in *The Progressive, Liberation,* and *Studies on the Left*. . . . Michael Maccoby is now completing a study with Erich Fromm of social problems in a Mexican village; he has previously written on the relationship between military and foreign policy and social structure. . . . Robert Potter teaches sociology at Flint College of the University of Michigan . . . T. J. Ross has appeared frequently in DISSENT and other journals; he is on the English faculty at Farleigh Dickinson where he teaches courses in Shakespeare and modern literature. . . . Robert Paul Wolff teaches in the Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago; he contributed to DISSENT's symposium on "The Young."

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among ourselves

• *The next issue of* DISSENT *will mark our 10th anniversary—a notable record of survival and growth for this kind of magazine. We plan an enlarged issue in which many of our leading contributors will appear.*

• It's been a busy season in New York for DISSENT editors and friends. Early in the fall we held a public forum on the Eichmann case and the Hannah Arendt book—with Marie Syrkin, Raul Hilberg, Lionel Abel and Daniel Bell speaking—at which the audience numbered nearly 500. The discussion, from the platform and the floor, was passionate and exciting : one of the most vivid political meetings held in New York for many years. A few weeks later, after the coup in South Vietnam, we held a smaller but excellent meeting at which Joseph Buttinger and Milton Sacks spoke, providing a wealth of background detail and analysis. We plan a series of meetings this winter and spring; local readers will be informed.

• *We add to our roster of contributing editors: Stanley Diamond, a frequent contributor to* DISSENT *who is an anthropologist now teaching at the University of Syracuse and has done field work in Israel and Africa, as well as writing for numerous scholarly studies; and Paul Jacobs, one of the most expert and controversial labor journalists in the U.S., whose recent book* The State of the Unions *will be reviewed in our next issue.*

• Michael Harrington, author of *The Other America* and a Contributing Editor to DISSENT, will now become a regular and active member of the editorial board. Harrington's book, just reissued in paperback by Penguin, has been a major factor in the recent discussions of poverty in America, and we are pleased to welcome him to our ranks.

• *May we remind those few* DISSENT *readers who still owe on last year's fund drive that payment is due, welcome, needed, urgent?*

• Books by DISSENT editors (which it is our policy not to review) keep rolling off the presses. Here are a few of them:

Henry Pachter: *Collision Course* (Praeger), a study of last year's Cuban crisis;

Norman Mailer: *The Presidential Papers of Norman Mailer* (Putnam), a collection of recent articles;

Norman Thomas: *Socialism Reexamined* (Norton), a political study.

Irving Howe: *A World More Attractive* (Horizon), a collection of literary and political essays, and *The Basic Writings of Trotsky,* an anthology.

• *If you have* DISSENT *copies in good shape for the years 1954–1956 and would like to sell them, drop us a card. We are always on the lookout to complete library files.*

• Our readers will be interested in an article by Ralph Ellison, "The World and the Jug," which appeared in the *New Leader,* December 9, 1963. This long and impassioned article is an attack upon Irving Howe's "Black Boys and Native Sons," DISSENT, Autumn 1963. A rebuttal by Howe appeared in the *New Leader,* February 3, 1964.

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• *We hope in the next year or two to publish a series of articles, some of them general and others specific, on the theme: America in the Next Decades: What Do Radicals Propose? We have already approached several writers and have commitments on such topics as automation, medical care, etc. But we remain interested in other possibilities and would like to hear from writers who have relevant ideas. Perhaps we will be able to bring these pieces together in a book entitled* The Radical Papers.

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WINTER 1964

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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"Pieds Noirs" in the Canal Zone

In Algeria they were called "pieds noirs" or blackfeet; in Panama they are called "Zonians," dwellers in the leased 10-mile wide strip of the Canal Zone. There were a million of them in Algeria, there are only 35,000 in Panama. The French are all gone now, property and *présence* liquidated by the Algerian independence movement. The Zonians, by the same token, will have to go from the Canal Zone sooner or later. Better sooner, before they stir up more trouble, hatred and violence. The *Herald Tribune* (Jan. 13, 1964) referring to the Zonians as "dinosaurs from the age of Teddy Roosevelt," cites an American lad from Balboa High School who said,

> I am sorry for the rioting because the three Army guys are dead, but I couldn't care less about the Panamanians. They have no business here anyway.

That's the kind of upbringing the 6,000 civilian employees of the Canal Zone Company want for their kids in Panama. The *Tribune* goes on:

> On top of their salaries (double that of a Panamanian doing similar work) Zonians get a 25 per cent overseas differential, the highest additional allowance paid by the State Department (for whom they work) in its graduated scale of "uncomfortability" pay. There is also a superbly stocked commissary in which prices are considerably less than across the border in Panama, sometimes as much as 50 per cent lower. Once every two years the Zonians get free passage round-trip to the U.S. . . . late-model cars, mostly Thunderbirds, are the "in" cars here, and sit in almost every garage. Many children get motor scooters as a matter of course and social status.

Every high school student in the U.S. knows the sordid story of how we seized the Canal Zone strip, then in Colombia's possession, by fomenting a phony "revolution" in the area. And Teddy Roosevelt's high-handed behavior ("... I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate; and while the debate goes on the canal does also") is also described in standard high school history texts.

The people of Panama have never accepted this situation. A string of corrupt governments has been satisfied with small handouts (currently $2 million out of an average Canal business of $100 million per year), and it is likely that the present government will agree to continue the current arrangement with a substantial increase in its share. But this will not answer the problem of the Panama Canal behind which stand not only wounded national pride but the whole issue of North American relationships with the Latin American countries.

What ought to be done? Only one answer is conceivable. Pull out—immediately—lock, stock and barrel. Withdraw all American troops, marines, naval forces and unwelcome civilians except those willing to stay on and work loyally for the new authorities. And the canal? Let it be turned over forthwith to whomever the Panamanians designate as acceptable to themselves, be it the United Nations, the OAS, or the Panamanians themselves. Only we Americans can operate the canal, it is objected? The same folktale was heard about Suez. The objection is no more serious now than in the case of Egypt. Furthermore, everyone now acknowledges that militarily the canal is useless while commercially a much bigger, wider and deeper canal is required.

Latin America watches. All political forces of the southern hemisphere are alert. Is it not time for the United States to take a bold and unambiguous step?

STANLEY PLASTRICK

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Irving Howe

UNIVERSITIES AND INTELLECTUALS

Schools reflect a culture; they do not transform it.—Unsigned review, *The New Yorker,* November 16, 1963.

A university should not be a weather vane, responsive to every variation of popular whim. Universities must at times give society, not what society wants, but what it needs.—Abraham Flexner, *Universities: American, British, German.*

There could not be a sharper contrast. The American consensus is echoed by the *New Yorker,* which even if it does not wholly approve of the society that exists, speaks nevertheless with the spirit of those who "maintain themselves by the common routine, learn to avoid expectation." And the voice of intellect comes from Abraham Flexner, historian of American education.

To suppose that many American educators strongly disagree with the *New Yorker* would be an indulgence of optimism. What the magazine says can be found, spread more thinly, in *The Uses of the University,* a recent book by Clark Kerr, president of the University of California, the largest in the country. Mr. Kerr is a decent man, and one would rather serve under him than many another college president. But in his plea for the "multiversity" (which Flexner had years ago described as a mere "service station"), Mr. Kerr makes it clear that, whatever he may know about its uses, the *idea* of a university has faded from his mind, as it has faded from all too many academic minds. He speaks now as the agent of a prevailing drift:

> The university has become a prime instrument of national purpose . . . This is the essence of the transformation now engulfing our universities. Basic to this transformation is the growth of the "knowledge industry," which is coming to permeate government and business . . . What the railroads did for the second half of the 19th century and the automobile for the first half of this century, the knowledge industry may do for the second half of this century: that is, to serve as the focal point for national growth. And the university is at the center of the knowledge process.

There is the voice of dominant America: knowledge as industry. And its style too: "the knowledge process." How old-fashioned, by contrast, is the opinion of Cardinal Newman that "knowledge is capable of

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being its own end," and how characteristically utopian of Lewis Mumford to write:

> As the cloister of the monastery might be termed a passive university, so the university might be called an active cloister: [its function is] the critical reappraisal and renewal of the cultural heritage.

II

A few decades ago it all seemed very different. Not many writers, certainly not many liberal or leftist writers, would have presented the problem of education through the contrast I have made here. We were unhappy over the refusal of most American professors to become passionately involved with the trials of American life; we mocked the sterility, the illusion of protective distance, that characterized the work and thought of many academics.

And we had our reasons. The failure of many German professors to resist Hitlerism had left a taste of bitterness. Mencken's academic-baiting, often vulgar yet now and again justified, remained a strong memory. In the distraught society of the thirties and forties, it seemed unworthy of a thinking man to content himself with the pose of academic detachment. And for some years now the progressive educators had been teaching us that school and society were interdependent; that the young should learn, in part, through an immersion in common experience; that the scholar who cares about the life of the mind must also take responsibility for the democratic renovation of society. I remember the pleasure with which I came upon a study of school and society by George S. Counts, a disciple of John Dewey: here, it seemed, was an educator who spoke to the urgencies of our time. Reading him once again, I think he still does:

> . . . the purpose of public education in the present epoch of American history . . . is to prepare the younger generation for labor and sacrifice in building a democratic civilization and culture on the foundations of a collective economy. This means in very considerable measure the abandonment of ideals that have dominated the schools for generations . . . Education is still regarded primarily as a road to special privilege and personal aggrandizement . . .
>
> The aim of public education now should be, not to elevate A above B or to lift gifted individuals out of the class into which they were born . . . but rather to abolish all artificial social distinctions and to organize the energies of the nation for improving the condition of all. (*The Social Foundations of Education,* 1934).

A little naive? Professor Counts had not yet been taught by the *New Yorker* that "schools reflect a culture; they do not transform it." A bit one-sided? Professor Counts was not yet worried—at that time no one was—about the "knowledge industry" and its capacity for mangling human thought.

But if we take such writings to be insufficient, it would be sheer

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impudence to claim that they no longer matter. Inertia is fundamental to social and intellectual life: the majority of professors in the sixties, though somewhat better-paid, are not very different in outlook from what they were in the thirties. Parochialism, timidity, snobbishness, indifference to human suffering, a feeble-spirited "professionalism," thin-blooded gentility—these persist in the academic world, and you need only wander away from the handful of universities that are true centers of learning in order to find all the symptoms that once led intellectuals to use "academic" as a term of derision. Sluggishness of mind and spirit remain: and if for no other reason, the prescriptive writings of men like Dewey and Counts are as vital today as they were thirty years ago.

Yet it would be disingenuous to deny that their call for social involvement, stirring as it may still be, seems far from adequate in the sixties. Today there are new troubles, new problems. When Dewey and Counts began to write, they were responding to America primarily as a class society; now we need, in addition, a sense of America as a mass society. Neither category, "class" or "mass," is wholly adequate for understanding the world in which we live; both must be used, alternatively and together, often in conflict and sometimes in contradiction.

III

Language is deceptive, and most of all when it points toward new phenomena that cannot yet be described with precision. The word "mass" is used in sharply different ways, so that it becomes quite possible to say, as I would, that one believes in "mass education" and is hostile to "mass culture," for in the first case "mass" serves as a more-or-less neutral descriptive while in the second it tends to be a term of deprecation.

By "mass education" we have in mind an historically new situation in which it is commonly assumed that all members of society have a right to receive as much education as they wish to or can absorb; we may also be pointing to what follows from this assumption, namely, the problems inherent in the effort to give a growing segment of the population at least some kind of college education. The term "mass culture," as usually employed, signifies not merely a description but also an implicit judgment of the mass-manufacture of synthetic pseudo-cultural products in journalism, books, television, movies, etc. This difference in usage is awkward, but it exists and must be acknowledged.

"Mass education" is here to stay, historically irreversible. Only a small number of reactionaries oppose it on principled grounds, though an alarming number of liberals, their liberalism increasingly diluted, begin to conclude that "mass education" must fatally corrupt educational standards. (There are also the harrumphing Old Humanists in the universities who wring their hands over the invasion of plebeian hordes; such people are mainly tiresome.)

Whether more American boys and girls will go to college each year is no longer a question. The question is, what will happen to them once they arrive. For "mass education" is one of the more significant dem-

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ocratic experiments of our time: an experiment barely begun, and under circumstances that work heavily against its realization. Our society has stumbled into the possibilities of "mass education"—perhaps more accurately, it has been forced to confront these possibilities because of military and technological pressures. But it has not yet appropriated a small fraction of the talent, energy and resources needed to make "mass education" a success. Whether *this* society can do that, is an open question; perhaps here, as in other areas of social life, we shall have to suffer the results of an uncompleted revolution.

Suppose, however, that the circumstances for introducing "mass education" were to be very favorable. Suppose the country were to throw itself heart-and-soul into the work of serious education. In the short run, this would lead to severe social difficulties: for work begun at the college or pre-college level could not take hold with sufficiency depth and urgency unless there were corresponding changes in the immediate environment. (It is all very well, for example, to propose special tutoring for Negro children in order to prepare them for academic advancement, but such measures cannot remove the handicaps of these children as long as they live in rat-infested Harlem tenements, their fathers work at substandard wages, and the fumes of discrimination poison their very being.)

Still: let us agree to imagine favorable circumstances for "mass education." Even then we would soon have to confront new kinds of difficulties, perhaps resisting immediate solution. For we would be trying to cope with the heritage of centuries of neglect, we would have to break through those thick deposits of inertia and resistance which have settled onto the consciousness of millions of people. Even to begin to do this would be highly meaningful work, for we would be facing authentic problems, not the pseudo-problems thrown up by weaponry and advertising. We would be trying to fulfill the democratic revolution of the past 150 years, which for the first time in history stirred the masses into the possibility of consciousness.

The difficulties, I repeat, would be staggering. Consider, for example, the recent expansion of our colleges and the consequent appointment as professors of men who lack the necessary training and more important, the spirit of austerity and devotion which, at least occasionally, ought to characterize the scholar and the intellectual. I do not wish to be misunderstood: I would quite agree that thousands of college teachers are decent human beings trying to do a decent job. But perhaps that is just the trouble. Fifty or sixty years ago, when the American university had a relatively well-defined role as the cultural training-ground for the country's upper strata, a decently mediocre professor was not likely to do much damage. As a carrier of the received culture, he might even do some good. Today, in an atmosphere of fevered expansion, lucrative busy-work and harsh uncertainty as to what a university should be, the decently mediocre professor tends all too often to be a disaster. In the past, tradition could carry him; now he must float, or sink, on his own. He is a disaster because he cannot cope with the staggering task of convincing thousands of ill-prepared and poorly

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motivated students that, quite apart from utilitarian or national ends, there is a value to the life of the mind. And he cannot persuade his students that there is such a value because, more often than not, he does not know what the life of the mind is.

Inevitably, then, "mass education" brings with it severe and unprecedented problems. But the truth is that the turn to "mass education" has not occurred under favorable circumstances, has not been planned or thought through, and is frequently the result of drift, panic and national egotism. Coming in a society characterized by misshapen values and economic injustice, racial prejudice and political evasiveness, "mass education" is contaminated from the very moment of its birth. To make high claims for the life of the mind in a world devoted to accumulating money and bombs is either to indulge in a pious hypocrisy or to indicate to one's students that if they are to become serious intellectuals they must be ready to accept a measure of estrangement, perhaps even deprivation.

But more. Just as the tragedy of the Negro freedom movement is that it reaches its climax at the moment automation is undercutting the Negroes' economic possibilities, so the tragedy of "mass education" is that it appears at the very moment "mass culture" is seeping into the American universities. Ideally, the university ought to be a bastion of resistance against "mass culture." Some universities are. The dominant trend, however, is toward allowing the university to become, among other things, a depository of "mass culture"—and less through deliberate intent than mild slothfulness. For if a certain lowering of standards *is* unavoidable when the number of students entering college is sharply increased, this is not nearly so great a threat to our intellectual health as is the lax acceptance by all too many administrations and faculties of the happy spirit of American hucksterdom.

That I am describing a reality I shall not stop to document: the readers of this magazine may be supposed to know something about such matters. I would only say, and without aspiration toward paradox, that a crucial piece of evidence is that many American professors show but the faintest awareness that "mass culture" represents a deep and insidious threat to the life they have chosen to live. All too many of them would fear that an intransigeant opposition to "mass culture" marks them as "undemocratic," or snobbishly "intellectual."

The university, wrote Cardinal Newman, is "the high protecting power of all knowledge . . . it maps out the territory of the intellect, and sees that . . . there is *neither encroachment nor surrender on any side.*" (emphasis added). Yet it is in the very nature of "mass culture" that it cheerfully and insidiously encroach upon the territory of intellect. The vocabulary of academic statesmanship—the university should be "pluralist" in outlook, "moderate" in tone, "responsible" to the community, "alert" to the national interest—helps to blend the university into the surrounding social landscape and thereby to rob it of its reason for existence. Fortunately there are also strong counter-pressures, but insofar as this drift prevails the university becomes a place of

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mediocre efficiency, a busy middle-man of culture, a training-school for the professions, a center of usable research: indeed, almost anything but the *active cloister* of which Mumford speaks. For how can you expect people to defend the territory of intellect when they see no threat from beyond its borders?

IV

Enter now the intellectuals, perhaps through the back door.

A growing number of intellectuals has found shelter in the universities. Whether this is good or bad for them, the universities and society, I shall not here discuss. What matters is that more and more intellectuals spend their lives as professors and in the coming decades will surely continue to do so. Apart from a reasonably conscientious performance of duties, what are they to do with themselves in the universities?

Primarily, they are to remain what they were. Camus has described the intellectual as "someone whose mind watches itself." The value such a person has for the university depends largely on his insistence that he remain the ill-adjusted creature he previously was—quite as the value the university has for society depends upon the degree to which it resists a cozy adjustment to the prevalent norms. At evident cost and probable gain, the intellectual must continue to "watch his mind" even as his students watch it with him. And this is hard, for somehow the intellectual must maintain his spontaneity of work while in part allowing it to become a visible public act.

Intellectuals begin to cluster in the universities at the very time that students experience a profound sense of doubt as to the relevance of intellectual concerns. Every agency of our society keeps hammering at the students to tell them what in fact they already know: that there is practical advantage in getting a college education. But the more our students become convinced of the utility of a college education, the more problematic does the value of its intellectual content seem to them.

Why this should be so is an enormously complex problem, and here I shall confine myself to a single speculation:

The society we live in, especially to the extent that it really conforms to the model of a "mass society," tacitly persuades its young that the past no longer matters. It has always been true, but is now far more true than ever, that for Americans the past is not very real, the past is caught up with the blood and ideology of Europe in a way that they feel they no longer need be. Yet the past, as it happens, is that which we know, the substance of knowledge, the matter upon which the life of the mind subsists.

Now it is possible that these new assumptions about the past will prove to be correct and the United States will become a country that can indeed discard the pain and tragedy, the sheer historical accumulation, of the past. If so, people like ourselves, I who write and you who read, will become obsolete. But until that happens, we must struggle with all our wit and might against these assumptions about the past.

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I lecture to a class at Stanford, a class of bright-cheeked, good-hearted innocents: "Tell me now, apart from grades, politeness and caution: do the questions raised by Ivan Karamazov in his talks with Alyosha seem to you deeply, burningly relevant to the life you expect to lead when you get back to your offices and suburbs in California?" Not many can honestly say Yes. The dull students say No with ease; the bright ones No with disturbance. "But then," I continue, "it means that the past exists for you as something confined to the classroom, an exercise (at best) in piety. I, your odd professor from the east, nevertheless have the impudence to say: I will try to persuade, bludgeon, excite and coax you into believing that Ivan Karamazov's words are burningly important to your life. That is an assumption, you reply, which threatens the whole way of life you have chosen for yourselves . . . My dears, you are right."

The central task of the intellectual in the American university is to validate the past, to insist upon its organic relationship with the present, to deny that America is exempt from history.

A piece of arrogance? Are not the universities full of scholars who live in the past and know far more about it than most intellectuals? Yes; but the struggle for the *idea* of the past can be conducted with some hope of success only by those intimately related to the crises of the present: which by definition, so to say, the intellectual is and the scholar, insofar as he remains simply a scholar, is not. For the scholar there can be no question as to the reality of the past, since that is the substance of his being and it is good that it should be. But unless (to have, improbably, the best of all possible worlds) the scholar is also an intellectual, he does not often or sufficiently grasp why in our day there should be so much difficulty in validating the reality of the past. So, without meaning either praise or disrespect to either party, I would assert that while scholarship remains the property and honor of the scholars, it is the intellectual who is particularly obligated and in the best position to teach the young the beauty of scholarship. The teacher unaware at every moment (he need not talk about it at every moment) of those forces of anti-historical dispersion and anti-intellectual technicism besetting the minds of his students, is a teacher who has lost the battle of the classroom before it has begun.*

In American society, which has lost a good part of whatever historical sense it had, the intellectual must take upon himself a conserving task. It is an unfamiliar role for the intellectual who has usually been a liberal or radical concerned primarily with the idea of the future. Well, perhaps it is a paradox; but being a radical in politics enforces a certain conservatism in regard to education. And this conservatism is now necessary not merely for the reasons I have already suggested, but be-

* An editor of DISSENT, reading this article, makes the observation that it is not only the sense of history which can serve to challenge the constricting "present-ness" of American students: it may also be a timeless philosophical system or set of problems. True; except that with the kind of students we are here discussing such an interest is likely to manifest itself in historical terms.

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cause in our rigidly "moderate" society the idea of the future to which we radicals are pledged cannot survive unless there also survives a living sense of the past. I quote a passage from H. Stuart Hughes discussing the work of Karl Mannheim:

> It is impossible to read today Mannheim's strictures on the "barrenness" of a society "absorbed by its interest in concrete and isolated details" . . . without applying them to the present situation in the United States. For his own generation, Mannheim implied, so "prosaic" an attitude was impossible. "It would require," he wrote, "either a callousness which our generation could probably no longer acquire or the unsuspecting naivete of a generation newly born into the world to be able to live in absolute congruence with the realities of that world, utterly without any transcendent element."

That "transcendent element," one of the great privileges and conquests of the life of the mind, can in our day survive only through a living sense of the past.

V

Such elevated sentiments, such noble rhetoric! Hadn't we better return to reality, the reality of the classroom and a girl named Clotilda Adams?

Clotilda Adams was a student a few years ago at Wayne State University, the city college in Detroit, when the writer Herbert Gold taught a course there in the Humanities ("The History of Everything in Culture.") He found it something of a trauma: "The encounter with classroom reality has caused many teachers, like Abelard meeting the relatives of Eloise, to lose their bearings." As Gold tried to introduce a few notions about the moral problems that have plagued humanity since Socrates—Humanities 610 was not, you might say, an *intensive* course —Clotilda Adams sat there, impervious and recalcitrant, the classics bouncing off her mind like rubber balls off a fence. "The Humanities," wrote Clotilda in her final exam, "are a necessary additive to any teacher's development worth her 'salt' in the perilous times of today. The West and the 'Free World' must stand up to the war of ideas against the 'Iron Curtain.'" This was in answer to a question about Beethoven, Goethe and German romanticism. Clotilda did not pass the course but, adds Gold, she was "admitted on probation to the student-teacher program because of the teacher shortage and the great need to educate our children in these perilous times."

A sobering, a disheartening reality. Still, I believe that if Abelard really loves Eloise he will marry her, relatives or no relatives.

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Robert Paul Wolff

THE COLLEGE AS RAT-RACE: ADMISSIONS AND ANXIETIES

In 1950, 2,214,000 students were enrolled in American colleges and universities. By 1960 the total had grown to 3,570,000 and in the last academic year it was 4,207,000. Projections for 1970 range as high as seven million. This increase is not merely a consequence of the growth of the American population. Of 1,000 boys and girls in the 5th grade in 1942, only 205 entered college in 1950. But of 1,000 fifth graders in 1954, 336 entered college in 1962. By the time the present grade school children have reached college age, the proportion may exceed one-half.

The consequent rise in college applications has of course been distributed unevenly among America's colleges. Although there are still many accredited institutions which begin the year with room in their freshman classes, the élite schools—the Ivy League, the seven sisters, the best state universities—are faced with many times the number of students they can accommodate. The result has been a fundamental reorientation in the attitude of colleges toward the selection of students. Instead of setting admissions *requirements,* they have to develop an admissions *policy* by which to choose from among the excess of well-qualified applicants.

The applicants fall readily into three groups: the clear admits, the clear rejects, and (characteristically) a large middle group of possible admits. In this third segment are to be found the students with strengths and weaknesses which must be weighed against one another and translated into a one-dimensional scale of preference. Should the college admit a boy with strong but not spectacular grades and little evidence of independence, or the boy (from a different kind of school and background) whose relatively weaker but not disastrous grades are balanced by signs of creativity and ambition? Should the admissions committee deliberately strive for a heterogeneous freshman class, or judge each case purely on its merits without reference to the character of the other applicants already admitted?

The situation is aggravated by a number of interactions between the colleges and the high schools. Students, aware of the increasing difficulty of obtaining admission to their chosen schools, begin to make multiple applications in order to protect themselves. The result is an

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inflation of applications to the best colleges, forcing them to estimate the percentage of admitees who will actually show up in September.

Simultaneously, the "college advisers" in high schools and preparatory schools, alerted to the problems in the colleges, begin to discourage students from applying to schools to which they have little chance of being admitted. This entirely laudatory move merely worsens the problems for the colleges, for it reduces the number of "clear rejects" in the file of applications, leaving a still more unwieldy group of "possible admits" from which to select a freshman class. The colleges also experience considerable anguish at the thought of gifted students being discouraged by uninformed college advisors.

Meanwhile, the colleges have been making their task still more difficult by their attempts to adopt objective, non-parochial criteria of admission. It is true that athletic ability, the right prep school tie, or an alumnus father will improve a student's chance to get into many schools. But as applications mount and colleges strive to improve their student bodies, these factors play a decreasing role in admission decisions. By and large, the men who run the admissions offices of the top schools are dedicated to the principles of fairness and equality of opportunity which serve Americans generally as ideal standards. Their quite admirable dedication merely intensifies the problem of selecting an entering class from the mass of applicants.

Aptitude Testing

At this point, a different and originally separate factor in American education comes into play: the increasing use of aptitude and achievement testing. The Educational Testing Service first administered the Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT, in 1926, almost forty years ago. In that year, only 8,040 students took the examination. In 1961–62, this figure had increased one hundred-fold to 819,339. Virtually every applicant to a good college or university now takes the SAT, and large numbers take achievement tests in particular subjects as well.

The SAT is an objective examination of the multiple choice type. The faults of such tests are too well-known to require rehashing. What is less well appreciated by laymen (although this is clearly understood by admissions officers) is that strictly speaking, the Educational Testing Service does not even *claim* to be measuring intellectual capacities such as intelligence, creativity, receptivity to new ideas, or the ability to see conceptual relationships. It only claims to measure the probability that a student will do well in college. It is, one might say, an extrinsic, or black box, prediction. Students who do well on the test tend to do well in college. This may be because the test measures capacities which are later drawn upon by college work. Or it may be because the test measures exam-taking ability, which also serves the student in college. In any event, it is a statistical fact that the probability of a good college record is higher for the student with a high SAT score.

The test is far from accurate, however, even in terms of its own

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criteria. According to the 1961–62 annual reports of ETS, the divergence of any given score from the "true" score (i.e., an average over a long period of time of a student's scores on similar tests) is on the order of 30 points two-thirds of the time. That is to say, "if a student's 'true' score is 500, the chances are two out of three that the score he will actually make on the SAT will be between 470 and 530." Out of every six students, one will probably score more than 30 points above his "true" score, and another probably more than 30 points below.

If multiple-choice tests are suspect in themselves, and if their accuracy as predictions of college success is far from adequate, why are they used so extensively by admissions officers? There appear to be three reasons:

First, and by far the most important, is the admissions officer's need for some way of comparing the cases in his burgeoning file of "possible admits." Fairness and the bureaucratic strictures of committee work require him to produce reasons for favoring one candidate over another. When the dossiers are mixed bags of strengths and weaknesses, it is in practice impossible to defend one's ordering of five hundred or a thousand cases without reference to some sort of objective criteria. The SAT serves as just such a measure.

Closely related to this is the desire of admissions officers to reduce the percentage of admits who flunk out later on. The SAT claims to predict college success: deans are haunted by the possibility that a good and potentially successful student will be turned down in favor of one who eventually fails to complete the college course. Since deans (and professors) by and large conceive of success in education as a matter of grades, credits, and degrees, such a case appears to them to be an educational failure. A low percentage of drop-outs is considered a sign of a good admissions program.

Finally, as the average SAT scores of incoming freshmen classes rise at the élite schools, ambitious colleges begin to treat the scores as a sign and measure of their own place in the educational system. A rise of 50 points in the freshman average is used by recruiters as an additional inducement for prospective students and their parents. What began as a means of handling a swollen tide of applications becomes in the end a measure of educational status.

Here, as with the pressure of admissions itself, there is feed-back to the secondary school level. Parents quickly become informed (and misinformed) about the importance of "college boards." Pressure is put on high schools to coach the college-bound seniors in the mysteries of multiple-choice tests. Despite ETS's insistence that careful research reveals the futility of such preparations, classes sprout in SAT-taking. Soon, high school *juniors* are submitting to "Preliminary SATs" whose purely tentative results are then used to guide the students in their college choices. As figures pile up, tables are constructed showing the statistical relationship between junior and senior SATs. (ETS report, 1961–62, p. 34–35.) Indeed, ETS tells us that it is "possible to make similar estimates

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of senior-year SAT scores from the scores on the School and College Ability Test (SCAT) taken even earlier. There are tables which provide these estimates based on SCAT scores as far back as the eighth grade." (ETS report, 1961–62, p. 35.)

Damaging Pressures

The ever-earlier testing is merely the most striking element in the frenzied business of college preparations. Students are exhorted by parents and teachers to raise their grades. The colleges, which have never based their decisions solely on academic achievement, begin to emphasize "extra-curricular activities," and as the news filters back to the high schools, teen-agers are hastily enrolled in dance classes, music lessons, outing clubs, and intra-mural sports. The colleges counter with a search for signs of individuality and originality; desperately teen-agers are pushed into bee-keeping and piccolo playing. And so it goes, on and on —colleges searching for ways to sort the applicants and predict their college careers, students desperately twisting themselves into what they hope will be appealing shapes, anxious to be singled out from the crowd of fellow students.

What has been the effect of the endless testing and evaluating on our high school boys and girls? First of all, the ever-present imperative to "do well" in an objective and measurable way is intensified, to the detriment of real education, or even of non-"educational" growth experiences. Americans have come to treat education as a process of homogeneous, crisis-free absorption of information and development of skills. The irregular, the irrational, the unconforming, the random, is seen as a *failure* of education. The only difference between the traditional and progressive attitudes is that the first blames these aberrations on the student while the second blames them on the school. That they are undesirable is never questioned.

But as so many perceptive observers of adolescents have pointed out, growth from childhood to maturity is *necessarily* ungainly. It is the trying on of ideals and life styles, the committing of new-found emotional energies. As Erik Erikson has shown us through his study of Luther, the "identity crisis" of late adolescence or early adulthood is positively *creative,* and certainly not an embarrassing misfortune to be excused and quickly suppressed.

Unfortunately, the college race has just this repressive effect on many of the most intelligent and sensitive—hence vulnerable—youngsters. Experiment and commitment require a willingness to accept the possibility of failure. They demand an incautious, even imprudent singleness of purpose. The wise counseling and anxious hectoring of the college-mongers is death to experiment.

In his junior year in high school, John, an A student, becomes fascinated by boats. He spends hours at the docks, quizzing sailors about their tasks, cadging rides on tugboats, dreaming of distant places. For a year he is completely wrapped up in the sea. Then, abruptly, the passion

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leaves him and he puts behind him as childish the dream of becoming a sailor. He has tentatively tried on a role, given himself up to it, and found that it does not answer to his needs. The year has been immensely valuable to him as a stage in his growing up. But it has been a disastrous year at school. Absorbed in sea charts and sailing manuals, he has had scant time for history, French, math, and physics. In his record there is no indication of the milestone which this year has marked in his life; only the low grades, dropping his cumulative average below the "top college" level. Discouraged by the unaccountable slump of a promising student, John's college advisor directs him to a solid local state college. The competition is so stiff for admission to the élite schools that there seems no point in his trying to overcome the handicap of that junior year.

John has been hurt by the system, for the education available to him at the top schools really is superior to that offered by the local college. But at least he has had his junior year, and he will be a better man for it. Far worse off are the other young men and women who have been cajoled or harassed away from creative adolescent commitments by their parents and teachers. In the name of a "good education" in the future, these well-meaning adults stifle the good education of the present. The energies which should be used by boys and girls for growth, are instead diverted to useless and deadening "college preparation."

Aware of the tragedies of secondary education, many colleges have begun to make room in their admissions policies for a controlled measure of irrationality. Each year, a school will accept a certain number of applicants who defy all their objective criteria, but simply "smell right." Admirable as such risk-taking is, it has no effect on the high school student, for he cannot be sure that he will be one of the mavericks who is saved by an intuitive dean. If the internal dynamic of his growth carries him outside the limits of secondary-school acceptability, he must be prepared to forfeit the race to college.

The successful college applicant has thus frequently mortgaged himself to the future, sacrificing a genuine education in high school in order to obtain a superior education in college. What does he find when he finally enrolls at the school of his choice? No simple description can be given, any more than for the high school, but again trends are visible which are deeply disturbing. Until a very few years ago, the entering freshman at any of a number of top colleges would have been confronted with a mixed program of broad survey courses designed to make him "liberally" or "generally" educated, more specialized courses from among which he could select a sample, and in his last year or two, a departmental "major" requiring him to concentrate on a single discipline. In addition, he would have the opportunity to do independent research, usually as a means to a degree with honors. The premises of this sort of undergraduate program were basically two: first, that the typical freshman had not yet had a chance to roam at will in the realm of ideas, acquainting himself with the excitements and potentialities of

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the intellectual life (I remember my astonishment when, as a freshman, I discovered that there was a field of knowledge—sociology—which I had not even known to *exist!* It was like discovering a new color, or better a whole new sense); and second, that several years should be given over to relatively uncontrolled experimentation before a young man or woman was required to make a decision about a career.

Race for Education

In the past decade, however, both of these premises have been yielding to pressures from below and from above. The General Education movement is under severe attack at Columbia, Chicago, and Harvard, the three schools which have done most to foster it. The causes are complex, involving problems of personnel and administration as well as of educational principle. One reason is that good high schools have instituted "advanced placement" college level courses using many of the same books which appear on the General Education reading lists. Consequently, more and more students have had the material by the time they reach college. Now just what it means to have "had" Dostoevsky or Freud or Marx is, of course, problematical. It may mean that the student has read works by the author, brooded over the ideas, and grown through his struggle to understand them. It may also mean that he has been intellectually immunized by being inoculated with small, weakened dosages of the author. At any rate, the well-prepared student can pick the right answer out of five choices an adequate number of times, and so he is assumed to be generally educated.

In response to the improved preparation of the freshman (which manifests itself in better language, math, and English composition training as well as in advanced placement courses), the colleges decide to "enrich" the undergraduate curriculum. The job is turned over to the departments, or—at universities—to the graduate faculties, whose general view of undergraduate education is that it is a watered-down version of graduate education. Everywhere the same solution is hit upon: give the bright, able, well-prepared undergraduates a first-rate training in some graduate department. Administratively, this amounts to listing graduate courses in the undergraduate catalogue and requiring the concentrator to take baby generals and write baby dissertations. At a school like Harvard, for example, a senior honors thesis in history may be a 150-page research monograph, and the honors generals in English demand a professional mastery of large segments of the literature of the last millenium.

At the same time, pressures of military service, post-graduate professional training, and the cancerous growth of specialized knowledge, place a premium on choosing a career early. The sciences have long insisted that they cannot give adequate graduate training to the college graduate who has not already tucked some of the requisite material into his mind, and medical schools of course set "pre-med" requirements. But now the same song is sung by economists (who fancy them-

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selves really mathematicians), psychologists, philosophers, and historians. As the undergraduate population swells, the admissions squeeze reappears at the best medical, law, and graduate schools. Once more, the education of the present—for which the student gave up so much in high school—is sacrificed to the demands of the future. Eager to relax and reap the fruits of his race to college, the student must climb onto the treadmill to graduate school.

But here the race for education ends. Upon entering graduate school, the student—now an adult—is told that his education lies *behind* him. From this point on, his intellectual and spiritual maturity is taken for granted. Graduate schools do not educate the whole man; they train the specialist. So it seems that somewhere, somehow, the successful student has lost an education. Always it was before him, over the next exam, beyond the next degree. Now suddenly it is behind him, and that unique moment of potentiality in the growth of the soul is gone.

What has gone wrong? The answer is simple: Each present was sacrificed to the future, until the presents were all past, and the future an empty present. It is a familiar enough story in our society. We call it prudence, or deferral of gratification, depending on our tastes in moral discourse.

Available Alternatives

What can be done? Alas, the answer is not so simple. It won't help to administer the system with more intelligence, awareness, compassion, and imagination. These qualities are already in surprising abundance among the educators of our country. The solution, if there is one, must cut to the root of the problem. It must reverse the order of priority, and at every stage subordinate the education of the future to that of the present. A good high school experience must count for more than admission to a great college. An exciting college education must in turn take precedence over pre-professional preparation for post-graduate training. How can this be done?

First of all, there is no point in demanding that college admission procedures be made *fairer.* The harm they inflict on high school students does not flow from their imperfections. It flows from their very existence. So long as the education in our colleges varies widely in quality, and admission to college is based on an evaluation of pre-college performance, parents and teachers will push students into a competition for admission. Nor should we issue pious warnings to high school students about the dangers of listening to their elders. They do not yet have the inner resources to withstand the threats and seductions of the adult world. Indeed, their spiritual growth demands identification with precisely those individuals who are encouraging them to compete. The adolescent student is faced with an impossible dilemma. If he accepts the values of his elders, he loses his chance for real growth and instead climbs on the treadmill. But if he shies away from the grade race, where else is he to find the adult figures through identification

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with whom he can realize himself? As Paul Goodman has pointed out, the only alternative is to retreat into a sterile, adolescent world of beats or gangs.

The solution to the problem, if it exists, must be institutional. The temptations of the admissions race must be destroyed. So far as I can see, there are two ways in which this might be done, neither of which will meet with instant acclaim. Either the value of admission to one college rather than another must be eliminated; or admission to college must be made an irrational process on which the student can have no influence. The first could be achieved by a nation-wide forced homogenization of institutions of higher learning, the second by assigning high school graduates to colleges at random. Both alternatives have analogues within the educational world.The academic high schools of a large city system like New York are kept approximately equal by budget allotments and the policy of teacher assignment. Most students then go to the school in their district. And many colleges assign their students to dormitories at random, for the very sound reason that competition for rooms would lead to discrimination, jealousy, cliques, and all the unpleasantness associated with fraternities or private clubs. My personal preference is for a process of random admission. It is by far the easier of the two to administer, and could be instituted immediately.

The objections are obvious. They will already have sprung to the mind of every person who reads this essay, particularly if he is a teacher at a good college. But before the proposal is rejected out of hand as absurd and impractical, let me urge one consideration in its favor. If I am right that our present educational system stifles the intellectual growth of millions of young men and women, then surely we should be willing to pay a very great price to set them free. It is absurd to build the schools, stock them and staff them, and then hustle our children through them in a frenzy of college-oriented competition. In education, imprudence is a virtue.

DISSENT is a journal devoted to the ideas and values of democratic socialism. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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Michael Walzer

PAUL GOODMAN'S COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS

> *"I love the University of Salamancha, for when the Spaniards were in doubt as to the lawfulness of conquering America, the University of Salamancha gave it as their opinion that it was not lawful." He spoke this with great emotion. . . .*
>
> —Boswell's *Life of Dr. Johnson*

Like Dr. Johnson, Paul Goodman loves the University of Salamancha. He admires the strong sense of corporate responsibility and independence among those old Dominicans who spoke with one voice against the most powerful government of their time. He guesses that their students must have rallied enthusiastically to their side, knowing, as modern students presumably do not, that they were studying with *men*. In his book *The Community of Scholars,* Goodman suggests the self-governing medieval corporation as an alternative to the modern university—also a corporation, but no longer a community and no longer self-governing.

Like every appeal by modern radicals to the example of the Middle Ages, this is a strange suggestion. Paul Goodman, anarchist, social critic, man of letters, psychologist, is himself a latter-day product of the breakdown of medieval corporatism and the shattering of that single truth which had made it possible for the scholars of Salamancha to speak with a single voice—and, indeed, impossible for them to speak in any other way. Goodman is a prime example of an admirable figure: the modern intellectual set loose from all corporate authorities, philosophical systems, and political controls. But he recognizes, along with many of his colleagues, that the price of this freedom has all too often been isolation and ineffectuality. Against these two conditions, and all the diseases of academic life which derive from them, he is in active rebellion.

Goodman seeks a community in which the intellectual might be integrated but still free, a lively, critical, slyly inventive participant in the day-to-day life of his society. There is, of course, nothing medieval about this vision. Goodman may admire the corporate courage of the medieval faculties, but he will have nothing to do with the restraints of corporatism; he does not go so far as to mention them. In his rapid-fire history there is not even a hint of the hardships of the "common

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life." Precisely for this reason, his use of history is worth examining: it suggests some of the intellectual limitations and practical dangers of the contemporary search for closely integrated communities.

Imagine a thirteenth century Paul Goodman beginning a dialogue with a heretic, questioning the value of a syllogism, trying to "unblock" a witch—and then wondering why the authorities solemnly condemn him to the stake. In a sense, he would be right to wonder: why indeed? Yet corporate integrity in the Middle Ages depended upon the repression of individual dissent. The Dominicans at Salamancha could never collectively have called the conquest of America unlawful if they had not first enforced among themselves a common opinion as to the nature of law. It is characteristic of Goodman to applaud such judgments, to ask angrily why contemporary faculties do not deliver themselves of similar pronouncements, and at the same time to ignore the historical conditions which made them impossible.

He treats all control as the work of outsiders; his book is a polemic against chancellors, deans, regents, trustees, presidents, captains of erudition and modern administrators. Left alone, he insists, the community of scholars would happily have tolerated such a man as himself. But this is not entirely true: there have always been powerful, internal drives toward unanimity and uniformity in academic societies—and, in fact, in all "face-to-face communities." It would be difficult to study medieval history for any length of time without sensing the often suffocating atmosphere of guilds, corporations and religious orders. And this atmosphere was the product of the very community structure which Goodman so much admires. If modern individualism has its price, so did medieval mutuality and corporatism. It may even be true, it is in any case not obviously untrue, that to refuse the price of the second—togetherness and repression—is to pay the price of the first—loneliness and ineffectuality. When individual scholars rebelled against the authority of the church and imagined some heretical opinion as a possible truth, they were laying the foundations of the contemporary university, where it is no longer possible to consult the faculty on matters of morals or law and where the professors privately become consultants. Freed from the corporate controls of great monastic orders, we are left also without their support. Whether we conform or dissent, we do so alone.

II

Yet we are still members of a university community. In one form or another the medieval institution survives, a city, as Goodman writes, walled from the world. Today those walls seem neither very high nor very strong. Life within them is not very different from life outside. The professors, if they like, move easily back and forth through the wide gates. The students are admirably prepared during the years of their residence not only for careers in business and government but also for home and family, daily television and book-of-the-month. The

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administrators of the contemporary corporation are men of the world, devoted to the openness of the university and to the weakness of its walls; they are agents of the integration of school and society. Thus the academic community does not oppress its members, but it provides only minimal insulation against the manifold and subtle pressures of the outside world.

For anyone dissatisfied with this situation, for anyone who feels—with Goodman—that the integration of the university into American life compromises the professors and frustrates and disappoints the students, two choices seem open. The first is to raise the walls higher—not in the name of a single truth or a universal faith, but perhaps in the name of a cultural tradition which is under attack and an ethic of independent truth-seeking threatened by the intrusion of "national needs" and "pragmatic" standards. The second choice is to create a world so admirable that no walls would be necessary, a world where closely-knit bands of intellectual brethren would interact freely and harmoniously with the citizens of society at large. The first alternative raises all sorts of difficulties, practical and moral—and chief among these the difficulty which Goodman so resolutely ignores: of maintaining freedom and encouraging disagreement and conflict within the walled city. The second, at this moment in our history, does little more than provide the basis for a wide-eyed wonderment at the failures and atrocities of academic life. It raises no real difficulties, because it repudiates the very idea that difficulties might exist.

With some hesitation, I want to describe Goodman as an advocate of the second alternative. He is by no means a consistent advocate. In fact, he argues persuasively the value of social and intellectual conflict both within the community of scholars and between the community and the world. Once again, however, the use he makes of history suggests his general point of view: just as he ignores the restraints of medieval corporatism, so he fails entirely to describe the historical consequences of conflict. Writing as an anarchist, he seems to view social struggle as a kind of disagreement among friends, who quarrel fiercely, then embrace, and soon enough are at it again. There are so many wonderful issues about which to argue! But it has not been so. The experience of conflict has, instead, generated those very adminstrative structures which Goodman deplores. In Paris, writes the medieval historian Rashdale (quoted by Goodman on page 32 and his major source throughout), "It was the necessity of mutual support and united opposition to the Chancellor (of the Cathedral) which called into existence the university organization."

As in any other community at war, the struggles of the scholars for freedom and *room* in the medieval world led to organization and centralization. And since war is not a permanent condition, they led also to negotiations between the new university leaders and the secular and religious authorities. If the war went badly, these leaders were often replaced by appointees, whose function it was to see that the struggle

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was not renewed. More often, when the authorities were distant or weak or divided, the result was some sort of compromise in which an area of academic autonomy was marked out and institutions devised to protect it. (Paris won its autonomy, in part, by playing off distant popes against local bishops, though Goodman treats this, in his usual fashion, as a simple struggle of scholars against outsiders.) But those autonomous institutions, intended to defend the community as a whole, were often repressive and stifling for individuals *within* the community—who might win freedom for themselves only by reversing the original process and appealing to outside authorities against the intolerance and bigotry of their colleagues. Thus Oxford and Cambridge, become suffocating enclaves of narrow-minded dons, were reformed by Royal Commissions in the nineteenth century. As in international affairs, intervention sometimes overthrows free institutions and sometimes preserves or restores them.

Organization, leadership, domestic disagreements, intervention: these are the forms conflict takes. Goodman dislikes the whole business. He is really an advocate of absolute non-intervention, academic *laissez faire*. He believes that the universities ought to become centers of heresy and criticism (harboring men like himself) and that they ought to exist in some sort of easy harmony with the world outside. But societies do not usually give medals to their critics. There is, in fact, nothing surprising about the heavy-handed attempts of men satisfied with the status quo to make the university a basis of stability rather than a source of change. When Goodman writes with high indignation about the repression of academic radicals, he is forgetting that had there been no danger of repression, there would have been less need for radicalism. Or, to put the matter differently: radicals are repressed when they are dangerous and it seems to me very foolish to long to be dangerous without accepting the risks of repression—and then the need for struggle, organization, leadership, and so on.

But this is what Goodman does. For all his talk about teaching and learning "for keeps," about courage and risk-taking, he yearns for a society in which courage will hardly be a necessary attribute of teachers or critics: there will be nothing to fear. Teaching will be "for keeps" only in the sense of being sincere and intimate. The university will be a genuine community, "anarchically self-regulating." And government, church and business will keep their hands off. They had certainly better keep their hands off, for in the event of attack such a university will hardly be capable of protecting its members or of carrying on a sustained conflict with organized society. I suspect that anarchy would not survive long in the academic city alone.

III

It is always difficult to know whether Goodman is writing practical proposals or utopian essays. I would quarrel with his vision of harmony and anarchy even if it were a pure utopia, but it seems to me especially dangerous when it becomes a view of the real world, a basis

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for concrete reforms. Goodman's practical proposals, in this and other books, seem to assume that a better world already exists; it need not be *created* but only *evoked.* It requires men who can see it, not men who can make it. Something like this seems to underlie his strange conception of the academic curriculum. Problems of curriculum are the usual topics of books on education, he writes, "But I do not think they are important. Curriculum is always given; it is the sciences, mores and institutions of our civilization. In every part of it, it is possible to find spirit, for it was created by spirit—how else is anything created?" So there already exists, in the most basic sense, a harmony of school and society: society is the subject matter of the school; it is *there,* within the walls, to be lovingly appreciated and criticized. Now in a trivial sense, this is true. But it avoids all the problems of selection and choice—the crucial problems of intellectual life.

Those sentences of Goodman's remind me of a story by J. D. Salinger in which a cloying and precious description of a college classroom is concluded on a typically pious note: "Seymour once said that all we do our whole lives is go from one little piece of Holy Ground to the next. Is he *never* wrong?" Seymour is wrong: there is plenty of ground that is not holy; and Goodman is wrong: there are sciences, mores and institutions which have in them painfully little "spirit." Curriculum is not given but created; it is created in the course of lonely scholarship, communal argument and debate, and faculty intrigue and competition. The most important politics in the university is the politics of curriculum and the most important freedom that a scholar can win is the freedom to flout, say, the pragmatic mores of his own civilization and ignore the existing institutions and their "needs." This is especially difficult today when the demands of the outside world are so specific, so complex and directed with such force at the educational corporations. In the Middle Ages, the demands were both more general and less forceful; indeed, the universities—and the cities in which they grew—were cut off in large measure from the feudal world which made no demands at all since it did not require educated men. It is probably true that the more people we undertake to educate, the more society and government will attempt to dictate the precise character of the education. There will be spirit, doubtless, in whatever it requires, just as there is water in all physical objects; but we don't squeeze water from stones and we must avoid if we can the deadening business of extracting spirit from modern technology and mass culture.

C. Wright Mills once wrote that the purpose of a liberal education in a mass society is "to keep us from being overwhelmed." He suggested an image of the university as a kind of bastion (rather than a community) and while this image is by no means adequate, I want to pursue it briefly. One way to keep scholars and students from being overwhelmed, as I have already suggested, is to raise higher the university's walls and to struggle within those walls to define more strictly the content of teaching and learning. That struggle, of course, never ends: no

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sooner are definitions arrived at, than individual students or young teachers feel themselves compelled to rebel against them and suggest alternatives. They speak, to some extent, for the ever-changing purposes of modern society—but within the context of the university these purposes are not *given*; they are argued, challenged, transformed. All this is what I mean by the politics of curriculum and it is, or rather it ought to be, the core of academic self-government. This self-government is what the bastion protects. It is the process of intellectual argument and growth which involves continual experimentation with new courses and teaching methods as well as with new ideas and hypotheses, new arts and sciences.

On the periphery of this core of curriculum politics, the professional administrator finds his place. He takes care of the day-to-day business of the university; he defends the walls of the city; he represents to the faculty the demands of church and state; he mediates between the resistance of the scholars and the pressures of the authorities. He is, of course, a lover of peace and order, an advocate of received ideas, an attorney of sorts for an established corporation, and almost always more worried by faculty experimentation than by outside pressure. But he can be dispensed with only if we assume the possibility of some such harmony as Goodman describes. Then indeed caretakers, representatives and mediators would be unnecessary; the whole complex structure of the academic bastion might be dispensed with. But if universities must always generate conflict, then we need the administrator. He is a middleman of social and intellectual struggle.

Too often, however, the middleman seizes control of the academic bastion and turns it into a department store or a social-service station. Describing such administrative takeovers, Goodman is at his best: rightly outraged by their destructive effects upon the always problematic business of teaching and learning. Yet it must be said, in defense of administrators, that all they ever do is to enforce that "givenness" of mores and institutions which Goodman himself acknowledges. To oppose them, one must question that givenness and develop an alternative conception of curriculum. The problem with administrators is not administrative (nor is it, as Goodman suggests, "constitutional"); it is intellectual and political, first of all a problem of cultural definitions and then of cultural conflict.

These problems would not be solved if the scholars were to take Goodman's advice and secede from the captured communities, walk out through the gates with their students and wander about the world. This may at times be necessary for individuals or groups, but it is not automatically a good thing; there is no guarantee that new cultural definitions will be produced in this way rather than in some other; nor that any significant challenge will thus be posed to the mores and institutions of the outside world. Historically, secessions such as Goodman describes have occasionally occurred, but they have led not to peripatetic universities of radical intellectuals, but to new institutions with all the old

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difficulties. In the high Middle Ages there were many cities ready to welcome the wanderers and enter into the same relation of tension and conflict with them that they had once enjoyed elsewhere. Today, Goodman's advice is rather like that of John Locke when he wrote that if individual men found the social contract unappealing, they could always go off to the American wilderness.

Since the academic middlemen do not bring with them the Inquisition—the reason for many a medieval exodus—and since they run a very loose organization, and since there is nowhere to go, most of the professors stay. Some of them become academic specialists, dear to an administrator's heart, serving the social needs and reproducing in their own persons that narrowness and dogmatism which in other ages have characterized whole groups of men. Other scholars pursue their lonely studies and forget the academic city. Those studies, it should be said, are not without their effects in the world, though Goodman here is concerned rather exclusively with another, more dramatic sort of effectuality. And finally, some of the professors stay to fight a hundred small and bitter battles in the name of an ideal curriculum and a liberal education. They search for allies among the students, aim always at spreading and escalating academic controversies and, simultaneously, at rebuilding the walls of the city and wresting control from the administrators. They fail, more often than not; but then, let us remember, those old Dominicans did not succeed in stopping the conquest of America. In their fashion, they defended the law and the culture. In another and perhaps more difficult fashion, both are still being defended.

Paul Goodman replies

I don't want to answer Mike Walzer in any detail, since much of what he says by way of criticism I also strongly affirm in my book—he is not a close reader. Perhaps I write too much in the old style, of meaning what I say pretty exactly, including the little concessive clauses, and people aren't used to this any more.

There seems to be one simple misunderstanding that I can mention for purposes of dialogue. Mike assumes that there is normally such a thing as an isolated individual who can make free choices. The evidence is, I think, that people are communal by nature (they naturally speak, imitate, communicate, identify, compete, etc.); when they are stripped to their individuality, they are in a pathological situation and must fight hard to keep the pathology from being internalized as charismatic or mass-identification. One way is to assert community and cry out to friends for help, as I do. At best, however, we are anxious and vulnerable.

In a community where each one, in his spontaneity and by his ani-

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mal presence, is a force in the actual decisions, the dilemmas of "individual freedom" and "corporate decision" do not exist in the way we are used to. Mike talks as though he had never belonged to a good club or sat at a good staff meeting.

Conversely, guild or congregational power seems to me to provide the best and safest relation to the ghostly unifying principles—ideals, the city, Natural Law, God, etc.—that make possible the whole fabric of society. I am no lover of the medieval superstitions; we have our own scientific and democratic superstitions that I inevitably and gladly share. But I would suggest that the medieval juridical relations—of ghostly universal consensus freely (and casuistically) applied by face-to-face corporations that have independent power—make a tolerable social life. (All that society can ever provide is the tolerable; it cannot give inspiration or happiness, which come by special grace.) As a community anarchist, genre of Kropotkin, I often express this view by saying that I strongly affirm the Common Law and that every malefactor should be brought to hear it, but I strongly oppose the existence of policemen or jails.

As the case is in 1963, however, I am astounded when Mike speaks of society's "subtle pressures" on the schools. Subtle! 15 billions of government money last year for Research and Development (75 per cent channeled through the corporations, two billions directly through the universities), plus three or four billions by the corporations themselves, plus the NDEA money for dormitories and special equipment, and the student loans, etc., etc. It is impossible to look frankly at the present educational system, from top to bottom, and not say that we are making a monolith to process apprentices, at the public expense and parents' expense for college tuition, for a *very few* corporations, the armed forces, and the educational establishment itself. Those who are weeded out, or drop out, are coped with as "dynamite" or "unemployable."

In these circumstances, *are* the administrators "caretakers?" as Mike says. The single point of my book was that by "scientific coordinative management" they have taken over and have *become* the university communities. And by keeping the teachers and students out of contact, they coordinate them too.

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Douglas F. Dowd

ON VEBLEN, MILLS... AND THE DECLINE OF CRITICISM

If these are, as ever, times that try men's souls, most academics will soon see to it that the trial is carried on at a safe distance from the American campus. And the consequences will be most damaging in the area where it is least seemly and most advanced: in the social sciences.

The institutionalization of aloofness will not be halted unless it is understood, and unless strong alternatives are offered. That is a large task; it may already be a hopeless one. But the task is worth attempting, not just because the academy contains remnants of a worthier tradition, but because many students are almost desperate in their eagerness to explore the nature, and mitigate the intensity, of today's troubles. Students cannot do that alone; soon they will not be able to do it at all. Soon, one's degree in the social sciences will depend upon what Veblen would have called a "trained incapacity" to distinguish between the vital and the trivial. It will be a degree combining misunderstanding of theory with misuse of mathematics, one leached of any social commitment.

I mention Veblen deliberately. His personal history, his outlook and work, his virtues and defects, the place he occupies in American social science—are all pertinent to an explanation of the current malaise of social science; not least because today's is in many ways an aggravation of sickness evident to Veblen in his day. But the already aggressive social scientism is further emboldened by matters barely or not at all present for Veblen. For the consequences of these more recent "matters" one must turn to the career of C. Wright Mills.

Veblen and Mills were different in many ways. Mills was gregarious, Veblen a virtual anchorite; Mills was outspoken and political, Veblen oblique and (he presumed) above political controversy; Mills was aggressive in life and muscular in print, Veblen retiring and, as a writer, involute. Aside from the linguistics involved, Mills would not have worked through *The Laxdaela Saga;* Veblen could not have written a *Listen, Yankee.*

NOTE: This essay is a revised version of one written for the volume *The New Sociology: Essays on Social Theory and Social Values in Honor of C. Wright Mills,* edited by Irving L. Horowitz and to be published this spring by Oxford University Press.

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Yet Veblen and Mills seem also much alike, especially if we view their careers from the standpoint of contemporary developments. The battle between humanism and scientism in the social sciences was one they fought throughout their lives, as teachers and writers. Style and special training apart, Veblen could have written *The New Men of Power, White Collar,* or *The Power Elite;* Mills could have written *Absentee Ownership, The Nature of Peace,* or *The Higher Learning.* And what Veblen attempted in economics, especially in *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,* Mills attempted in sociology in *The Sociological Imagination.*

Veblen and Mills would have designed the good society differently, but both wrote with the good society in mind. Both were motivated by what they saw as the widening gulf between ends and means. They were repelled by much the same processes and relationships. They asked similar questions which, wherever they began, allowed no resting place; and which led both men finally to question the institutional foundations of modern society.

If Veblen and Mills were much alike in the breadth of their focus, it must be added that they were also much alike in the nature of, and the reasons for, their failures—both as social scientists and as human beings. Their failure was glorious, when measured against what usually passes for academic success; nor can either the glory or the failure be separated from their radical stance.

Veblen and Mills were radicals in the analytical, if not in the programmatic sense. Both were committed to democracy and individual liberty, to peace, and to material well-being, for all and without qualification. That commitment may be taken as a net large enough to catch all but a few social scientists these days—not to mention politicians, businessmen, and even generals. This, the liberal rhetoric, is now the air we breathe; but as that rhetoric is usually meant, like the air we breathe, it is polluted. The pollution consists of conscious or unconscious reservations sticking at class, or nation, or color, or religion, or—something. They are what Veblen would have called "invidious" reservations, none held by either Veblen or Mills—least of all the hardiest of them, that of nationality.

Knowledge, analysis, and viewpoint combined in Veblen and Mills to make them not only radical but also profoundly pessimistic. Contemporary social scientists tend increasingly to be almost cheerful, and not only by comparison. Veblen and Mills explored the jungles and slums of modern society, which they found dank and reeking. Social analysis tends now to be filed from a hermetically-sealed room, in which neither life nor odors may exist—by assumption. Today, such reports are in flood; they were trickling already in Veblen's time, and had become a river before Mills died. The rate of change accelerates. As Veblen and Mills dissected society, both also took pains to explain why so very many of their colleagues were unable to see through, even to see, the veil of hypocrisy, moral numbness, patriotism, and self-righteousness separating

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the comfortable minority (in and out of academia) from the "underlying population."

II

As earlier for Marx, as ultimately for all who study society within the broad perspective of humanism, what Veblen and Mills took to be vital led them in one way or another to examine the question of *power*—who holds it, how it is obtained, how used, how rationalized. For Veblen this meant at first a study of "the leisure class," a term transmuted through study and bitterness to "the vested interests." For Mills the relevant focus ineluctably became "the power elite." Neither Veblen nor Mills left us with an adequate theory of power or social change; but in this century they were the two American social scientists who most persistently kept such questions in view. They knew how deep and important the problem was, and they cared about what was at stake; it was this that made them radicals. As such, they developed systematic analyses that searched and roamed. This was the strength they shared; and it was their mutual weakness. It took strength to stand against the onrushing specialization and trivialization of the social sciences—a trend now approaching the limits of credibility. The weakness of Veblen and Mills resided in the fact that they attempted so much, in what was almost a lone endeavor—and this in a society that, for the very reasons it needs serious analysis, contains towering obstacles for those who would make the attempt.

Progress in science requires the cooperation of many well-trained specialists working diversely toward a common end: understanding. Veblen and Mills sought to understand the conditions for a humane world society, a goal difficult to attain under the best of circumstances. But when the surest means of academic success lies in paving the road to a technical obscurantism—in, for all practical purposes, pushing *back* the frontiers of knowledge—then a Veblen or a Mills can scarcely be taken to task for falling short of his goal; surely not by those who have sat idly by or stood as obstacles in the path. The economist Rothschild, in a related context, once remarked that "it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong." Veblen and Mills, at their best and worst, were vaguely right.

It would be better still to be precisely right about the larger dimensions of the human condition. This is doubtless an unattainable goal. Even to be tolerably "right," even to have a barely adequate framework of social theory, clearly requires considerable specialization in the social sciences. It was not specialization as such that Veblen and Mills reacted against, nor is it that which is being attacked here. When specialization is an antonym for dilettantism, it is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for social analysis. But when, as is increasingly true, specializations are developed without conscious reference to or adequate training in the knowledge and purposes of one's discipline, scientific procedure is corrupted. When, as is already notoriously true, specialists

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lose the ability to communicate with each other, the situation has become ludicrous—but not amusing.

Today, the refinement of specializations is such as to require the acquisition of techniques—especially mathematical and statistical techniques—so demanding as to preclude the acquisition of perspective. Worse, the graduate student today is likely to be unaware of the *need* for perspective. Like his mentors, he may sense that technicism can serve as a rewarding option to the social scientist's alternative: the plunge into an ever-widening, ever-deeper sea of critical perspectives. Suffice it to say that all the great names in economics and sociology were men of great learning in "related" (and many "unrelated") fields, as well as masters of their own disciplines. They were all critics, all humanists. It was Keynes who said, "The economist is the trustee of the possibility of civilization." Perhaps the body of knowledge today is so much larger and more cumbrous that contemporaries can never achieve the breadth and depth of the earlier greats. Perhaps. It is more likely that the growth of knowledge has imposed upon us a greater need for selectivity; but how go about establishing standards of selectivity if there is no purpose, no perspective?

III

In its youth, social theory may have been too grandiose to be entirely meaningful; the tendency today, toward pulverization, is not likely to be meaningful at all. For society to be understood, it must be appreciated as well as studied: specialized analyses, indispensable to understanding, achieve coherence only when unified and stimulated by consciously-held values. Today as always, this must mean that the investigator have in mind an alternative to the present; if you will, he must have the good society in mind. To suggest that the social scientist work with such an approach, that he work within the framework of a commitment, is not merely an invitation to work harder, or differently. Formidable personal, practical, teaching, procedural, and theoretical problems must be confronted—problems such as those confronted by Veblen and Mills.

They were possessed of talent to a degree few are likely to have; even so, Veblen and Mills paid a price for their professional recalcitrance. Veblen's difficulties in gaining and keeping a first-rate academic post, his slow promotion, his low salary, and the general turbulence of his career, need no recounting here. If Mills had lesser difficulties, this may be explained in part by his location in one of the bastions of academic freedom in America, and in part by the fact that for many of his colleagues he did not emerge as an unremitting social critic until late in his life. When that role became apparent, his professional life became more combative and, to an unfortunate degree, warped.

Saying this, it is important to point to an important feature of Veblen's and Mills' professional, and even their social, existence. Given their career choices, both were outsiders by birth. Both became professional outsiders, standing off to view society through a glass darkly. But there

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is yet another sense in which they were outsiders: both, in fact or in effect, withdrew from their colleagues, from their profession, even from their professional responsibilities, as their work and views fell into a persistently and ever more deeply critical pattern. Not salary and rank, but the ability and finally the desire to communicate with asssociates came to suffer. They took on the symptoms of the social critic trapped in a complacent environment.

At its beginning, the path of social criticism, for both Veblen and Mills, was sandy with skepticism; at its end, it was strewn with the sharp stones of bitterness. Toward the end of their lives, a shrillness appeared in their writings that one does not find in earlier years. Living in a society that seemed almost eager to accord with their gloomiest observations, and surrounded by colleagues who regarded them, if at all, with some combination of tolerant amusement and hostility, both men became progressively more intemperate. Having arrived at, or been brought to, that stage, both men have been judged as such.

Need this happen? If the conventional become mellow to the point of blandness as they age, must the unconventional become all bile? Only, I think, if to be unconventional means to work alone; to become an intellectual gunfighter, a recluse. Veblen and Mills of course had professional defects and were less than perfect as persons; but much of what was true in both these respects came from working under conditions of too little professional cooperation and recognition, and too much professional hostility—conditions conducive to imbalance in manner as well as in analysis.

This is not to suggest, obliquely, that social critics expect huzzahs or rewards from the society they question—although there is a (doubtless naive) sense in which that case could be made. It is to say, however, that the personal costs of a critical stance might well be reduced, and the quality of its product improved, were the number of functioning social critics to expand, were they to work together, were they to shed their usually defensive posture.

The academic profession in America is the social critic's refuge; even, in extreme cases, his foxhole—with all the limitations of such a vantage point. Although academic freedom has had an honorable career in some American colleges and universities, its career has been less than honorable in many more. As a concept and an ideal, academic freedom is barely understood, let alone supported, in the non-academic community; within academia, the notion has more frequently been identified with narrow considerations of job tenure than with creating an atmosphere in which the free pursuit of understanding might prevail. As with other freedoms, the weakness of academic freedom may be explained in part by the infrequency with which it is exercised.

There have been periods of vitality for the academic social critic in America, and those periods are instructive: they reveal that the quantity and the quality of social criticism and the strength of academic freedom rise and fall together. Social criticism by academics in the thirties and

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in the immediate postwar years was, if compared with today, rampant. It came from Right and Left; nor was participation confined to faculties. Is it an aside to point out that these were the years in which Veblen received his greatest attention in America? when Mills received his higher education? when the social sciences most actively performed their function of social criticism? when academic social critics, though never as secure as their conventional colleagues, were both more productive and less precariously situated than before or since?

It is easy to say that the heyday of the social critic was a result of the Depression; that the combination of McCarthyism, Cold War, and disillusionment on the Left, along with industrialized affluence, accounts for the current desuetude. Today's problems may be less evident to the man in the street than was his own unemployment; maybe. But surely their urgency is not beyond the ken of a properly trained social scientist. In accounting for the timid, do we also account for the celebrants, the cheerleaders? How does one account for the acquiescence in McCarthyism *before* it triumphed? We return to the loneliness—perhaps today we should say the alienation—of the committed social scientist; to which, in recent years, we must add certain institutional trends that intensify his loneliness and encourage his silence.

Social criticism today is more unsettling than earlier because those few who engage in it stand isolated, etched against the horizon. It is less productive of useful results because the problems afflicting society are immense and ever more complicated, while simultaneously the number of those who would attack such problems is reduced by the process of intellectual emasculation mistakenly called specialization.

IV

This unhappy situation is the latest stage of a rising trend. Today the trend accelerates for several related reasons. As the society has expanded, it has produced institutions whose power and problems are substantial and multi-faceted. At the same time, the techniques of the social sciences have narrowed the training and the focus of the novice. The two developments come together in a complementary manner: the economist can now work for business groups, for labor groups, or for the military, say, to the profit of both himself and his employer. Similarly for the sociologist, the political scientist, the psychologist, even the anthropologist. Demand and supply are reciprocally stimulating. And "society" in the social sciences increasingly becomes something to be manipulated for the benefit of one or another of its component parts—one or another of its "vested interests." In the process, the social scientist stands in danger of becoming a lackey, and his training that of a lackey's. None of this is to be understood as arising from a conspiracy among evil men. It is a process as natural as the flooding of valleys in the absence of dams and levees. But there has been a default among social scientists, whose function it is, if it is anyone's, to construct the needed dams and levees. To do so, the social scientist must be guided by a vision of safety and desirability.

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The ranks of social critics in the social sciences, never thick, are steadily thinned out; the supply of recruits dwindles to the vanishing point. Potentially interested undergraduates are bored and turn away; or they stay in the social sciences to be trained as steely-eyed, if amiable, technicians. Those critically-minded few who survive the cold douche of the undergraduate major, mistakenly expecting that graduate work will at last introduce them systematically to the urgent social issues that first attracted them, find their frustrations compounded. They join the careless procession that moves from sociology to sociometrics, from political economy to economics to econometrics, even, if one can believe it, from economic history to Cliometrics. The social sciences cannot make sense or progress without quantification and logic, to be sure; nor can they make sense or progress if their practitioners are informed by quantification and logic solely, let alone when they are lacking a definition of progress.

The manner in which the foregoing process has speeded up, and spreads, is familiar; it may be characterized by Gresham's dictum: once the debasement of coinage begins it will become cumulative if there are no conscious efforts to halt it. As the study of moral philosophy and social problems moved toward "social science," the process of specialization and the development of quantitative techniques were quite appropriate. However, given the pattern of rewards in the academy, and those that beckon outside, these useful coins have been debased.

One normally has to teach in the academy, and the better teacher, other things being equal, is preferred to the poorer. Alas, rewards are meted out primarily for publication; publication, in turn, is facilitated by a narrow focus; in turn, this encourages quantification. There are, of course, elements of the picture that keep it from being totally dismal: some who publish much, publish meaningfully; some quantified work is broad in focus, and some that is narrow is valuable; generalists who preserve breadth and imbue purpose as teachers are still rewarded, particularly in the good small colleges. But the trend remains a forbidding one.

This is, of course, the era of the research grant. The granting agencies, beset by numberless applications—and apart from any more insidious motivation—tend understandably to seek objective criteria as their guides. This inclines them to the narrow, the quantifiable, and ordinarily the non-controversial projects, if only, but not only, because the last are likely to be finished with dispatch. Those who receive the bulk of the grants tend, over time, to gain power in the best faculties of the land; over time, they set standards for admissions and curricula. Mastery of technique, and the acquisition of perspective, both essential, come to seem competitive; and the latter gives way to the former.

With all this, a related development: the undergraduate curriculum is steadily infiltrated by attitudes and purposes that encourage a dubious specialization. The new young specialists who become teachers are un-

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able to teach in a broad tradition, and would be disinclined to even if they had the ability. So a Bachelor of Arts degree comes to mean a degree in training for a specialty. Specialization and quantification, necessary attributes of science, take on a life of their own which dangerously threatens the historic perspectives and purposes of the social sciences; so much so that both the perspectives and the purposes are already well on the defensive, must be argued for, with hope that fades. Back in the world, meanwhile, problems multiply, institutions fray or rip, structures wobble, and the new social scientist decries the ignorance and gullibility of the masses. And the unsophisticated involvement of students in political issues is deplored.

V

It will bear repeating that one cannot sensibly dissent from, indeed one must support, specialization and the use of mathematics and statistics as tools of inquiry in the social sciences. But, it has been said, the specialist should be like a tack: a sharp point given force through a broad top. The newcomers are pointed at both ends. They are specialists in tools; their interests are at best aesthetic, but more usually careerist; they have little training in either the traditions or the impulses that carried the social sciences into this century.

How and why do the established members of the profession allow such trends to gain momentum? It is not absurd to begin an answer by asking another question: How and why did social scientists, among others, allow a response of panic before McCarthyism to sweep so many universities? Lacking a firm commitment to standards, the elder statesmen puzzle in silence, or acquiesce in "evidence" that has the appearance of objectivity. And in the academic world, evidence consists all too often of performance on examinations, and performance in publications. Bemused by these "objective criteria," and hesitant to argue for something less certain, if more meaningful, to take their place, those who should know better behave no better than those who know nothing. True, the critic can still find a perch, whether as student or as professor, if only to make everyone feel that things are as they should be. But, as Veblen pointed out long ago, "only individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long run retain their self-esteem in the face of the disesteem of their fellows." In the academic world, where status is often an important substitute for money, the observation has more force than elsewhere.

And yet there is an uneasy feeling in the social sciences that all is not well. Hardly a department meeting goes by without a murmur of concern over the present trend (excluding those places where the triumph has been achieved, and there are some); but few meetings conclude without a new brick being laid on the wall threatening to seal social scientists off from society. A sign of the uneasiness, as well as a prime indication of the reasons for it, may be found in a symposium recently sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science: "Mathematics and the Social Sciences." In order to explore this topic

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one professional was to speak to the uses and another to the limitations of mathematics in economics, political science, and sociology. The uses, for economics, were ably stated by Leonid Hurwicz, one of the better craftsmen of mathematical economics; the limitations were analyzed by Oskar Morgenstern, a prime mover of mathematics in economics, who wrote approvingly: ". . . we see that mathematics penetrates more and more aspects of economics and that no limits are in sight where this process may stop." The mind boggles.

What are the alternatives to this threatening ice age? For Veblen the tasks of the economist centered on the study of institutions at work; and to Veblen the very existence of an institution implied that it was to some extent dated: "Whatever is, is wrong." To make that more than an amusing epigram, much work is necessary, and the work involves much in the way of social criticism. For Mills, the sociologist must engage in "structural criticism" that, while not neglecting the quantitative, emphasizes the qualitative side of social existence, explores relationships, illuminates process, and brings value to bear on fact. Surely a renaissance with such purposes as these among social scientists, manifested in class and in print, could stem the hemorrhage of bright students that has so weakened the vitality of the social sciences in recent years. From such a starting point, meaningful use could be made of mathematics and statistics by specialists who were about something and knew what it was.

A renaissance of such dimensions will not be led by those who, like Veblen and Mills, are defensive about their position. Veblen's defensiveness was hidden behind a mask of diffidence verging on hostility in his teaching and dishonesty in his writing—however, sardonically the latter may have been disguised. Mills too frequently clothed his acute judgments in spurious statistical wrappings which served him as a defense against the conventional-minded. Veblen mumbled; Mills shouted. The academic loneliness of the two men, indeed of all social critics, helpful though it is to explain such defensiveness, by no means can be used to condone it. The principle of selection of the conventional teacher and writer are no more readily justified than those of the critic; indeed, less so. The uncritical social scientist is as much in default of his professional obligations as would be a doctor whose diagnoses were confined to cheerful comments about his healthy patients.

To be committed should mean an attempt to place the intelligence and energies of students at the disposal of their values, using the open procedures of science. Commitment need not and should not mean that the social scientist use the classroom to put forth a program (although it might well mean that he do so in print); it should entail teaching that probes, asks questions, and does so systematically while taking nothing as sacred, nothing as given. In economics today, so much is taken as "given" that many no longer even list what is being ignored; some students may now believe that society, far from being the subject matter of the social sciences, is merely a synonym for "parameters."

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Proceeding along the lines of a Veblen or a Mills means that some precision has to be exchanged for some vagueness; but it means nothing worse than that. The fear today is not that minds will be led down one path to the exclusion of others; it is that young minds, spinning on dead center, will pursue *no* path.

The question to be asked of those who work with a commitment is simply this: what is the relevance of this work to that commitment? A satisfactory and humanistic answer requires no single technique, approach, project, or focus, nor need it by any means exclude the use of abstract models; it requires merely that he who does the work should know the relevance of his work to the problems of our society. The commitment of the new social scientist, increasingly, is to technique itself. This would be a cause for derision only, were it not for the effective zeal of the devotees of refinement. Their zeal, along with the basic shaping institutions of academia and the confusion of those who should know better, has allowed an imperialistic spread of the needle-like specialists.

Those who pursue the refined specialty easily develop precise results. This, combined with a loss or initial absence of perspective, as easily contributes to arrogance. The humanistic social scientist is more likely, of necessity, to be humble in face of the mass of events, institutions, and processes he must grapple with. Humility is appropriate before such problems; defensiveness, not. A revival of morale and conscious efforts toward cooperation among those who would, in Veblen's words, prevent "the triumph of imbecile institutions over life and culture," is not only possible, it is long overdue.

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THE UNFAMILIAR CAMPUS

1. Southern Negro Students: The College and the Movement

Staughton Lynd and Roberta Yancy

NOTE: *Staughton Lynd teaches history at Spelman College in Atlanta. Roberta Yancy received her B.A. from Barnard College, then joined the Special Human Relations Staff of the National Student YWCA to work with white and Negro Southern college students. Miss Yancy is now Campus Coordinator for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. In the following article, Mr. Lynd is primarily responsible for the section on "The College" and Miss Yancy for the section on "The Movement."*

The College

"Where we differ," the administrator said, "is that you think a college should be a democracy; you forget that it is a corporation." The student wrote: "To be a Negro in America is a perpetual wonder and bewilderment."

The remarks of the administrator and the student help to explain why the Negro college is both the most stifling and the most exciting educational setting in the United States today.

If my own experience before going South to teach in a Negro college is typical, graduate students in the North know next to nothing about the world of Negro education. They may be vaguely aware of Howard University in Washington, D.C., and of Fisk University in Nashville. But the typical Northerner is likely to be wholly unaware of the other 114 predominantly Negro colleges such as Lincoln University, where Nkrumah went to college; North Carolina A. and T., four of whose students staged the first sit-in; Alabama State and Albany State, seed-beds of the Montgomery and Albany Movements; Atlanta University, where W. E. B. DuBois wrote *Black Reconstruction*; Bennett, Hampton, Dillard, Tougaloo, Spelman, and many more. This ignorance is one more indication that separate education for the Negro has not been equal. Yet the cultural isolation of the Southern Negro college is in good measure shared by its white counterparts: Ralph McGill has called the poverty of Southern education a "wound draining away the strength of the region."

When as a graduate student I faced the decision of where to work, the vocational counselor of the department advised us only to select

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schools which appeared in the football scores of the sports section of *The New York Times.* No Negro colleges appear there. Of course, the adviser's comment was a jest: yet it illustrates the gravitational pull which grips even the most adventurous graduate students and turns them into academic organization men. What more conclusive criticism could there be of American higher education than the fact that so few products of the best universities come to the South to teach, and that no university or foundation has yet seen fit to finance properly even the bare chronological recording of the Southern student movement?

One understands, of course, why the teachers hesitate to come. The courage and vitality of the Southern student movement attracts; the intellectual deadness of what Mencken called "the Sahara of the Bozart" repels.

The deadness, the stifling, the burden of Southern history press most heavily on the Southern Negro college. Generations of cultural deprivation have trained the Negro student, in Baldwin's words, not to aspire to excellence but "to make peace with mediocrity." This is no abstraction. Many if not most incoming freshmen are unable to express themselves effectively on paper. Their fund of general information is astonishingly meager: the same, very bright student who wrote of the "perpetual wonder and bewilderment" thought that the Battle of Lexington took place in Lexington, Kentucky.

On the Negro college campus there are likely to be few student organizations, no bookstore, a bare semblance of an independent newspaper. The laboratory facilities and specialized courses which a modern education in the sciences requires are generally lacking. Coming from elementary and high schools where the textbooks were often discards from the white schools and the teachers often had no preparation in the subjects they taught, the Negro student entering college may never have had an exciting teacher. His academic life, following the pattern of his whole life in a society full of danger for him, has been directed by parents and teachers fearful above all of mistakes. If he is bright, he probably spent the last two years of high school running administrative errands rather than forging ahead of his classmates intellectually. The wonder is that, emerging from this smothering subculture, the incoming freshman so often has a glint in his eye and a hope for graduate school.

Much of the mediocrity is the direct result of external pressure, financial and political. The State of Georgia, in which one out of every three inhabitants is Negro, last year spent $39,800,000 on college education for whites and $2,500,000 on college education for Negroes. In the Mississippi Delta, where the annual income of Negro families is little more than $1000 a year, one study showed that because of the necessity for all members of the family to chop cotton, 70 per cent of the Negro population twenty-five years and over had not completed seventh grade. Even for those less indigent Negro families who of course provide a disproportionate part of Negro college students, a 1960

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study by the United States Civil Rights Commission revealed that accessibility, "in the sense of proximity to home and lesser cost," is the most important reason given by students for attending Southern Negro colleges. Because of inadequate guidance and counseling, these students frequently are not aware of alternatives when they choose the nearby Negro college; and this, too, is part of the penny-pinching, the acceptance of second-best, the restricted horizons, which poverty produces.

Political pressure on the state-supported Negro college is equally bald. The academic freedom crisis in the South which C. Vann Woodward reported last year in *Harper's* is, once more, serious in all Southern institutions but especially so in those predominatly Negro. The Negro college president who receives his funds from a white Board of Regents is the quintessential Uncle Tom: Booker T. Washington was the prototype. Albany State College expelled students for taking part in civil rights demonstrations during Christmas vacation. Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, closed down entirely after student demonstrations reached a high point in 1961. South Carolina had a barbed wire fence erected around South Carolina State College at Orangeburg to separate it from nearby Claflin College after State students participated in protest demonstrations. The tenure of independent-minded teachers at such institutions is inevitably precarious.

But mediocrity in the Southern Negro college involves more than external pressures and unavoidable deprivations. Cut off from the larger society, recruiting faculty and staff from recent graduates or the graduates of similar schools, these colleges tend to perpetuate a style of administration which may have been necessary for survival in 1900 but is grotesquely inappropriate in 1963. My biggest surprise when I began to teach at a Negro college was to find that the same students who had no fear of defying governors and policemen were so meek and mild in confronting their own college administrations. Describing itself on ceremonial occasions as a "family" but very ready in private to stress that the student is financially beholden to the institution, the Negro college still strives, like the company town, to control all aspects of the life of its dependents. Paternalism shows itself in the largely prescribed curriculum; in the absurdly restrictive social regulations; in the summary expulsion which student or faculty dissenters may expect.

This is a paradox when one reflects that the larger Southern society is in the last analysis responsible for the deficiencies of the Negro college and that life on the campus should be at least somewhat more free than life on the segregated streets. But so thoroughly have the values of the oppressor been internalized, so rigorously do Negro administrators implement the white man's view that a young Negro's every move must be watched and guided if he is ever to amount to anything, that today the excitement in Negro college life comes from off the campus while the campus stifles and holds back.

Though schools like Miles College in Birmingham and Tougaloo

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College near Jackson, Mississippi, are breaking free from this pattern, the Booker Washington tradition is dominant in most Southern Negro colleges. At Tuskegee Institute, which he headed from 1881 until his death in 1915, Washington created a regime whose spirit was not only *in loco parentis* but very definitely also *in loco Caucasiensis.* In his autobiography *Up from Slavery,* Washington tells proudly of checking each incoming student to make sure he had a toothbrush, and observing students as they left chapel to make sure all buttons were in place. The Negro sub-culture as well as physical grime were ruthlessly expunged. "We made a special effort," Washington tells, "to teach the students the meaning of Christmas, and to give them lessons in its proper observance": this, to the creators of the spirituals!

In the same years that Dewey and James revolutionized Northern education with the gospel of spontaneous, unfolding, individualized activity, Washington fastened on Negro education a single purpose: to create standard human products externally acceptable to a white-dominated world. That the Tuskegee program included more manual labor than progressive education ever dreamed of only added irony to tragedy. Tuskegee students built their school buildings partly because they were poor, and partly—as Washington made quite clear in his Atlanta Exposition Address (1895)—because they were intended to become docile manual laborers and domestic servants for white employers.

He who doubts the persistence of the Washington imprint on Negro college education need only reread the opening chapters of *The Invisible Man,* based on Ralph Ellison's experience at Tuskegee in the 1930s. The setting and the cast will be found all over the South: the beautiful fragrant campus with its imposing buildings; the patronizing white trustee, anxious to be sure his money is well spent; the president, deferential to donors, unctuous in chapel, overbearing to students; finally the students, eager to succeed on the terms agreed to by parents, teachers, and the mass media, but obscurely aware that some larger possibility is thereby being forfeited.

Instead of providing a breathing-space in which the youngster might explore his identity and gird his loins in an atmosphere of freedom, the Negro college too often reproduces the coercions of the larger society in a context the more stringent because small and easily-controlled. By treating its students as boys rather than as men, the Negro college produces men who will consent to be treated as "boys." By maintaining a repressive social atmosphere, the college accentuates the obstacles to academic learning. When students have to lie to evade the surveillance of ubiquitous matrons, they will cheat on examinations as well. When students survive in their non-academic college lives by threading their way through a maze of inflexible regulations, they will also be inclined to believe that knowledge has already been fixed and can be found in the assigned text. When in social life emphasis is laid on external correctness and the avoidance of mistakes, the willingness to explore and take risks in the classroom will be discouraged, too.

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The administrators of Negro colleges defend the tight ships which they run by referring to the small-town rural backgrounds of many students, and to the desires of parents. But the fact is that there is a new spirit among Negro young people which will no more tolerate paternalism in the college than it will continue to accept segregation in the larger community. Students have often had to defy their own administrations in order to participate in off-campus demonstrations.

When one president referred to student demonstrators as "vicious hoodlums" and expelled them, the student body called on the administrator *en masse* and circled his home at night with lighted candles until he was willing to speak with them. At another school, indignant students "sat down" in the auditorium until the trustees investigated their grievances. When a professor was fired at Savannah State in spring 1963, students withdrew from the college in droves despite "back to class" orders from the State Board of Regents. By its own attitude, the college administration transfers the question of freedom onto the campus. If teachers who support student grievances are denounced as outside agitators, if petitions for campus freedoms are met with scholarship cancellations and expulsions, the students are educated to see the off-campus and on-campus struggles as a single movement.

Thus the movement is transforming the college. The movement for Southern Negro students is an alternative education, a different kind of career: it is the closest America has come to Paul Goodman's "anti-college," where students learn because they want to, learn in order to do, and discover who they are.

Not long ago I was present at a conversation between a young student rebel and the venerable social philosopher Horace Kallen. The dark passionate young lady and the calm white-haired sage understood each other perfectly. Kallen recalled how during the worst of the McCarthy years the trustees of the New School had drawn a curtain over an Orozco mural in the lobby. The student told of administration arguments that education was a "privilege not a right," and that "loyalty to the institution" was the first duty of teacher and student. "My dear," the philosopher responded, "what is an institution? Would a doctor take an oath to his hospital, or to his patient? You see . . ." They talked on, and as I listened I felt a renewal of hope for America.

The Movement

I looked over Jordan
on the Eve of swinging low
And beheld the blood of the lamb.

The events leading to the present revolution began long before the advent of segregation, a late nineteenth century phenomenon. Planning certainly began in the minds of Nat Turner, Denmark Veasey, and in those of most of our black grandfathers. Somehow the nature of the plan has always been held in secret. It managed to bring out a bit of soul rhythm through spirituals and the blues and jazz, but only

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recently have we begun to translate for outsiders what it means to walk all over God's heaven in a golden robe, or for all of God's children to have shoes.

As I surveyed the revolution from an academic height in New York in 1962 it occurred to me that anything revolutionary North or South was bound to raise my citizenship status. Being Negro already, it could not drop much lower. It seemed to me that if the movement in the South remained strong, Negroes all over the nation would soon get the message. So I decided to join the ranks of the rebellious, and prepared to move to Atlanta. En route I stopped at a number of campuses in the South. After living in the North all my life, it seemed like a good idea to spend a little time looking and listening. There is a lot to be heard, but not particularly on the campuses. The most revolutionary sounds flow through an office at 8 Raymond Street in Atlanta, headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. This is where one is certain to hear the news when students in Americus, Georgia are charged with attempt to incite insurrection (and face possible death sentences) for trying to get people registered to vote. This is where one comes to realize what it takes to raise the percentage of registered Negro voters in Leflore County, Mississippi above one per cent.

SNCC evolved out of the sit-in movement which began on February 1, 1960 in Greensboro, North Carolina. The Committee was originally formed to coordinate activities among protest groups. After the Freedom Rides in 1961 it became clear that something more should be done to alleviate the fears of Southern Negroes. Thus SNCC launched its first voter registration drive in Walthall, Pike, and Amite counties in Mississippi. SNCC workers went to Albany, Georgia, in October. By November 16 students, feeling that the problems of the day should take precedence over immediately earning a college degree, volunteered to take a year or more from school to work in the hard-core areas of the South. As of 1963, SNCC had initiated and participated in direct action campaigns in fifty-four cities in thirteen Southern states. This summer the staff reached a high of 190 workers.

The men and women of SNCC are a breed unto themselves. Their educations range from what one gets in a Mississippi Negro high school to Masters programs at Harvard. There are, however, many supplements to institutional learning. I could not help being impressed when I stumbled wearily over stacks of paperbacks in a Freedom House in Mississippi. It happened one afternoon when I arrived in Jackson, weary after a long ride from Nashville, to find myself in the company of Camus, Baldwin, Ellison, Faulkner. And it could happen any place where SNCC is in action.

Education extends to the knowledge one acquires by being both student and teacher in the real world—without the help of required reading lists. This is simultaneously attractive and repulsive. The attraction comes from the richness of the experience of meeting people

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in the course of a voter registration project, or when one goes North to interpret the movement. The repulsion comes with realizing the depths of fear which the system of segregation has instilled in the people one is trying to persuade to register; or when one realizes the equally deep fears of those who feel they must defend the system at any cost.

> On March of this year I went to the court house to register to vote and things was swell until one day three weeks ago I was in the field chopping cotton, a big Negro man hear me talking about voting and he started to talk loud and say that I was the cause of him not having the job he used to have, that them people and that voting mess was messing things up for him, to go over to Greenwood and tell them niggers that he had had freedom and to just let the people alone. The boss man was in the field and heard him talking to me. I don't think that he knew I had been down to register. The boss man did not say nothing to me but then that night his wife told me that there was no more cotton to chop and that they did not need me and my children anymore. . . . [SNCC affidavit from Mississippi, July 29, 1963.]

When a Negro student becomes committed to the revolution, he learns that there is little value in theoretical study if he is not free to use his knowledge on the outside. For those who see the movement as a means of broadening their horizons, the decision to leave school and work in it is an easy one.

This is not to say that the value of higher education has decreased for students in SNCC. They are increasing its value, making it worth something. The movement is encouraging its members to meet the challenges confronting them. Some students work during summer breaks from school. Others are preparating to return to school. Funds have been provided from various sources to make it possible for fifteen SNCC staff members to return to college this year. Work-study projects have recently been instituted at Tougaloo College and Miles College to relieve the tension experienced by some students between action and academics. This program, which Dr. Beittel, president of Tougaloo, calls "an internship in practical citizenship," will permit students to work on a voter registration project and attend special civil rights seminars for one year, and will provide funds to cover the cost of their tuition for the following year.

> We have walked through the shadows of death,
> We had to walk all by ourselves;
> But we'll never turn back, no, we'll
> never turn back
> Until we've all been freed and we have equality.

The summer of 1963 has been called everything from the summer of our discontent to the second American Revolution. It was more like the dawn of our recognition. The cloak of invisibility has been dropped. Now we must keep from crawling back under its warmth.

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2. Portrait of a Working-Class College

Robert J Potter

In 1956 the University of Michigan entered into a partnership with the Flint Board of Education to establish a distribution outlet in Flint. The purpose of this cultural service station—the Flint College of the University of Michigan—is to provide undergraduate instruction for juniors and seniors (chiefly graduates of Flint Junior College) leading to a BA from the University.

It's not wholly facetious to describe Flint as a cultural service station. The architecture imitates the baked enamel paneling and aluminum trim of service-station-modern. The unending traffic of commuters in and out of the floodlighted driveways and parking areas, the students who park for an hour and are gone, the vocational upgrading which so many seek—all contribute heavily to this impression.

What kind of college is this? It calls itself a liberal arts college, yet nearly half of its students are taking education courses and preparing to teach in elementary schools, a sixth in secondary schools; another fifth are studying business administration. Inevitably, the college reflects the needs and aspirations of the local community. Teachers may entertain any number of utopian ideals, but so long as the college draws its students mainly from Flint, the achievement of those ideals will be problematic. I am not trying to say that the instructors don't have a strong effect on the college—and on the student body. Indeed, the excitement of a Flint education lies mainly in the conflict of expectations that occurs between the instructors and the students. Yet, in the long run, it is the background, outlook and typical experience of young people raised in an industrial town which determines the character of the college.

In a city whose livelihood depends heavily on General Motors, it is not surprising that over half of our students are from families in which the father has held a blue collar job most of his life. The parents of two out of three students have had no higher education. Even here, however, there are class distinctions: students whose fathers hold *unskilled* factory jobs are markedly under-represented in the college. The children of skilled workers and managerial and professional families are three times more likely to attend. Convenience and low cost are attractive to all, but family background is apparently most significant in teaching a child that higher education is a useful way to get the things he has learned to want.

Given these backgrounds, the attitudes of our students toward higher education are somewhat different from those of most liberal arts students. Their approach to learning is very serious. Occasionally their deadpan earnestness takes the form of excessive awe before the printed word—both biblical and secular. At other times, the students are excessively skeptical or even arrogant about the published work of others. They tend to be literal-minded, unable or un-

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willing to play with ideas or engage in imaginative thought. When asked for a critical review of a book, for example, they will either compulsively praise everything about the work or violently denounce it. Mixed and ambiguous judgments seem false to them.

Another kind of literal-mindedness is suggested by the response of some students to a sentence in Margaret Mead's *Sex and Temperament*: "If a man wishes to demonstrate his superior wealth he may choose to give a yam-feast to a man who has been his enemy, and so heap coals of fire upon his head." They were horrified to think that the Mundugumor people "burn their enemies with coals!" While arguing over this misreading, they were, of course, missing more important conclusions.

For all this, the students tend to think of themselves as intellectuals—faculty opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. This self-estimate is supported by their friends out of school who often call them "hard workers" or "brains." And, indeed, the students do work hard! Two-thirds of them report that they study three or more hours on an average weekday. They are almost compulsively conscientious about class attendance. Instructors find that an unannounced free cut is not appreciated by students who have driven five or ten miles for class and may be paying a babysitter as well. Students working their way through college with so much effort cannot help taking an earnest view of education. But this inevitably restricts the instructor, making his own interest in detached, playful consideration of ideas seem frivolous and his task doubly hard.

One does not find at Flint a self-conscious minority disdainful of learning and the learned. We have such students, but they get little support from their peers. Few of the young people here have come dutifully to college to please doting parents. Similarly, there are few whose hopes for marriage overwhelm their academic goals. No, the major rival to learning in this school is a fixed desire to achieve specific vocational aims—a standard, largely acquired at home but reinforced by so much of mass culture, that measures the value of any subject matter by its imagined practical relevance.

But a literal-minded student's view of "practical relevance" may, in fact, be highly distorted. He is likely to choose low-level vocational or professional training rather than a broader liberal arts education. Students at Flint are not impressed by the abundant statistics showing nationwide shortages in a wide range of occupations open to college graduates. Although a fifth do elect traditional liberal arts fields and a similar proportion go on to graduate school, nearly two-thirds fix their academic objectives on easily obtainable vocational targets. They are unaccustomed to thinking of occupations as careers in which the "payoff" may come after a decade or two of work. Like their fathers, they are likely to believe instead that the hardest part of a job is getting hired. So their aspirations remain fixed on the first step of a specific occupational ladder offering prestige and good working conditions, regardless of where the ladder may subsequently lead, indeed, often without noting if there are second and third steps. It is not enough to want a college education

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for its intrinsic value; they must be able to convince themselves, their parents and spouses that higher education will lead immediately to practical benefits. Some students even feel guilty about going to college at all—it is not *work*. Many cannot comprehend those values of higher education which lie in something other than the job for which it may be a prerequisite. Here is prudent, working class morality . . . with a vengeance.

Alongside this practicality, there exists an equally strong desire on the part of many students to be of service to others and to the community. Older students in particular set aside the selfish motives I have just described, choosing instead to do something ethically significant with their lives. These are men who have given up lucrative jobs as skilled workers to educate themselves for roles in society paying less money but permitting a greater self-respect. These are women who have given up a comfortable life at home for the demanding task of educating other people's children.

II

Students come to a college like Flint in order to get to the next step on an occupational ladder. The crucial consequence of this is that, in addition to teaching a subject, the faculty must exert themselves to demonstrate the meaning of higher education. Such goals as the development of a capacity to appreciate and create, a willingness to accept responsibility for the direction in which society is moving or might be induced to move—these are only dimly recognized by most students. And the instructor is likely to discover that in enlightening even a single student he may be engaged, willy-nilly, in a struggle with other members of the student's family who daily challenge the ideas he brings home. Addressing the student body, he is also struggling with the whole local community. A college like Flint must find some way to insulate itself from the "practical reality" of its environment.

The teachers have some success. Almost immediately upon arrival, students are shocked, awakened, threatened by the intellectual atmosphere. How could they have known that the halls of academe hold more than information? The reaction of some is that college professors who question a comfortably habitual way of life must be subversives or atheists. An opposite reaction is to cling slavishly to a particular professor's theories as the new-found Truth. Sometimes, however, a student realizes with appreciative surprise that a college education can prepare him for a way of life previously unknown but now satisfying. This is perhaps what students mean when they say, as many of them do, that college has changed their whole outlook on life. For they had not expected higher education to do more than add facts, useful facts, to their fund of knowledge.

Programs promising a specific vocation at journey's end are the "price leaders" that pull students into the cultural service station. Then with the parking lot full, the instructors wheedle, tease, amuse and invite the students into a liberal education. Hopefully, a large minority can be infected with the thrill of intellectual pursuits. It is hard work: even over coffee, the teachers are on duty, playing the role of advanced peer, giving the inside dope on what they

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said in class, trying to lighten the students' burden of earnestness.

Given a student body like ours, one can't really object to vocationally-tied "professional education." A "pure" liberal arts college would fail miserably in Flint if it had to depend on local clientele. It would be unattractive to, and misunderstood by, potential students. Flint's mixture of teacher education, business administration and liberal arts may well be the proper mix for shaking up simple life orientations and for introducing—at least to a few—the complexity and strain toward ideals which are the badge and burden of intellectuals. Of course, it *is* necessary to object when, with a student body whose objectives are already limited, professional programs exhibit overconcern with *minimum* requirements for "certification" or employment. This makes vocational education even weaker than it need be, and hinders the necessary fight to transform the seriousness of the working class student into intellectual excitement and enthusiasm.

For all this, Flint College turns out teachers and junior executives who are more broadly educated and more interesting than those produced by various schools of education or business in many large universities. It is simply too soon to say how well we will do in that other, larger task of higher education—the development of a creative minority capable of identifying and overcoming the challenge of our time.

NOTE: I am indebted to the members of a sociology class in the fall of 1960 who interviewed a random sample survey of eighty-six Flint College students: A Brendes, A. Brooks, B. Brown, E. Butler, J. Fisher, T. Gendron, M. Leavy, R. Martin, P. McKinney, J. Morrissey, G. Moss, M. Redmond, S. Scott, J. Thurman and I. Wilson.

3. San Jose: Portrait Of a Second Rate College

An Observer

Over nineteen thousand students registered at San Jose State College this fall, two thousand more than a year ago. This rate of increase is common among California colleges, where the shock of the population explosion has been felt year after year. In 1975, when an estimated 660,000 students will be enrolled in California's public institutions of higher learning, the state still plans to offer each student not only a place to sit and a book to read, but the best public education in the nation. This extraordinary optimism is based upon a Master Plan for Higher Education, adopted in 1960.

The Master planners had to reconcile rising enrollments with limited income. They had to accommodate the

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Plan to existing institutions—the University of California, the California State Colleges and the junior colleges. They solved the problem by eliminating "wasteful" duplication, making clear delineations of function and channeling students into institutions suited to their presumed abilities. They opened up the junior colleges to all high school graduates, reserved the State Colleges for the upper third and the University for the upper tenth. The planners began with an excellent state university and a group of mostly second-rate colleges. It was easy to decide to maintain the excellence of the university, but they made this excellence exclusive. In the delineation of of function between the schools, research and scholarship were assigned to the University and teaching to the State Colleges; thus the Plan placed bounds on a vital part of the intellectual life of the Colleges.

There are seventeen State Colleges in California; they enroll over 100,000 students, twice as many as the University. Will this large and growing number of students receive a second-rate education in these Colleges? In the opinion of this writer, the Master Plan guarantees that they will, because it assigns the Colleges a second-rate operating budget and largely ignores the problems of their second-rate past.

I

One of these second-rate colleges is San Jose State, oldest institution of higher learning in California and largest of the State Colleges. San Jose is located in one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the country; within an hour's drive are San Francisco and the universities at Stanford and Berkeley. The faculty is well qualified and the students are from the upper third of high school graduates. Nevertheless San Jose is mediocre. In California it is known to students and to the public as a "party school."

San Jose began its career in 1855, when a group of San Francisco citizens established Minn's Normal School to train "moral young men and women" as teachers. The founders urged an ideal of cautious teaching, and their conservatism became the school's tradition. When San Francisco proved to be too great a danger to the morals of the students, the school, by then called the State Normal School, was moved to San Jose. In supporting the new location, the State Superintendent of Education offered this argument:

> Where should the State Normal School be permanently located? . . . To locate the Normal School in San Francisco would be dropping a drop of literature into an ocean of mammon. Neither Oakland nor Berkeley is the place; in either of these towns the Normal School would be so overshadowed by the State University, with its magnificent endowment and huge proportions, that it would be like a sickly little plant in the shade of a great oak . . . Sacramento has the State Capital; Stockton has the State Insane Asylum; Oakland has the University . . . ; San Francisco has several institutions that receive state aid; San Jose has nothing. [B. F. Gilbert, *Pioneers For One Hundred Years, San Jose State College, 1857–1957* (San Jose, 1957, p. 47).]

In 1870 the school was moved to the town that had nothing. The San Jose *Mercury*, today the town's only newspaper, reassured the townsfolk about the sort of people the school would bring: "Unlike a college or university that attracts many fast and mischievous young men, not a desirable acquisition to any community, the

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Normal School comprises only the most desirable class of young people."

The school passed through several changes but preserved its original character. In 1887 it became San Jose State Normal School; in 1921, San Jose State Teachers College; and in 1935, San Jose State College—a typical history. Its president during the transition from Teachers College to State College was Thomas MacQuarrie, who favored manual training and disavowed the notion that a student be required to have a "cultural education." From 1927 to 1952 MacQuarrie ran the school like a personal satrapy, seeking no counsel from the faculty, while he fostered the kind of practical education he had described in his inaugural address: "There exists a demand for a college offering education for immediate use and San Jose is such a college."

In 1952, a new president took control. John T. Wahlquist, a former Dean at the University of Utah, encouraged liberal education but did not consider it basic for the State Colleges: "the institutions designed to bring higher education to the greatest number at the lowest cost . . . must continue to emphasize the practical aspect of education."

Wahlquist accepted the educational philosophy traditional to San Jose State and the functions awarded to it by the legislature and enforced by the Superintendent of Public Instruction—the ultimate head of the State Colleges at that time. However, by 1952, the college was already growing rapidly. In its growth, it inexorably took on the scope of a university and became less like a teacher's training institute. As a consequence, the ways of autocracy became increasingly inappropriate and inefficient; but, except for innocuous faculty advisory committees, Wahlquist continued to exercise enormous presidential powers.

II

The Master Plan brought one major improvement—a new governing board for the State Colleges. Until this change, they had suffered under the management of the State Superintendent of Instruction and the random attentions of the State Board of Education, the Department of Finance, the Public Works Board, the State Personnel Board, the Division of Architecture, and the Legislature itself. The powers were now collected and vested in a Board of Trustees, which would have a Chancellor of the State Colleges as its chief executive officer; nevertheless, the State Legislature and various administrative bodies would continue to exercise greater power over them than over the University. Indeed, the plan codified the traditional distinction between the two systems of higher education in California.

Except in regard to the new governing board, the Master Plan benefited only the University of California. The University, which had the power and prestige to coerce the State College presidents into agreement, was interested only in preserving its privileged claim on state funds and in guaranteeing that the state colleges would not improve enough to encroach on their prestigious domain. Inevitably, the University monopolized both basic and applied research and was designated as the repository for "unique library resources needed for graduate training and research programs." Research libraries were not deemed necessary for the State Colleges, whose paramount function was *instruction* and who were to provide facilities ap-

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propriate only to the degrees offered. Yet the Colleges were to carry on "faculty research, using facilities provided for and consistent with the primary function of the state colleges." Obviously, this distinction of function frustrates the scholarship of State College faculties and limits the intellectual horizons of the students.

"Function" also affects the distribution of public money. The Master Plan and the annual budgets are supplied with figures to show that the cost of undergraduate teaching is about the same at the State Colleges and the University. Only in graduate instruction are the University figures markedly higher. But this only means that many of the major expenses which directly benefit the faculty and the undergraduate students at the University are charged to graduate and research needs, the province and ornament of the University. The true effect of spending policies is clearer in a comparison of total expenditures at San Jose State and the Berkeley campus of the University. In 1961–62, Berkeley had 23,000 students and spent approximately $50,000,000 for current operations. In the same year, San Jose had 15,784 students and spent approximately $13,000,000. The average cost per student at Berkeley was $2,175, or two and a half times the $820 cost per student at San Jose. The Berkeley library offered 124 books per student, while San Jose had only 19. Berkeley spent nearly four million for its libraries; San Jose, $679,391.

The Legislature's generosity to the University is demoralizing for the State College teacher, because the state affords it by economizing in the State Colleges. Last year, the State College Trustees requested $500,000 for research for 5,000 faculty members at the seventeen State Colleges; the Legislature gave them nothing. Any economy in the State Colleges could be justified by reference to their "function" as defined in the Master Plan. At San Jose, the quality of the faculty has been maintained by occasional salary increases to keep pay about equal to similar colleges; California's climate does the rest.

The Master Plan is a formidable obstacle to the improvement of the State Colleges. If the primary distinction is that the University offers graduate training and the State Colleges do not, then, at least, the undergraduate education the State Colleges offer should be in no way inferior to that at the University. But the education will necessarily be inferior. Every teacher knows that study and research form the very basis of intellectual life and consequently of college teaching: scholarship and "instruction" cannot successfully be separated. The intent and effect of the planners in separating them is to offer two kinds of undergraduate education; expensive at the University and cheap at the State Colleges.

Because of the University, California has an undeservedly high reputation for its public support of higher education. In fact, it spends relatively little. In the years from 1952 to 1958, California ranked thirty-fourth among the states in the percentage of personal income (0.46%) spent on public higher education. Among states west of the Mississippi, only Nevada ranked lower. On the basis of current state expenditure and education costs, the Master planners predicted that, in 1975, annual budgets for higher education would be $197 millions more than projected available appropriations. The State Colleges will thus be thrown

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into increasing competition with the University for the taxpayer's dollars, and it is unlikely their financial situation will improve. As the Master Plan now operates, it enjoins the State Colleges to be excellent teaching institutions while denying them the means. In good nineteenth-century fashion, it encourages the poor to be rich.

III

The function assigned to the State Colleges by the Master Plan does not seem to conflict with President Wahlquist's philosophy of Education. Wahlquist equates education with teaching in the most literal sense. At San Jose there seems little appreciation of the position that good teaching arises from a creative and vigorous intellectual life; nor is there much sympathy for or understanding of the intellectual as a type. Instead, teaching is equated with training in an efficient nine to five environment.

President Wahlquist makes his idea of a college teacher explicit when he greets new faculty members each fall. In his welcoming remarks, he begins by assuming that the main interests of his listeners are keeping their new jobs and finding a place to park their cars. His advice on how to get tenure and promotion—come to class on time; let your class out on time; don't cause trouble in your department; be nice to your students even if you have a headache. Tame and tenured professors are easy to control because they have no intellectual energy. Men who are contented and who do not question the present scheme of things will prosper at San Jose.

It might seem odd that good men stay at San Jose under such circumstances, but many do. The vagaries of the academic marketplace leave some stranded; others stay from preference. With little pressure to publish, men do not need to sell their souls to scholarly fashion in order to keep their jobs. If the faculty produces few works of major scholarship, still it bears little responsibility for the shelves of academic nonsense written by desperate men striving for promotion. Because San Jose has no status to preserve, it is free from the cant which mars a campus concerned with its relative prestige. There is no need for charlatanry and little exists. It would be an equivocal improvement if San Jose had to accept the evils of the prestigious university in order to gain the status of a first-rate college!

Most of the students, not aware of the difference between a good and a bad college, get their degree with the least possible effort. But the "fast, intellectually mischievous" young men and women, who in another age would have gone to Berkeley, are deeply dissatisfied. If they have the grades and money, a sizable number, with the strong encouragement of their professors, leave for Berkeley after two years. It is not wise for an ambitious student to stay at San Jose. Few graduates receive fellowships or assistantships in good graduate schools. The college has produced a surprisingly small number of academic or professional men. There is no way of escaping the fact that a degree from San Jose is inferior.

Forty million dollars' worth of state penal architecture has permanently marred what was once a beautiful and peaceful old campus. New drive-in education is available from seven-thirty in the morning till ten at night, dispensed from easy-to-clean concrete shelters. For the State College professor, the great threat is that he may

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turn into a teaching machine and give the state only what it asks—instruction without intellectual excitement.

The president of San Jose has a program for the students which fits his concept of education as training. When taking office, he said, "I, for one, would not deny [the student] all the liberal education he can assimilate in the time at his disposal." San Jose students, in common with most students in publicly supported institutions, are more dedicated to their social than their intellectual life. President Wahlquist seems to accept this view of college life. Last fall he told the new faculty that

> . . . our students live only one life, and the college period should be the most happy one of all. Of course, [the students] are beset with all the problems that bother us, and I certainly have no desire to belittle the problems that surround us all and could not, if I wished to do so. They are so real and self-evident. But in the days of their youth, they are entitled to some happiness and some optimism on the part of those who surround them. They may be in for some great troubles and tribulations; they likely are. But, meantime, let's see if we can help them live day by day with some feelings of security, some faith in our form of government, some appreciation of our institutions, and some love for their fellowman.

One thousand contented professors surrounding twenty thousand happy students might be a thing of rare delight, but it is not the way to achieve academic excellence.

President Wahlquist has announced his retirement, effective next September. It will be interesting to see if the new president can stimulate the college to overcome the disabilities of San Jose's history and its function under the Master Plan.

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Michael Maccoby

GOVERNMENT, SCIENTISTS, AND THE PRIORITIES OF SCIENCE

Massive federal financing of the sciences which in principle should be strengthening American society, in practice threatens to divert science and higher education from their proper goals. In the universities, the influx of government funds has often narrowed rather than broadened the search for knowledge and has resulted in neglect of teaching. In general, the harvest of scientific discovery is disappointing, considering the investment involved, for too often the supervision of governmental agencies has reinforced the trend toward bureaucratized projects which produce trivial, non-controversial findings.

Apart from the effects of federal financing on the universities, one must question the results of concentrating funds in research bearing on national defense. Not only does such concentration hinder the solving of non-military problems; it also diminishes our capacity, as Norbert Wiener puts it, "to react homeostatically to the vicissitudes of the future." Especially important here is the role of the scientific community, as it responds to government support and to the political dictation of priorities; for the worst effects of government influence are aggravated by the willingness of scientists to pursue those goals least likely to arouse division or debate. Consequently, science, rather than serving men, has become increasingly the enemy of life.

Federal Support and the Universities

The results of government financing of university research have been studied systematically by Harold Orlans and summarized in his book, *The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education, A Study of 36 Universities and Colleges.*[1] On the basis of 400 interviews with administrators and 3500 faculty questionnaires, Orlans concludes that large-scale, high-level scientific programs cannot survive without federal support, but that the manner in which grants are doled out creates dangers and imbalances. Most of the funds go to a few wealthy universities which use them to help attract the leading scientists and the best students. (According to a recent report from the House Labor and Education Committee, 90 per cent of the federal funds were concen-

• NOTE: This article is based on the Gabrielson Lecture on Government and the Priorities of Science delivered at Colby College, February 14, 1963.

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trated in 100 universities, 38 per cent in ten.) Within the universities themselves, the money goes almost entirely to natural scientists and psychologists, who consequently improve their positions and prestige at the expense of other social scientists and humanists. Even among scientists, government grants carry greater prestige and chance of advancement than do good teaching and individual research outside of the government-financed project system.

Yet, while supporting scientists, government funds have not necessarily opened new scientific frontiers. Orlans states that while the "best" or most well-known scientists can get support for projects of their own choosing, the "average" scientist must do the work the government wants in order to receive its support. And Orlans writes that "The preference of government agencies for 'safe' and 'projectable' rather than venturesome research, and for experimental rather than theoretical work, was noted by many observers."[2]

Although government support has sometimes led to important discoveries, Orlans emphasizes the view, as stated by one professor, that federal financing is creating a higher education that is "nationalized" rather than "universalized." While the universities have some power to resist government interference in regard to educational policies and academic freedom, it remains an open question whether in fact they would resist, should the issue arise with fresh McCarthy-style hysteria. Since the days of McCarthy, government support has grown to the point where not only research but also teaching programs and salaries of permanent faculty members often depend heavily on federal funds. Yet the universities appear to be more concerned with beating one another in the race for money than in banding together to assert their autonomy. Thus, the two main dangers of federal aid, as cited by Orlans: "(1) that academic values and objectives will be surrendered to those of a business enterprise or the more important goals of a nation, and (2) that some form of political control will, indeed, follow federal aid."[3]

Federal Priorities and the Response of Science

There is no question but that the federal government now dominates the setting of scientific priorities in the United States. Of the nearly $16 billion spent by the nation on research and development during 1962, over $12.2 billion was appropriated by Congress, most of it in contracts to industry ($5.8 billion) and universities ($4.2 billion). The current federal research and devolpment budget asks Congress for $14.9 billion, continuing that trend which since 1956 has increased appropriations by 10 to 35 per cent every year.[4]

Fifteen per cent of total expenditures in American universities derive from government sources; some private universities, including Harvard, Yale and Princeton, receive a larger percentage of operating revenue than do land grant colleges such as Illinois, Kentucky and Maryland[5]; and in the most heavily supported schools some 78 per cent of the natural scientists receive federal subsidy.[6] The most essential statistic concerning federal involvement in science, however, is that

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most of the funds spent on research and development (R & D) fall under the military budget. For example, of $9 billion invested by the government in R & D in 1961, $6.2 billion went into national defense, $1.4 billion into space research, $.9 billion to atomic energy, and the remaining billion was divided among smaller programs such as health, agriculture, the Bureau of Mines and the National Bureau of Standards. And of the $613 million spent by the government directly on university research (as opposed to "development"), one-third supported work related to military purposes.[7]

What are the results to science and to the nation of directing so much energy and genius into the arts of weaponry? Why does this trend continue even though, as we shall see, it is economically and morally self-defeating? To answer such questions requires an examination not only of the forces that determine Congressional appropriations, but also of the scientists' motives, the bureaucratization resulting from the project system, and the manner in which political priorities blunt the free spirit of scientific inquiry.

The failure of American scientists to oppose pressures which could reduce their community to a technical bureau contrasts markedly with C. P. Snow's description of the scientific ethos in *The Two Cultures*.[8] According to Snow, the scientist is supremely qualified to set the priorities of society, because his intellectual outlook is molded by his professional method. He is democratic and objective, influenced by considerations of utility rather than established authority. He believes in progress; he is open to new and better ways of doing things.

Snow reports the scientific ideology accurately enough, but his evaluation of it is overly optimistic. For all too often the scientific mind equates "winning" with "progress," and substitutes a belief in personal achievement and the "advancement" of a field for an authentic interest in knowledge and truth. Thus many scientists appear as members of teams out to win contests, concerned more with personal batting averages than with the value of the game or the cost of winning. Scientists with the "game-like attitude"[9] seldom come to grips with the needs of the world they live in, believing instead, as Don K. Price comments, "that the public interest is the same as their professional specialty."[10]

But it is unjust to lump all scientists together, as both Snow and his critics tend to do. There is a great difference between the scientist whose pleasure begins and ends in the elegant development of a device, whether it be a triggering mechanism for a bomb or a new drug, and the scientist impelled by a vision of widening the scope of natural knowledge or understanding human existence. The trouble with the first kind of scientist is that he might do just as well on a project designed to destroy the planet as on one to bring cheap power to the underdeveloped world.

The major problems that arise from government and science are not the fault of either large-scale government support or the scientists' lack of say in setting priorities. As Price points out, scientists in the

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United States have more influence at the highest levels of government than do those of other countries; indeed, many administrators are themselves scientists. Even the problem of explaining scientific problems to Congressmen might not be insurmountable, if scientists were firm in their convictions. But scientists in general, according to Orlans, are satisfied with the present form of government support; the trouble lies in the very ease with which they accommodate their activities to the going market.

A certain amount of red tape and inefficiency under the project system seems an inevitable price for progress in those fields that cannot be developed without huge financial investments. But it is clear from Orlans' interviews that the quality of scientific work is compromised as much by the scientists themselves as by the agencies, which in fact are often troubled by the lack of courage and imagination in the research projects proposed to them. Thus Orlans quotes from the Proceedings of a *Conference on Academic and Industrial Basic Research* (National Science Foundation, 1961):

> The present atmosphere of the intense competition for jobs, for prestige, and for research grants places too much emphasis on the achievement of quick and fairly certain results at the expense of the slower and more valuable maturing of the scientist. The younger men have become concerned with making their reputations as quickly as possible; to do this they are forced to choose problems they are sure will yield publishable results in a short time, rather than the more difficult problems with uncertain results. Some of the participants in this Conference felt that the research of younger men is becoming more superficial and even trivial, although in the past it was the younger men who made the deepest and most striking contributions to science.[11]

The best scientists also worry about the trivializing of research. Hans Bethe has noted that with large computers doing so much work, scientists do not think enough: "They lose the inspiration for further research that came from an intimate contact with every phase of the calculations."[12] Professor Melvin Schwartz, a physicist at Columbia, writes that with expensive machines, science becomes assembly-line research. No one tries risky problems because the machine is expensive and he fears wasting money on a worthless result. And no one takes responsibility for accuracy, for it is the machine that does the work.[13]

At the present time the scientific community is receiving from the government more or less what it demands. If scientists were truly determined to attack more important problems, there is no evidence that the government would stand in their way. Professors in Orlans' sample note that agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and even the Navy with all their limitations, show more courage in backing adventuresome ideas than do private foundations. Similarly, administrators in Washington are more often characterized by breadth of vision than many within universities who measure success—as do scientific guilds themselves—by quantity of

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publication. Most universities hire and fire purely on the basis of work published, without regard to the work's significance or lack of it.

Yet even if one grants that the scientists—especially the best of them—might claim somewhat more autonomy than they do, that institutions accepting federal funds hoard more independence than they spend, and that the opinions of scientists are heard at the highest levels of government, one must still ask how the scientific community uses its power and influence. Price, in *Government and Science,* suggests that generally American science goes along with fixed political goals, rather than trying to influence society toward better goals. He explains that the decentralization of science into private institutions facilitates the carrying-out of specific projects, "but not our ability to give integrity and direction to our total effort."[14]

It is a common belief that to improve our society all we need do is give more money and power to science. Price remarks, however, that "We will do well to recognize that a government bureau is tempted to be more concerned with its own status and power than with the purposes of national policy."[15] Since the scientists themselves suffer the same temptation, the two groups unconsciously conspire to promote the kind of work which is most likely to gain congressional support. In other words, although the scientific community may have a great deal to say in setting its own priorities, there is a reluctance to risk power, prestige, and support by clashing with priorities set in advance by the interplay of political forces. Like many other Americans, the scientist does not want to be told what to do, but he will gratefully accept a clue as to what will sell so he can then suggest it himself. The results of this attitude go beyond the concentration of research in safe but unimportant areas. A more serious consequence is that the majority of scientists will search for "interesting" research problems with military significance.

Science for What?

Considering the large government investment in military research, the character of scientists, and (as we shall see later) the government's fear of scientific projects that might radically change our society, there is a real danger that a bureaucratized scientific community, with a naive, games-playing mentality, will ally itself with the military-industrial complex. It is not my purpose to make a wholesale indictment of American science. Clearly, many scientists are aware of the danger I am citing. Orlans indicates that 70 per cent of the scientists he interviewed realize that the present concentration of federal funds in the sciences is not in the "long-run national interest," although over 50 per cent do believe it to be "in the present national interest."[16] What concerns me, however, is not support of science vs. support of humanites, but that the kind of science now supported has a deadly effect on the spirit of scientific inquiry and the pursuit of human-oriented goals.

"Necrophilic" scientists who revel in a science of destruction are probably rare, statistically speaking, but their strong minds and pur-

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posive attitude may significantly influence the direction of scientific endeavor.[17] The physicist Ralph Lapp writes that while many scientists accept military employment reluctantly, the complex problems of weaponry which now enlist the majority of the nation's scientists also attract the best of the younger men—because these problems are so scientifically fascinating. Lapp also refers to the fact that weapons of destruction have traditionally compensated man for his physical weakness and given him the means to master others.[18] Elaborating on man's age-old fascination with weaponry, Lapp quotes from G.B. Shaw's *Man and Superman,* where the Devil tells Don Juan:

> I have examined man's wonderful inventions. And I tell you that in the arts of life man invents nothing, but in the arts of death he outdoes Nature herself, and produces by chemistry and machinery all the slaughter of plague, pestilence, and famine. The peasant . . . eats and drinks what was eaten and drunk by peasants 10,000 years ago; and the house he lives in has not altered as much in a thousand centuries as the fashion of a lady's bonnet in a score of weeks. But when he goes out to slay, he carries a marvel of mechanism that lets loose at the touch of a finger all the hidden molecular energies, and leaves the javelin, the arrow, the blowpipe of his fathers far behind.

Through science, to be sure, man has found many ways to preserve and extend life. But there is far more to the difference between science for death and science for life than is expressed in the contrast between making weapons and making medicines. Science for life implies research motivated by a profound vision of harmony, of *ecology* in its broadest meaning, of rational inquiry into the interrelation of things—whether it be expressed by Einstein's interest in mass-energy-space-time or by Rachel Carson's concern with protecting the balance of nature from technological assault.[19]

The difference between science for life and other science is not one of method, but of openness to a larger universe of variables. To the "biophilic" scientist, a problem does not end with the supression of a symptom or the discovery of a relationship; the central question is how the cure or discovery affects a wide balance of forces. Such an attitude is easier to observe in the biological than the physical sciences, for example in the work of Hans Selye on stress reactions and the medical possibilities of reinforcing natural homeostatic mechanisms while guarding against destructive side effects and over-reactions by these same mechanisms. Perhaps in physics the distinction is more subtle, involving the choosing of problems, the use of techniques as means not ends, and the quest for truth rather than for power. (It is noteworthy that Einstein became one of the very few scientists to refuse political power when President Roosevelt offered it to him in 1939.) The "biophilic" scientist is not so intent on *conquering* nature as he is on discovery or on learning how to employ the forces of nature to create a greater harmony for man within his environment.

I do not mean to insist that the priorities of scientific work be

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totally determined by social priorities, nor that society does not benefit from science based on mixed motives. The important question is whether the motives are weighted in favor of understanding rather than power, and whether the thrust of scientific work in general is toward life-enhancing goals. As Norbert Weiner points out, science is most useful to society when scientists set priorities themselves, free from political pressures. Science must be allowed to gather information without regard to "historical predictions and prejudgments which belong primarily to one particular age, and may be proved false. . . . Thus the internal life of science must be preserved without a too direct dependence on the policies of the moment, or the official fashions of thought. This means that the scholar must retain for his own efficacy something—not too much—of the ivory tower attitude which it is the spirit of the times to decry."[20]

Yet the government provides massive support mainly for military research and development, and most scientists are neither capable nor interested in setting their own priorities based on pure scientific interest. Unlike Einstein, they are too concerned with worldly power. The question is no longer whether or not the government will support science, but what kind of science will be supported. The average scientist thinks less about the ultimate purpose of his work than about the immediate investigation at hand. As Lapp reminds us, for those fascinated by problems centering "on gyro-mechanisms, on miniaturized electronics, on plasma physics," it is "easy to forget the monstrous machines of destruction to which their work is contributing."[21]

Federal Priorities in Science

The bulk of science now supported by the government is not science for life. Much of it is devoted to outright destruction, and much of what is not—such as space exploration—diverts resources from the alleviation of pressing human problems. It can be argued that some of the research done in military and space programs has contributed to our store of useful knowledge concerning new plasmas, improved communications systems, etc. Yet it is difficult to secure appropriations for direct non-military research into these problems. Furthermore, medical scientists report that although the military services may at first offer to support an investigator's non-military work, once his laboratory is dependent on their funds he may be pressured into military research.

Why is it that the science most readily supported by Congress is either a science for death or a science for leaving the planet, when in fact there is so much to be done in developing our own planet? We do not yet understand the processes of physical and mental disease. We have not solved problems of water and air pollution. Most of the world is impoverished, although for the first time in human history we have the means to eradicate poverty. According to Lee A. DuBridge, member of the National Science Board and President of the California Institute of Technology, we now possess the scientific knowledge to:

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> Produce enough food to feed every hungry mouth on earth—and to do this even though the population should double or triple.
>
> Make fresh water out of sea water and thus irrigate all the world's arid regions.
>
> Produce enough energy from uranium to light and heat our homes and offices, electrify our railroads, and run all our factories and mills.
>
> Build houses, buildings, and indeed whole cities, which are essentially weatherproof—heatproof, coldproof, and stormproof. . . .

Yet plans to realize these possibilities awake fears of socialism, despite the fact that they would create a higher standard of living and help solve the problems of the underdeveloped world; while the investment in destruction and space, involving at least as much government control, is rationalized as national security.

The claim that military and space science serves as a guarantee of national security can be disputed from two separate points of view. First the United States has a sizeable advantage over Russia in armaments, though it is in the interests of the military-industrial-scientific complex to remain unsatisfied. The report on the economic effects of an arms control agreement issued by Senator Humphrey's subcommittee on disarmament in August, 1962, has not been made public, apparently because some Senators felt that the Russians would exploit information contained in the report—even though Secretary of Defense McNamara tried to assure them that it disclosed nothing the Russians could not learn by themselves. The report cited not only the concentration of military investment in a few specialized aircraft and electronic firms which would go bankrupt without military contracts, but also pleas from certain industrialists for a start in peacetime planning before industrial resistance to disarmament becomes overwhelming.

Secondly, there is the strong possibility that concentration on military research has weakened our long-term economic and scientific capacities. As the economist Yale Brozen puts it:

> . . . large-scale spending on military research is restraining the growth of civilian research. This may represent an uneconomical use of research *even from the point of view of increasing our military strength.* Defense potential is more than a matter of having technologically advanced weapons. It also depends upon the productivity of the economy. We are a world power as much because of our productivity as because of our arsenal of guided missiles and atomic bombs.[23]

Furthermore, it is not mere coincidence that bureaucratization of university research dates from World War II and the beginning of military subsidy. One scientist writes:

> Despite the large amount of superficial evidence to the contrary, the present state of science in the United States is one of considerable confusion . . . we appear to have lost sight of our intellectual foundations and have reverted to authoritarianism. Contributing to this situation is

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> the state of the universities. Since World War II these have become so deeply engaged in the pursuit of various kinds of applied research that they have seriously neglected their primary duties as institutions of learning and of education. Possibly the greatest source of this disruption is the government contract-grant system upon which the universities are becoming increasingly dependent for continued existence.
>
> At the same time, the problems confronting the human race today are such that a widespread knowledge of science is essential if they are to be dealt with effectively. If noncatastrophic solutions of these problems are to be found, it is urgent that our universities again become institutions of learning. . . .[24]

Thus the investment in military R&D goes beyond the "rational" needs for defense, and besides being wasteful, it undermines the nation's strength. Furthermore, because it is so costly, and so shielded from criticism, Congress can rationalize a penny-pinching approach to more constructive science by emphasizing the priority of military needs. The result has been that budgetary obsessions cripple scientific programs directed toward human betterment. For example, when Congress passed President Kennedy's program for mental health facilities, the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee slashed away funds for salaries and research grants. As *Science* remarked, "The results of the committee's total deletion of the $427 million slated for the salaries of the staffs at the community mental health treatment centers may be . . . 'shiny new buildings with inadequate professional staffs.' "[25]

In its attempt to cut budget deficits, Congress has even begun to attack the National Science Foundation and its policies. For the first time in the NSF's twelve-year history, the House Appropriations Committee has refused proposed increases in funds and directed NSF to refrain from setting up new programs. *Science* comments that "The Congress is clearly peeved by the mounting costs of research, by its own inability to grasp the substance of scientific matters, by the conflicting counsel that it receives when it seeks advice in the scientific community, and finally, by imbalances in the geographical distribution of research funds."[26] As if to illustrate Congressional prejudices *against non-military science,* Representative Charles R. Jones of North Carolina declared the following in the course of the hearings:

> I fail to see how, with the need as great as you say it is to develop scientists, you can justify paying a man $20,000 to spend two years studying the cultural evolution in peasant communities. That is a very nice field for someone to go into, but I doubt if it contributes greatly to our store of scientific knowledge. . . . You think in view of the condition of the country, its finances, etc., that we can well afford $20,000 of the taxpayers' money to make a comparative study of village life.[27]

Another example of Congressional feelings came from a hearing by the Subcommittee of Government Operations of the House (August 9–16, 1962), concerning a project by the Research, Evaluating, and

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Planning Assistance Staff of the Agency for International Development (AID). One of the AID officials had conceived a plan to provide a cheap and efficient source of power for underdeveloped areas far away from large power centers such as hydro-electric dams. He wanted to produce a small solar-powered battery recharging center. Such a development would have an enormous effect on countries where "there is simply an absence of fuel, not merely high cost fuel but . . . just not enough fuel to go around." It was hoped that "If you could find a simple way of capturing the power of the sun for small projects . . . you could begin to bring . . . energy way out in the areas where, if you wait for rural electrification to take place, 25 or 30 years from now, the problems of economic development will have simply gotten beyond us. . . ."

Congress ignored the positive implications of this research, and instead saw it as an instance of government competition with private industry. If solar energy was such a good idea, why wasn't private industry already developing it? What was the gimmick; which federal employee was trying to get rich on government time? It happens that one of the promoters of the solar boat did make some questionable contacts with private firms and did attempt to bring in a magazine to publicize the expedition. But the testimony indicates that this was due more to amateurism than underhandedness. Unlike the military, AID has little experience in pushing a research project. The committee accused no one of illegal or immoral behavior, only of working outside of proper channels. But it is not clear that proper channels exist.

Furthermore, Congressmen criticized the very entry of AID into such research. "I was a little surprised," one Congressman stated, "that foreign aid was being used to develop and promote a speculative power source. . . . I had not realized that foreign aid was being used for that purpose. It might be something that Atomic Energy, Space, or the military might do in their research contracts or grants, sponsor some programs of the kind, but it sort of shocked me to know that the AID funds were being used in this speculative endeavor." Later, the same congressman repeated that the undertaking seemed something that "perhaps the military might do. They have need for power in remote places as it affects their mobility."[28]

The total expenditures for the solar boat project were estimated at the relatively small sum of $40,000. The project was killed, however, and the originator of the idea left AID to work for a private research firm, after the chairman of the subcommittee, Porter Hardy of Virginia, pressed for his dismissal.[29] AID, under its new Administrator, David Bell, is now striving to strengthen its research program and enlist more help from the scientific community. But its future depends, as *Science* reports, on "whether or not funds are provided . . . to hire some first-class specialists to strengthen the AID research staff. In the reorganization act of 1961, some 'supergrade,' higher-level executive appointments for scientists and others with technical training were authorized, but

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appropriations for pay were never voted and the jobs were never filled."[30]

In general Congress distrusts any non-military science which involves federal planning, conflicts with free enterprise ideology, or questions military policy. Recently the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology, J. Herbert Holloman, stated that our overconcentration of research and development in military programs retards the growth of the civilian economy and thereby damages the ability of the United States to compete with other nations on the world market. He pointed out that between 1954 and 1961 three-quarters of the scientists entering research and development were absorbed by defense and space programs. To improve the "technological base" of our economy, Holloman suggested a program designed to increase "the basic technical work important to industry and to encourage a more rapid translation of technical information to industry." The program would be implemented by grants and contracts to various research institutions —"but not [those] organized for the manufacture or distribution of products"—and by the establishment of a university-industry extension service, similar to the agricultural extension service.[31]

Immediately *Fortune* opposed the plan in its May issue, stating that "nothing in the record suggests that government can organize research more efficiently than industry . . ." Frank T. Bow of Ohio, the ranking Republican on the appropriations subcommittee, attacked the proposal as coming "about as close to destruction of the free-enterprise concept as anything can get," since scientific information would be distributed to small firms as well as the large ones which maintain their own research departments. Even labor officials disliked the idea; they "equated research with automation and, hence, with less labor."[32]

The point of interest here is not the adequacy of Holloman's plan, but the fact that government-supported science involving *non*-military planning immediately arouses the spectre of socialism, outweighing the real threat to industry of falling behind in the economic competition with Western Europe and Japan.

Irrational overconcentration in military spending and congressional unwillingness to support wholeheartedly a science in the service of life walk hand in hand. Because the implications of a more humanly useful science might upset the current ideological equilibrium, military and space science become ways to keep the economy running without clashing against powerful vested interests; instead, a group of industries become increasingly strong at the public expense. A free science searching for truth is bound sometimes to question the goals of private interests. Price recalls the case of the Iowa State research assistant who found that oleomargarine is as nutritious as butter and more efficacious in producing edible fats. The dairy interests demanded that he be dismissed.[33] The government would have to stand strongly behind science if it were to be given the power to criticize uses by private enterprise of drugs, insecticides, chemical pollution of air and water etc. By fearlessly exploring our environment, science would inevitably show that the

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profit motive often works to the public detriment, stimulating false needs while ignoring real necessities.

Besides blocking economic and scientific development, massive military subsidies increase the chances and the destructiveness of war. Social scientists who might be expected to warn of this danger are often seduced into harmless research by government and foundation grants. Orlans notes that "sociologists complained about the restriction of government programs to quantitative, statistical, and computer analysis to the exclusion of qualitative and descriptive approaches; political scientists about the shying away from political implications which lie at the heart of their field."[34] The same criticisms were levelled at private foundations.

Tragically, the behavior of the scientist is being moulded like that of the rat in a Skinner box, who is reinforced only for the right kind of action, so that gradually he learns to want to do what is rewarded and loses interest in what is not rewarded. As Lapp states, "No one . . . is responsible—and everyone is responsible. We cannot single out the scientists, or the politicians, or even the military, as the villains of our danger. We have no recourse but the hard one of disentangling the hypnotic skein in which we are all enmeshed—of finding a way out to rationality."[35]

But the same forces which block humane science and free scientific inquiry also nourish the apathetic and self-destructive tendencies in our society. The new generation of scientists, raised in the shadow of world war and anesthetized by the anxieties of the cold war and the bomb, has little faith that man can control his destructive impulses or that individuals can influence society. Thus scientists alienate themselves from that tradition which stems from the Enlightenment: that through reason and science, man can create a better society. Some of them seem not to believe man wants a better society.

The scientific community has the knowledge, the ability, and the prestige to reorient the nation toward "biophilic" goals. Unless science wakes up to the dangers of acquiescence and objects to priorities set by fear and political expediency, there is little hope of reversing a process which at best leads to waste and stagnation and at worst to moral disintegration and suicide.

1 Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1962.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 292.

4 *Science*, 26 July 1963, p. 339. It is doubtful, however, whether the Congress will appropriate all this money, especially the requests for non-military research which House subcommitteees have already begun to cut.

5 Harold L. Enarson, "Free Universities and National Policy," *Science*, 2 November 1963, p. 582.

6 Orlans, *loc. cit.*, p. 98.

7 National Science Foundation, *Federal Funds for Science X*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

8 C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

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9 For the effects of this game-like attitude on military strategy, see M. Maccoby, "Social Psychology of Deterrence," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* September, 1961. This scientific attitude reinforces the tendency to seek technical solutions while ignoring political realities and long-range unintended effects of policy.

10 Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York: N.Y.U Press, 1954), p. 26.

11 Orlans, *loc cit.,* p. 98.

12 Quoted by Sidney Lens, "The Professors and the Pentagon," *The Progressive,* October, 1962, p. 34. Lens also cites the opinions of other eminent scientists that many of the best investigators waste much of their time on administrative work. The quality of science is also diluted by government demands for secrecy and that projects be planned that are easily explained to untrained legislators.

13 Melvin Schwartz, "The Conflict Between Productivity and Creativity in Modern-Day Physics," *The American Behavioral Scientist,* December, 1962, p. 36.

14 Don K. Price, "The Scientific Establishment," *Science,* 29 June 1962.

15 Price, *Ibid.*

16 Orlans, *loc. cit.,* p. 103.

17 *Necrophilic* is here used not in the sense of the rare sexual perversion but in a broader definition suggested by Erich Fromm in *War Within Man* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1963). Fromm shows that necrophilia is characterized by a love of death, a need for certainty, for complete predictability which can result in commitment to force, a preference for machines over living organisms (and the desire to make men into machines). Fromm also shows that the complex, overly-bureaucratized and mechanized society conditions the spread of necrophilia. In contrast to the necrophilic attitude, Fromm describes a *biophilic* attitude, based on the love of life.

18 Ralph E. Lapp, *Kill and Overkill* (New York: Basic Books, 1962). p. 16.

19 Cf. Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

20 "Science and Society," *Science,* 9 November 1962, p. 651.

21 Lapp, *loc. cit.,* p. 21. But Lapp also cites Tartaglia, the 16th-century ballistics expert who wrote, " 'One day meditating to myself, it seemed to me that it was a thing blameworthy, shameful, and barbarous, worthy of severe punishment before God and man, to wish to bring to perfection an art damageable to one's neighbor and destruction to the human race. . . .' "

22 Cited by Alan T. Waterman, "Science in the Service of Man," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May, 1963, p. 4. Dr. Waterman, the outgoing director of the National Science Foundations goes on to cite the need for large-scale research in oceanography, pollution, and the development of plasmas.

23 "The Role of Government in Research and Development," *The American Behavioral Scientist,* December, 1962, p. 25.

24 M. King Hubbert, "Are We Retrogressing in Science?" *Science,* 8 March 1963, p. 890.

25 *Science,* 30 August 1963, p. 791.

26 *Science,* 18 October 1963, p. 368.

27 *Ibid.,* p. 369.

28 All quotations from the Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, concerning Agency for International Development Contract Operations, (Office of Research, Evaluation and Planning Assistance Staff), (Part 1) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

29 *Science,* 2 August 1963, p. 412.

30 *Ibid.,* p. 413.

31 Quoted in *Science,* 28 June 1963, p. 1381.

32 *Ibid.*

33 Price, *Government and Science,* p. 103.

34 Orlans, *loc. cit.,* p. 97.

35 Lapp, *loc. cit.,* p. 22.

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Oscar Gass

THE PROFESSORS IN WASHINGTON

Some Fragments of Observation*

I

I fear I may be writing even these fragmentary observations under false pretenses. In "A Quarterly of Socialist Opinion," I am writing about Professors. But I am not a Socialist, and I am not a Professor. (It is not enough, I think, that I *do* hold that what were historically Socialist doctrines have something important to contribute to that better polity for which Socialist is not an adequate name. Just so, I do not qualify as an academic by having, years ago, taught two little, narrowly specialized courses in economics.) Shall I say, in the phrase loaded at once with self-defense and other-denigration, "Some of my best friends are Socialists"? Indeed it is true. But those of my closer friends who call themselves Socialists are, for the most part, not Americans. Shall I say, "Some of my best friends are Professors"? They are. But those of my friends who are Professors only very infrequently work in Washington nowadays. And, for the greater part, I cannot imagine them working here. They would, I suspect, be almost as ill at ease—would feel themselves almost as constricted in a pointless round of "business as usual"—in the New Frontier of President Kennedy as in the Great Crusade of President Eisenhower.

Worse. If a study of the academics in Washington is to be taken seriously, the student should, I suppose, get a Foundation grant, should design questionnaires, solicit objective responses, and assemble statistics. That is, no doubt, an innocent and even commendable occupation for a learned man. For my sins, I have even some times condemned myself to read the products of specialists in Public Administration who employed such methods. And I have, on some matters, learned from them —though I do not know any such study that contributes importantly to the understanding of the operation of government in the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch in Washington today. In any case, I can have no present ambition to compete in that league.

Well, then, perhaps I shall at least betray confidences or tell anecdotes? I number by the dozens the Professors and lesser academics I have observed on their official duties in the federal government in

* These observations were sent to the editors on October 18th. I have decided to let them stand as they were before the assassination.—O. G.

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the past quarter century. During all that period, I have lived in Washington most months of each year. Each memory might contribute something of illustration or anecdote. But I hate such things. And the sharpness of anecdote adds nothing to the weight of argument. Everything turns on the justice of selection. I do not wish to defend the dead—with one notable exception—or to praise or condemn the living. I shall try to avoid names. If the spice of personality is diminished, the quality of judgment may gain.

II

I came to Washington to work first in June 1938—exactly as thousands of others have—because of the recommendation of one Professor to another. In my case, the recommendation of an economics Professor from Reed College (who knew me) to an economics Professor from Lawrence College (who did not). I was then a year out of the Oxford school of Philosophy, Politics and Economics and four years from a degree in History at Reed College. Though initially I was to be only the most junior professional member of a small staff in one Division of the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, I approached the job with some trepidation. It was comforting to find, on my first day in the Treasury, that my Chief was a former Professor, even if only a Professor of Economics. A rather unusual former Professor—Harry Dexter White. Though Harry White had little good to say of academic economists—especially if they were actual or potential competitors—his senior assistants were all former academics, mostly ex-Professors. For me, the profusion of academics eased the unfamiliarity. Thousands of others have had similar experiences. I think that, in this, the interchange between academic and government work is a good thing.

I came to know Harry White well—though not always pleasantly. He was among the most capable, decent and honorable of the Professors and Civil Servants I have known—in all that I knew of him and all that I know to this day. Yet, for several years (1942-45), we were not on speaking terms, and I thought him then terribly twisted and diminished by the struggle for personal power and self-assertion. A frequent experience of the Professors in Washington—and not only of the Professors. In the last years, after his defeat, when we worked together again, White appeared to me mellowed. Perhaps, having stopped competing, he would give to everyone something of the consideration previously reserved for the young and for the circle of intimacy. His resources of personality were always greater than the normal ones.

III

What I have found most consistent in the Professors whom I have observed in Washington is their freedom from structured political views. (I mean structured or systematic political views of any kind—not merely, I hope, views that coincide with my own judgments or rela-

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tionship or value!) Of course, they have sentiments, preferences, and aversions—dispersed along our conventional conservative-liberal or liberal-conservative spectrum. The Professor who wishes to serve in Washington will be indulged a great variety of interests. Only intellectually structured and firmly held political views are seriously disqualifying. Those would be judged a barrier to *objectivity*. And objectivity is decisive. To be objective, in the federal bureaucracy, is to take one's first principles of public policy from the front office. Everything else is personal vagary and subjectivity. After all, were you elected or was the President? How far can a Civil Servant rightly go in repeatedly advising the boss that he is fundamentally on the wrong track? So the selection runs—among both academic and non-academic Civil Servants. No use having people around who are not *objective!*

Because he is politically objective (i.e., has a mind and personality almost devoid of structured content regarding the fundamentals of politics), the Professor characteristically is of little use in any activity that requires either understanding the politics of Washington or understanding the larger politics of the United States. Characteristically the Professor works in the Executive Branch. There he quickly absorbs the High Doctrine of the federal career service. And, if he is a Professor of Government, he may in later years teach this High Doctrine as the ultimate wisdom of American politics. It has only two points. The President—Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman, every President—is the Good Guy. The Congress is the Bad Guy. All else is nuance and minor qualification.

Pursuant to the High Doctrine, the federal career officer, in his dealings with the Congress, is sometimes deft but almost always evasive and not infrequently disingenuous. (How else should one treat the Bad Guy?) The itinerant academics show great aptitude in acquiring these attitudes and practices. In his relations with the Congress, the federal career officer rarely creates an atmosphere of shared problems and shared decisions—because no such thought is in his head. His is the attitude of partisan counsel, concerned to prevail in the case at the bar and careful only not to play any tricks for which he can be nailed. With all this, there is, on the part of the typical career officer, and his associated Professor, in relations with the Congress, a bland assumption of moral and intellectual superiority, an ill-concealed condescension (though, it may be, combined with fright) which the Congressman finds maddening. "I have longer views. I know the job better. These Senators and Representatives are hobbled by every prejudice and serve every vested interest. Why don't they give the President (and me in the background) the authority and let us get on with the job, without constantly badgering us?"

The Senators and Congressmen feel left out and resentful. How often they withhold trust from the spokesmen of the Executive who do not share problems and ideas with them but come tardily to solicit their votes! The Professor, in temporary high authority, has had lunch

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with the Senators and Representatives. He thinks he has influenced them. And now he leaves them on Capitol Hill, full of his good work, and they speak to one another: "No need to invite that one again. He sparred with us. He gave us a car load of propaganda. He tried a snow job on us."

These problems of Congressional participation are not easily resolved. They are harder in the United States than in some other representative systems because we have no strong national parties. Policies are not hammered out in wide discussions within a national party organization. Each of our Senators and Congressmen is still, in major part, an ambassador whose political strength is rooted in his own State and who maintains only less important relationships with other legislators who have separate roots. To overcome this separateness, to secure more effective and speedy participation by the Congress in the government process, may require a much larger—and differently conceived—effort than has previously been made in the United States. In 1963, this problem has become exceptionally acute because there is no effective Congressional or Executive leadership, and the processes of the federal government have slowed almost to a halt. But whatever the task, whatever the solution, it is vain to look to the Professors in Washington for any help. On these matters, they merely share the unreasoning vanities and frustrations that proliferate in the federal career service.

IV

Had the New Frontier been different, its Professors would have been different too. Not different people; the same people would have been different. The Professors do not set the style. They accommodate themselves to it.

The New Frontier wished to be great. But it could be denominated great only by a standard for which greatness is the inevitable concomitant of the exercise of high authority in a major power. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy—perhaps one day Lyndon Johnson—come to the same bar. The New Frontier presses on few new frontiers. It has no considerable intentions beyond those conventional in American government during a period in which politics flutters around *dead center.** (Will the future historian of American tax policy, for example, even have to pause to mention the change of Administration when he goes from George Humphrey's Revenue Act of 1954 to what seems likely to be Douglas Dillon's Revenue Act of 1964?)

Had intentions been greater, politics would have had to be quite different. Risks would have had to be taken. It would have been necessary to try to create a new Democratic party. The President would have had to seek out, indoctrinate, and lead new militants of his New Frontier in every State—in every likely Senatorial and Congressional

* I have given some further indication of my thinking on these matters in two essays in *Commentary* of April and December 1961 and in an essay in *The New Republic* of February 9, 1963.

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district. The willing professional political personnel (Senators, Representatives, Governors, Mayors, etc., etc.) would have had to be drawn in. In success, the unwilling would have felt the hot breath of the militants on their necks. But all this is fantasy. One does not seek instruments for non-existent purposes. For present purposes, the present political machine suffices. Militants would be an irrelevancy—in bad taste, heroes without a cause.

When there are militants in the national politics of the time, the Professors are among them. Try it today. Ask a dozen administrative assistants to Democratic Senators and Congressmen when they last met a militant from the Executive Branch—a militant on any question under the sun. You will get twelve horse laughs. Today, in October 1963, and for some time now, the New Frontier has no militants of any kind. No use asking about Professors separately.

The Fair Deal of Harry Truman and the Great Crusade of Dwight Eisenhower also had their Professors. Is there a detectable difference? Yes. In the years of the Fair Deal, world affairs dominated, even to a greater extent than subsequently. Few—Professors or others—recognized that domestic politics were on *dead center*. Under the Great Crusade, the ideology of *dead center* was overt public policy. The accredited federal Professors sang its song. In the New Frontier, the prevalence of *dead center* is acknowledged haltingly and with regret. Everybody else is to blame: the people will not; the Congress will not; the times are out of joint for great actions. The role of the federal Professor is to sing a mild lament, bearing the title "The Limits of the Political Process." Themes may be drawn from St. Augustine, Edmund Burke, or Reinhold Niebuhr, according to taste. What a handsome adornment a Professor can be!

V

Perspective is one of the things for which one looks to the Professors, in Washington as elsewhere. In my happy experience, looks not in vain. But the conception is tricky.

Perspective: large views; just proportions: balance in relating today's events to the whole. It is a word much favored by historians. I confess to years of concern over what it means to them. My first attendance at a Congress of professional historians was then correspondingly disturbing. Evidently, historical investigation proposes itself as a way of knowing. And here were people who had spent their working lives at it. And they were manifestly just average stupid. Where then was this perspective of theirs? And, if the professional historian has no extraordinary understanding of his own time, on which he has an abundance of evidence, why is he to be trusted to have surer perspective on other times, for which he has much less evidence? I think an historian of great intellectual capacity—a Frederic Maitland, a Lucien Febvre—may have valuable perspectives on remote matters, in which he has steeped himself. But can the ordinary historian then borrow these perspectives—as externally as one borrows a pair of field glasses?

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Do I grant the Professors in Washington an unmixed contribution of perspective? No.

Look—I beg of you, look again—at the paper which a Harvard Professor, who sits some times at the U.S. Treasury, Mr. Seymour E. Harris, has contributed to *The New Republic* of June 1, 1963. (One betrays no confidence. He has published it. It is fair game.) Is this the work of an intellectual? Is this the perspective of a Professor? Or is it the tendentious product of a captive public relations man? And it does not reflect a unique performance by a federal Professor.

Among the distinctive Professors' causes in Washington, in recent years, were The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the U.S. involvement in pushing Britain toward the Common Market. In these matters, in my judgment, the federal Professors contributed not sound perspectives but conventional thinking, inadequate information, and slovenly tactics—together with their own uniquely oppressive self-righteousness.* After Nassau, when the whole mess became apparent, a senior career officer in the State Department said to me, "Frankly, we all thought British entry was a 'shoo-in.' We haven't had a new idea on European integration in five years." Then he spoke bitterly of the President's idea of establishing a State Department staff college. "Even when our Professors come from various universities, on a question like European integration we almost never get anything from them but our own house doctrine. How much worse it will be if we have our own college!" About the same time, one of the largest research corporations serving the Department of Defense constellation inquired of me regarding new consultants. I asked, "Why do you need more? You already have hundreds." And they responded, "Yes, numbers we have. But both our Professors and our non-academic consultants are now so completely brain-washed that they are of no use. They give us back our own stuff."

No, the professors cannot be counted upon regularly to contribute perspective.

And yet, and yet—would Washington, in this respect, not be worse without them? I think no candid and informed person can doubt that it would be worse.

VI

Character is the most difficult issue. I do not wish to compete with Aristotle in defining. Nor is my present interest comprehensive. On the contrary, it is deliberately narrowed to a few points: internal moral standards; human dignity; independence; a personality not easily bent or broken. All this is much less than a whole man. Indeed it is only a little more than those aspects of a man that might be formed in accordance with the Biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil."

* I have dealt with these matters substantively in "Crusade for Trade" (in *The New Republic* of March 19 and 26, 1962) and in "Europe Renewed and Transformed" (in *Commentary* of May 1963).

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Thoreau has said, "None can be an impartial or wise observer of human life but from the vantage ground of what we should call voluntary poverty." We must hope he was wrong, for who among us has opted for poverty? And Thoreau was quite aware that climbing for power can blind the eyes as badly as climbing for wealth. No one in government service has chosen to be poor or powerless. Almost all are climbing. And they show it. But some with far greater destruction of character than others. Why?

An initial distinction in Washington is between military and civilian. I do not know the military well. It is therefore possible that I have mistaken them. Yet my limited experience is so consistent that I will state it: the military career officer in Washington representatively has decidedly more character than the civilian. A colonel will handle himself with more consistent self-respect, in dealing with a Senator, than will a civilian career division chief. The colonel will also conduct himself more consistently with dignity in his relations with the general than will the civilian division chief in dealing with his superior. Professionalism, colleagueship, public esteem, and security seem the decisive differences—all operating in favor of the military. The career civilian official in the federal government lacks the respected social standing of a professional, and he also lacks the internal self-possession.

For at least twenty years now, I have—at long intervals—repeated the same question game with people who know the federal civil service well. What would happen, in the civil service in Washington, if a native-style American dictatorship were to come to power—perhaps after the shattering blow of America's defeat in war? I have never known an informed and sincere person to give but one answer: if the coming to power was as smooth as Hitler's, at least 99.9% of all civil servants would probably report to work—and continue to work—as if nothing had happened. Hannah Arendt has made it easier to play this game by giving us a little Eichmann, smaller than the historical one but correspondingly better for this exercise. How many Eichmanns then in the Washington civil service? Thousands upon thousands.

Do the federal Professors make a difference? No and yes. No, in the representative case, with respect to those who have transferred their career aspirations to Washington permanently—after having attained an academic Professorship. Neither the education nor the previous life-style of a Professor seems to make for any character gain. In my experience, these ex-Professors are perhaps even, as a group, slightly more ambitious and slightly more sycophantic than the average career civil servant of the same rank. But this difference is marginal. Much clearer is the distinction of the *temporary* federal Professors. In them, by the circumstances of their non-commitment, there is far greater independence. Character makes a clear gain. Quite consequently, from these Professors who are determined to stay in government work only a year or two, the federal service makes a decisive profit. I wish there were more of them.

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VII

A young man in the federal service told me about a year ago, perhaps vaingloriously, that he had played an important part in drafting a speech for a high political officer. "This was the big speech," he said, "and my draft ran, 'The problems of government are moral and political, not merely technical and managerial.' They changed that slightly," he said, with laughter in his eyes, "to make it read, 'The problems of government are not moral and political but technical and managerial. But, you see, they preserved my skeleton!"

The story is almost too pat to be true. I take it for a convenient fable.

The federal government does not recruit the Professor for his judgment, his perspective, or his character. It employs him as a technician or manager, esteeming his technical and managerial ability—real or imaginary. How much real and how much imaginary, it would be vain to estimate. I have listened to a Professor in the New Frontier boldly declare himself an expert in petroleum economics, about which, I suspect, he had little more than an intelligent amateur's knowledge. I have listened, even more recently, to another federal Professor discoursing about British politics, with every presumption of expertise but in terms which suggested rather less acquaintance than would be common among knowledgeable newspapermen who had, at some time, been stationed in the British Isles. But I think Washington profits from having a considerable number of Professors around, at all times, even when their technical expertise is not of a high order. Generally, the federal Professors are not modest and retiring but, on the contrary, rather assertive and self-important. To be intellectually purse-proud is their most common mark. Their vanities clash with the vanities of the career officers, and such abrasion is, I think, a good thing.

In the eyes of the political high command, the Professors serving in Washington justify themselves as technicians and managers. I think the federal government would be the loser if that justification came to be believed unsound.

The federal Professors do not, I think, contribute anything to Washington in structured views of the great problems of American politics. The Professors do, I believe, contribute something in other perspectives, something of character, most as technicians. No man can give what he does not have.

I hope the Professors will continue to some to Washington—particularly as sojourners and transients.

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Lewis Coser

SOME REFLECTIONS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM TODAY

The freedom of publication, speech, and opinion that is claimed by the university professor is not in principle different from that claimed by other men in liberal society. Difficulties surrounding academic freedom in the past arose mainly from the fact that the academician is also a salaried employee who claims the license to disagree with the views of those who provide or administer the funds from which he is paid. Arthur O. Lovejoy put it neatly, "The principle of academic freedom asserts . . . that those who buy a certain service may not (in the most important particular) prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered." Members of the academic professions have usually based their claim for freedom on the idea that their socially indispensable functions cannot properly be carried out if their performance is dictated or controlled by those who pay for it.

Claims of this sort depart widely from the mores of a business society. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the American university, after successfully freeing itself from clerical domination, found it difficult to impress on trustees and regents the idea that he who paid the piper was not to call the tune. Until fairly recently most academic freedom cases could ultimately be traced to conflicts between men committed to the ethos of disinterested scholarship and men committed in their everyday affairs to the principle that payment should be based on the rendering of satisfactory services.

In the leading American colleges and universities the struggle for academic freedom has by now been almost won. But too often we forget or neglect the fact that matters are still very different in those academic institutions which come in the middle or near the tail of the academic procession. About such institutions one can still hear frightening stories—or read about them in almost every issue of the American Association of University Professors *Bulletin*. These are stories of trustee-inspired victimization of teachers because they are alleged to be unorthodox in matters of sexual behavior (or in expression of views about such behavior). And while witch hunting for "reds" on the faculty, once the favorite activity of not-very-knowledgeable trustees, has now somewhat subsided, it still persists in many places. Moreover, a number of other issues are still very much alive:

1) The academic freedom of students, as distinct from faculty, has been poorly protected. In a number of colleges the administration, most often probably because of trustee or regent pressures (or because of the expectation

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of adverse reactions from such men), has denied students the right to invite speakers of their own choosing. Even when their right to hear "controversial" opinions from their own faculty has been safeguarded, such rights have often been curtailed when "contamination" by outsiders was feared.

2) There have been a number of cases recently, the South being only the most conspicuous one, where state legislators, witch-hunting District Attorneys, local patriotic and veterans societies, rather than trustees, have been the main movers in restricting academic freedom.

3) Perhaps one of the major reasons why there are not more academic freedom cases at the moment is very simply that there aren't very many radicals around. A handful of members of the Young Socialist Alliance at Indiana University has been hounded by the County Prosecutor for alleged subversive activities after they participated in a protest meeting against the Cuba blockade last year. Probably there would have been similar moves in a number of other campuses, had any radicals been available for attack.

Yet, despite the seriousness and frequency of such little-noticed incidents, one cannot help feeling that during the last few years there has been a marked decline in the infringement of academic freedom by trustees and other outsiders, at least in the more representative institutions. And this, in turn, has tempted some people to conclude that since the old enemies of academic freedom seem to be routed, the battle is won. The result has been a mood of academic complacency which fitted neatly with the generally complacent spirit of America in the last fifteen years. I take this view to be profoundly mistaken.

Even if one were to grant that outside attempts to control the ineffectual performance of professors no longer constitutes a major problem, this does not at all imply that the survival of academic freedom is insured. In the first place, the very expansion of the university has created a vast internal bureaucratic apparatus of deans, directors, registrars, administrators of the most variegated kinds; and these "captains of erudition" exercise a kind of control over their faculties which is quite different from that wielded by trustees or regents. It is a control much blander, more polite and pleasing, but at times also more insidious. I suspect that nowadays when administrative officials wish to censor a member of "their" academic staff, they will seldom resort to old-fashioned methods of reprisal or threat. They will instead ask the erring professor to consider "the good of the university," "the spirit of the team," "the feelings of the community." Where the old-fashioned president, under the prodding of his trustees, was wont to swing a meat axe, the newer organization men will flick the stiletto. And before the stiletto, the bribe: promotion, raises, leaves of absence, will be offered the erring professor. (Such subtle pressures, one might note in passing, are likely to be the most effective with graduate students and with untenured members of the faculties. One reason why relatively few sanctions are needed in order to bring the tenured faculty into line is the simple fact that the weeding-out process which begins in the first year of graduate school operates with such efficiency that few rebels survive Ph.D. training and the early teaching years.)

Just as in the business community the tycoon has by and large been re-

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placed by the managerial glad hander, so within the academy new administrators armed with human-relations skills have taken over. I do not wish to imply that these men are in principle against academic freedom. On the contrary, you can watch them practically every week making impassioned speeches in its defense at fund-raising dinners. The matter is much more subtle than that. Being committed to a bureaucratic outlook on life, an outlook in which the removal of organizational friction is seen as a primary task, they quite naturally distrust "trouble makers" who might upset the desired routines. It is not that they love academic freedom less but that they love efficient operation more.

Nor is the internal operation of the academic bureaucracy the only issue. Academic administrators are now part of a much wider web of power and influence which links them with their likes in public and private fund-granting institutions. No university commands an independent budget sufficient to provide the necessary money. Local funds must be supplemented from the outside. And both foundation and government officials are likely to use criteria in making grants which match those of their brethren within the academy. They too are likely to distrust not unconventionality *per se* —in fact they have been known even to seek out an occasional odd-ball. They distrust those unconventional men who cannot be fitted into organizational plans of research teams or who do not stay in academic niches.

Here, then, are further pressures which tend to curtail the chances for articulate dissent within the academic community. Nor need this be seen as a crude decision by which "good guys" are being rewarded and "bad guys" penalized. It is rather a selective process operating, as it were, by means of a series of close-meshed sieves through which the faculty is passed. Gradually the usable particles are separated from the coarser ones—and the latter are refused access to research grants or generally pushed aside. At no point can it be definitely established that their academic freedom has been infringed upon, for nothing that is done is open or clear-cut or even deliberate. The rebellious professors are not usually fired; but once it has been intimated to them in a variety of ways that they are not very welcome, only those with unusually thick hides will stick it out.

Three years ago the University of Illinois discharged an assistant professor of biology, Leo F. Koch, for publically criticizing conventional standards of sexual morality. In a letter to the student paper Koch had said, "with modern contraceptives and medical advice readily available . . . there is no valid reason why sexual intercourse should not be condoned among those sufficiently mature to engage in it . . ." Koch's dismissal created a storm of indignation within the academic community and beyond. The American Association of University Professors placed the University of Illinois on its list of censored administrations, and the case is still before the courts.

This case, although recent, still fits an earlier pattern. The newer kinds of infringement of academic freedom are not likely to receive such publicity, in fact they are not likely to be known at all beyond small inner circles. Koch's case was widely debated. Who has ever heard of the—not entirely mythical—case of the chemist who insisted upon coming to the laboratory in sandals and in unstock-

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inged feet, only very rarely entrusted his hair to a barber, was known to have insulted a dean while in a state of slight inebriation at a faculty cocktail party, and was subsequently told that the university did not see fit to support his grant applications, and would take a dim view of his chances of achieving tenure?

Sixty years ago William James could proudly say at a Harvard Commencement Dinner, "Our undisciplinables are our proudest product." It is no longer so. Not because modern administrators are corrupted by vices from which earlier administrators were exempt, but rather because the older pattern of the few elite universities, still reminiscent of a medieval community of scholars, could permit "undisciplinables" a freedom that has been much more difficult to grant in highly bureaucratized organizations. In bureaucracies men not fitting into the table of organization might create administrative havoc far transcending their immediate and direct impact. All this does not mean, of course, that modern universities still do not have their share of eccentric professors. They have. Yet many observers have pointed out that over the years the denizens of faculty clubs, even in major universities, have tended to look more and more like executives of major corporations. Those who do not fit the new pattern have gradually been eliminated by death or the dean. Yet, to quote Kenneth Burke's memorable maxim: "People may be unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness." The means of academic administration are in danger of subverting or deflecting the ends of academic life.

Is all this far removed from the issue of academic freedom? I do not think so. Eliminate from the university all those for whom the freedom to think differently is a vital necessity, and there would remain no potential for the infringement of academic freedom. But there would be no academy left either. Academic freedom would then, in Paul Goodman's phrase, simply mean the freedom to be academic.

The first president of Harvard, Henry Dunster, resigned when he found, after prolonged searching of his conscience, that he could not approve of infant baptism, the accepted theological doctrine. He closed his presidency by interrupting a baptismal service at Cambridge with a speech against infant baptism and the "corupcions stealing into the Church." He was not formally dismissed, but he had to leave when he refused to suppress the heresy. Here was a man who insisted that a professor must profess.

How many professors are there today who have even given a thought to the etymological roots of the term professor? The majority of men who crowd the faculties believe very simply that they have been given a license to teach and do research within the specialized areas of their competence. In fact, they are often more conservative in their views than academic administrators. To them, one feels, academic freedom is about as relevant as the residual right of every American citizen to make a "citizen's arrest." It is a freedom deprived of meaning through persistent non-use. Yet, as long as there still exists a minority of professors who do profess, the defense of academic freedom against the backwoodsmen in search of moral deviations or political sins, and against the suave orgmen who wish to mold the faculty in their own image, remains a vital necessity.

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Philip Green

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

One of the striking intellectual phenomena of the past decade is the academic literature on military strategy: a literature produced not by military planners but by social scientists writing from within the academy or from such havens as the RAND Corporation. This literature has had a two-fold effect on the social sciences. Much work is being done on problems that once were almost completely outside the range of social scientists. And for the first time social science has become important in national policy-making. As Joseph Kraft has written in *Esquire,* "Collectively [Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling] are the vanguard . . . of a new element in the counsels of American government: the Academic Strategists." Their great contribution has been to spell out "a coherent body of doctrine: a theory of war and peace in the nuclear age."[1]

The relationship between this doctrine, known familiarly as the theory of nuclear deterrence, and the body of academic social science is very strange. I think it fair to assert that, with the exception of classified material, there is *superficially* nothing in the discussion of strategic issues that is beyond the level of any competent intellectual. The basic questions in this field—minimum deterrence vs. "overkill" capacity; first-strike capability vs. second-strike commitment; limited retaliation vs. massive retaliation; the relationship between civil defense and alternative strategies—are grasped without too much difficulty once they have been posed. And while it may take a Herman Kahn to think of some especially subtle ways of posing them, the issues Kahn raises are not at all subtle. Moreover, the entire discussion of nuclear strategy seems at first glance to be primarily *political,* so that one's choice among possible strategies (including strategies of disarmament) would seem to be dictated in part by the picture of the world one hopes to see realized. From this perspective the academic strategists should be seen merely as technicians pointing out the implications for practical action of different world-views, without being able to effect basic policy choices.

This is not, however, the position in which informed public opinion currently places the academic deterrence strategists; nor is it the position in which they wish themselves to be placed. On the contrary, what is novel is their insistence that a proper understanding of their expert opinion forces the rational reader or policy-maker to prefer *one policy alternative.* The weight of professional expertise is implicitly or ex-

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plicitly asserted to favor the particular national strategy of nuclear deterrence. The oracular statements found in Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* and *Thinking About the Unthinkable,* Oskar Morgenstern's *The Question of National Defense,* Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* and *Strategy and Arms Control,* Glenn Snyder's *Deterrence and Defense,* and in the scattered writings of Morton Kaplan, Daniel Ellsberg, Klaus Knorr, A. L. Burns, and Albert Wohlstetter, all more or less depend on this asserted connection with the expert findings of an academic discipline.[2] The conclusion to which one would be led by a casual reading of their work is that those who oppose a policy of nuclear deterrence do so out of wilful bias or ignorance or both. A disciplined mind, it is implied, leads one infallibly in the direction they have taken.

II. *Herman Kahn, Systems Analysis, and Civil Defense*

The most well-known of the attempts to infuse deterrence doctrine with the stuff of "science" is that of Herman Kahn, who wishes to demonstrate that a version of deterrence which includes an American first-strike capability is feasible. But the piece of systems analysis upon which Kahn's theorizing is based—RAND Report R-322-RC, *A Report on a Study of Non-Military* [*Civil*] *Defense* (July 1, 1958)—is quite devoid of the saving virtues of systematic scholarly work. I will take up only a few of the more obvious deficiencies in this report.

1. The purpose of systems analysis is, in the words of Wohlstetter, to apply "the method of science to the analysis of political-military strategic alternatives."[3] Kahn's essay leaves one in doubt that this can be done. For while his purported subject is the operation of civil defense in nuclear war, he has not in fact studied either of these phenomena separately or in tandem—since neither has ever existed. Instead, he has made some very complicated extrapolations based on arbitrary assumptions chosen by himself and his colleagues; it would appear that a conclusion is more substantial if it has been mathematically calculated from premises than if merely presented as a personal opinion. But assumptions are personal opinions too, until one gives some reason for extending credence to them. Of what use is "the method of science" when there are no data upon which it can operate? Nothing, one is tempted to say, will come out of nothing.

2. Kahn's assumptions *might* be treated as data if they seemed reasonable, but one is hard put to it to find any reason for adopting this view. The root assumptions of the RAND Report appear to involve the expected size of an attack in a nuclear war, the expected number of dead, the expected number of genetic casualties, and the expected effects on our economic institutions. Despite Kahn's efforts to be "pessimistic," his estimates of the megatonnage that might be delivered in an all-out nuclear war are already outdated. The purpose of systems analysis, according to Kahn, is to analyze dynamically the way the nature of a strategic system changes over time due to an opponent's reactions to it (and one's own reactions to his reactions). But Kahn has violated this purpose by fixing his analysis on a given stage of

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the nuclear arms race. This is due not to his inadequacy as a theoretician but simply to the impossibility of being prophetic about social and technological change in the "scientific" manner which systems analysis prescribes.

Kahn's assumptions about casualties in a nuclear war are similiarly worthless. At various points, he posits the result of a "likely" nuclear attack as between 2 and 90 million dead; he hardly ever repeats the same figure. With this kind of "data," one can prove anything. As for his economic analysis, it consists of the single remarkable proposition that an industrial economy is in no way an organic phenomenon, so that destruction of any part of it would not seriously affect the functioning of the rest, nor the general destruction of key industrial and service centers prevent full-scale recuperation for very long.

3. Kahn's presentation is largely unaccompanied by any reference to scholarly authorities, and this calls to mind the striking fact that *On Thermonuclear War* (as well as the original RAND Report) is completely devoid of the kind of documentation that has traditionally been required of reputable scholarly work. This is especially striking when one comes to question Kahn's pollyannaish extrapolations of genetic damage from nuclear attack. There are conflicting arguments on this point, but the reader is left in the dark as to the justification for the figures Kahn has chosen. Kahn's analysis is, as the scientists say, non-replicable, because there is no apparent principle behind his choice of data in any given instance. In most cases, the various factors, ratios, correspondences, and other mathematical calculations with which he "demonstrates" his findings, are entirely figments of his imagination. By overwhelming the reader with these fictitious calculations, Kahn hides the fact that the analysis of strategic systems in nuclear war involves almost total ignorance, and demonstrates nicely that one can prove anything at all if one uses the right numbers.

4. There are other ways to prove anything one wants. Kahn's forays into second-hand historical analysis, and the creation of "war games" and "scenarios," offer a case in point. In both these areas Kahn uses a highly tendentious analysis to argue that, since anything can apparently happen in war (though he offers no reason to believe that any of his scenarios are *likely* to happen) we must devote endless resources and emotional energy to being prepared for everything. Yet the contradictory conclusion that we should instead look desperately for ways to disarm so obviously suggests itself that one wonders why Kahn has not considered it. The answer is that he has not really considered alternatives —and indeed it is inconceivable to imagine his having done so, given the inadequacy of systems analysis for studying even *one* system. Disarmament and "surrender" (surely one simple way of surviving), having received no "scientific" attention, merit only Kahn's contempt, whereas the fantasy of civil defense is treated as sober, serious stuff.

5. Having thus assembled out of his imagination all the material necessary to cook his results, Kahn fails completely to do what he has

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promised: analyze survival in a nuclear war. In the whole history of intellectual controversy the following passage from *On Thermonuclear War* is surely the most graphic example of self-declared inadequacy:

> But perhaps what is most important of all, we did not look at the interaction among the effects we did study.
>
> In spite of the many uncertainties of our study we do have a great deal of confidence in some partial conclusions—such as, that a nation like the United States or the Soviet Union could handle each of the problems of radioactivity, physical destruction, or likely levels of casualties, *if they occurred by themselves*. . . . [Emphasis added.]
>
> But if all these things happened together and all the other effects were added at the same time, one cannot help but have some doubts. [pp. 91–2.]

If this is the nature of "systems analysis," we could clearly do with less of it. And I do not think that this is merely a case of Kahn's unwillingness to face the demon he has conjured up. Rather, what is revealed here is the hollowness of the idea of a dynamic *scientific* analysis of "political-military" strategic systems. Only the prophetic literary imagination can discover the historical future; "science" can not.

In sum, Kahn's "science" is spurious, and as a prophet he apparently does not convince even himself; it is only as a propagandist-salesman (he is fond of citing "objective studies") that he can honestly be said to carry real conviction. It is thus with great bafflement that one sees Knorr praise Kahn for his "masterly command of method," and Wohlstetter chide the original Pugwash *conferenciers* for daring to set themselves up as authorities on nuclear war even though "not one to my knowledge had done any empirical study of military operations likely in a nuclear war"—as though the use of computers made studies like Kahn's any more "empirical" than Bertrand Russell's views.[4]

III. *The Formal World of Game Theory*

The impact of Kahn's work on other deterrence theorists, and the willingness of the latter to confuse salesmanship with science, suggest that some general process of intellectual obscurantism is at work. This suggestion is strengthened when we see the uses to which the academic strategists have put von Neumann's and Morgenstern's games theory.

In his influential *The Question of National Defense* Morgenstern is explicit about the link between deterrence theory and the theory of games:

> The parallelism of these efforts with what goes on in games such as poker is apparent. One should therefore expect that an understanding of these games would be helpful. This is the domain of the mathematical theory of games of strategy. It has, indeed, produced rules of behavior which are directly applicable to military problems of the kind outlined here. We shall have an opportunity to draw at least one fundamental lesson later . . . [cf. p 78].

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The "fundamental lesson" drawn from the theory of games is that it is in the interest of the U. S. for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa. This "sounds paradoxical," but "It is *possible to give a rigorous proof*. The argument is complicated and difficult; it makes use of notions of the mathematical theory of games of strategy . . ." (p. 78). No doubt, since Morgenstern is more frankly a propagandist than most of those writing about deterrence (a virtue under the circumstances), his references to game theory can be discounted as hyperbole. But the presumably scholarly essays of writers such as Morton Kaplan, A. L. Burns, Daniel Ellsberg, and Glenn Snyder cannot be similarly discounted.[5] Ellsberg tries to do what Morgenstern only coyly suggests. The others all attempt to pass off their use of the language and methodology of game theory as merely academic examples of strategic reasoning. But since the examples invariably demonstrate the beneficent effect of deterrence doctrines with which these authors are otherwise associated, one can hardly take the attempt seriously.

It is thus with some surprise that one notes how defective game theory is for the purpose of justifying a particular policy choice. This defect is so obvious, and has been pointed out so clearly by writers such as Anatol Rapoport, Karl Deutsch, and the mathematical economists, Luce and Raiffa, that I will merely note a few fundamental difficulties.[6]

1. The first requirement for using game theory is that one be able to give numerical weight to values, so as to be able to compare expectations from different strategic choices. Although von Neumann and Morgenstern have demonstrated that this is theoretically possible, there is no reason to believe that it can be done practically with regard to the kind of "goods" that are involved in national survival. But there is an even more crucial point here. Unless the idea of deterrence (as opposed to disarmament, first-strike, etc.) has some kind of epistemological and ontological requiredness (like Kant's categories, for example), then only *some*—not all—values of the American people can logically be associated with the particular strategy of deterrence. To say, then, that a strategy of deterrence is "rational" implies that one knows exactly what American value patterns are. None of these authors knows anything of the kind. The complicated essays of Ellsberg and Kaplan, and the uncomplicated rhetoric of Morgenstern, merely demonstrate that if one posits a national value system in which the values particularly associated with deterrence are the *only* values, then it is rational to attempt to deter. No doubt; but to adduce game theory in support of this redundant proposition is pretentious.

2. All the writers in this field are agreed that war is an example of a "non-zero-sum-game." That is, rather than one side automatically winning what the other loses (as in a zero-sum game such as two-handed poker), each side can win something (as in the joint preservation of peace with honor), or each side can lose (as in a mutually destructive nuclear war), etc. But as Luce and Raiffa point out in their authoritative work, the theory of non-zero-sum games is at present a very fragile

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and tenuous structure.[7] The chief problem is that for a given "game" there is usually not one clearly "rational" solution. To put it simply, since a player does not automatically win what his opponent loses (or vice-versa) he cannot be sure that the strategy from which he gains the most is the one that satisfies him the most, if only because he also has an interest in the size of his opponent's gains (and vice-versa). With both sides in this two-pronged utility analysis, the result is not one "best" outcome, but rather what economists call a "negotiation set," within which there are several or many possible solutions over which the players must bargain. But since it is a bargain that is being undertaken, one cannot analyze the process without having, as Luce and Raiffa put it, a complete psychological and economic profile of the opponents.[8] Needless to say, no deterrence theorist has any such guide at hand; practically speaking, how much a given nuclear power will put up with in a crisis is a matter for sober scholarship in the field of world politics (if such is possible) and for the inspired guesswork of statesmen.

3. An even more decisive objection is that game theory is a static theory; it can hardly be applied usefully to the dynamics of conflict in world history. In the real world there are no utilities, probabilities and expected payoffs fixing the parameters of a given "game" until it has been played out. Rather, expectations modify values, and values modify expectations; short-run results modify long-run results. The contours of the real "game" of conflict are always changing, and one never knows at a given moment whether one is stating a policy (values), a strategy, or a tactic—nor even perhaps what the game is, or who the players.

4. Underlying all these objections is the obvious fact that human beings are neither rational nor knowledgeable in the way that the inhabitants of the game theorist's universe are. Purely instrumental choice unhindered by emotional or ideological blocks; complete relevant knowledge of one's own values and expectations and one's opponent's predictability: these exist only in the dream world of game theory. They are assumptions useful for exploring the logical implications of prominent terms in the theorist's vocabulary; they could not have less to do with a wise choice of national policies.

Thus, like Kahn's analysis, the analyses of these writers turn out to be ways of logically describing—but not of validating—policies they have previously chosen to support.

IV. *The Tacit Communicators of Thomas Schelling*

Recognizing the limitations of game theory but still hoping to show that there can be a more or less scientific foundation for national defense strategy, Thomas Schelling has attempted a major salvage operation, and in so doing has written perhaps the most respected treatise in this whole area. Essentially, the purpose of his *The Strategy of Conflict* was to point to ways in which the theoretical disabilities of game theory can be overcome in actual practice. His method was to put volun-

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teers into experimental (non-zero-sum) conflict situations in which their imperfect rationality and imperfect knowledge should theoretically have resulted in a failure to coordinate their strategic choices around a single point in their "negotiation set." His findings—to over-simplify greatly—were that on the contrary the experimentees often reached agreement, *without overt communication,* on the division of spoils. These agreements were made possible by the fact that the conflict situations contained within themselves simple psychological elements which coerced agreement between opponents. For example, two persons would be told, separately, to divide $100 into two piles representing their own share and the others'; if their divisions agreed they got the shares they had agreed on; if they disagreed, they got nothing. In most cases a 50-50 split was agreed on, and Schelling reasoned that such a division recommended itself in the nature of things. Thus he concluded that in a non-zero-sum (or partially cooperative) bargaining game—which is one way of describing Soviet-American relations—there were really fewer relevant variables necessary to the prediction of a "rational" solution than the formal theory of non-zero-sum games suggested. The prospect of opponents agreeing on a solution were correspondingly greater.

This and other more complicated experiments involving the communication of threats were intermingled by Schelling with comments about the possibility of setting tacit limits on war, implementing informal arms control agreements, making "brinkmanship" work, and deterring arms control agreements, making "brinksmanship" work, and deterring pose distinctive choices similar to the ones posed in the experiments: e.g., the "obvious" distinction between the use and non-use of nuclear weapons in limited war paralleled the "obvious" distinction between a 50-50 split and any other. Schelling concluded that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might be more likely to come to tacit agreements in situations presenting such distinct choices than the nature of the conflict between them would make seem likely.

Undoubtedly there is scholarly value in this work. Schelling's experiments brilliantly illumine the discrepancies between formal game theory and "game-playing" in the real world, and thus may help bring about the "reorientation" of game theory for which he calls. But only a very cautious reader can think that this exploration is what *The Strategy of Conflict* is really about. We have Schelling's own word:

> The essays are a mixture of "pure" and "applied" research. To some extent the two can be separated. . . . In my own thinking they have never been separate. Motivation for the pure theory came almost exclusively from preoccupation with (and fascination with) "applied" problems; and the clarification of theoretical ideas was absolutely dependent on an identification of live examples (p. vi).

That is a nice way of putting it. In the more polemical writings on arms control which have succeeded *The Strategy of Conflict,* Schelling has not been quite so nice. The "examples" of *The Strategy of Conflict* are merely put forward as possible ways in which the international situ-

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ation might be better organized; in the later works, they become the *best* ways, and other possibilities—general and complete disarmament, for instance—are treated with disdain.[9] The total impact of Schelling's work, in sum, builds up in a steady progression from academic theory to practical policy, and to separate the two aspects of his thought one would have to imagine him to be schizophrenic.

Again, then, it becomes important to look at the *uses* of this particular example of modern social science. Certainly, Schelling's version of game theory is more impressive than the formal version, from the perspective of practical affairs. But, just as in the cases mentioned above, the deterrence theorist has had to distort the obvious meaning of his "scientific" material in order to arrive at the political conclusions of deterrence theory. In Schelling's case, the various criticisms that can be made of his work really reduce to one—but a basic one: at no point has he made any effort to provide convincing linkages between the world of his experiments and the real world of international conflict. To mention only a few points: the stakes of the experimental games are minuscule or imaginary; the players' environments are not truly hostile; the threats made are not real threats, etc. Perhaps more important, the relationship between the players is simple, impersonal, and fragmentary; they are not emotionally or ideologically involved in the games; the game situations are without a historical or political context. Indeed, in many of the games—including the one I have described—there is no real conflict. What has all this to do with the Cold War, the specific situation Schelling is interested in?

The fact is that Schelling has imported into the structure of his experiments the one thing it was necessary for him to demonstrate independently if his work is to have valid reference to the world crisis: his experimentees are so culturally homogeneous that it is impossible to tell whether their tacit communication consists of an appreciation of the inherent nature of conflict situations, or merely of the meeting of minds which had already met in every essential long before Schelling put them in a laboratory. It is instructive to note that Morton Deutsch, by inducing something resembling real hostility among the volunteers in similar experiments, has arrived at tentative conclusions diametrically opposed to Schelling's, conclusions which to him suggest that the likelihood of reaching long-run understandings in the Cold War universe may be dim indeed.[10] Why should one "believe" Schelling's experiments, and not Deutsch's? More important, what kind of "social science" is it that leaps from such tenuously established hypotheses to policies involving the fate of the nation and the world? "Irresponsible" does not seem too strong a word to apply to this kind of theoretical "brilliance."

V. *The Rational Universe of Deterrence*

In all the instances I have so far discussed, there is a common assumption: that the political process is by and large rational. In the work of the game theorists rationality is conceived formally and relied on explicitly; Schelling and Kahn, by contrast, conceive of it more or

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less informally and rely on it only implicitly. Studying the literature of deterrence, one finds that this latter view of the rationality assumption is endemic, even where the analysis is not cast in as rigorous a form as it is by the writers I have mentioned.

Usually, the form in which this assumption is cast is implicitly or explicitly related to the familiar "common sense" version of rationality, which has been described by Harold and Margaret Sprout as follows:

> . . . the actor's psychological environment is assumed to correspond in essential respects to the operational environment in which his decisions are executed. [It is also] assumed that the individual applies his environmental knowledge rationally to the choice of ends achievable with the means at his command, and to the choice of appropriate means to achieve possible ends. That is to say, he calculates rationally the opportunities and limitations implicit in his operational environment. Finally [there is] the assumption that the actor upon the stage and the analyst who observes and interprets from the sidelines both perceive and evaluate the milieu of the actor in substantially the same way.[11]

Actually, however, the rationality assumption of deterrence theory is far more complicated and demanding than this description suggests. For what it really demands is that most decision-makers most of the time, in all the major nuclear powers, *act rationally toward the specific ends of a deterrence policy and no other ends, and be effectively knowledgeable specifically in the ways that will serve a working deterrence policy, and no other.*

Seen in this light, deterrence theory rests on an heroic assumption. If there is any evidence for the belief that to predict such consistent behavior of political decision-makers is better than a coin-tossing proposition, no deterrence theorist has seen fit to make it public. Some of the theorists have suggested that the concept of "national interest" *may* act as a special disciplining factor in international political behavior.[12] But this argument clearly rests on the peculiar bias of the postwar liberal internationalist, and on the historicist (and patronizing) idea that, say, a Goldwater would "have" to act with the liberals' version of rationality once he had the President's "responsibility."

To see how unlikely is this general claim, one need only note two points. First, even at times of greatest "rationality" the American government alone has the aspect of a battlefield in which the warfare between differing conceptions of what the "national interest" requires is fought out, often with no holds barred. Second, the information-gathering and communications processes in government, far from being in tune with "the operational environment," are subject to all the irrationality-breeding cold war pressures which I have already mentioned, to say nothing of simple human frailty.

The result is that available information is often not only inadequate but tendentious (if not simply distorted), as was so clearly revealed in the case of the fabulous missile gap. And fundamental to both difficulties is a defect in the whole concept of "decision-making"

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as a way of analyzing political behavior: a concept on which the notion of rational deterrence is implicitly based. International action does *not* simply consist of freely taken decisions by national and international actors, but is rather constrained by an historical process that may have decisive results long before a specific "decision" has actually been taken. Are the great powers historically capable of being rational in the way that deterrence theory demands? The theorists of deterrence have made not the slightest effort to confront this overriding issue in world politics.

Finally, there are two more important points about the conceptual foundations of deterrence theory. First, it is not at all clear that short-run and long-run rationality are invariably the same, and deterrence theorists offer no guide as to which may be expected to motivate nations. In the short run, those charged with protecting the nation's military interests will usually find it "rational" to take *any* military action that clearly promises a positive pay-off, whether the question be to initiate a situation of belligerency or to "escalate" the level of violence involved (*vide* President Eisenhower's recent statement that he favored using A-bombs in Korea if Red China did not agree to a truce). But in the long run, the accretion of such actions may lead to the destruction of international order or to an all-out nuclear war. An instructive recent example of obvious long-run irrationality based on rationalizing short-run calculations is the American decision to possess a clear first-strike capability against the Soviets, who are felt to be incapable of matching our effort. And so they are, probably: so that the next logical step for them is to move the arms race up a notch by developing some new super-weapon that will be destructive enough, and "invulnerable" enough, to unbalance the arms race all over again by destroying the security of America's retaliatory force (and also of any conceivable civil defense plan). Herman Kahn, of course, is the theorist largely responsible for this attack of *hubris,* and it is interesting to note that no other prominent deterrence theorist has taken issue with this policy—which would seem to indicate that as far as "rational calculation" goes, the blind are leading the blind. Such are the results when undisciplined "theory" and "science" are let loose.

Second, the tacit acceptance by virtually all deterrence theorists of the "rationality" (and thus morality?) of total war, is truly astonishing. A social science which subjects the most problematical questions of values to *raison d'état,* and thinks that this is a sufficient treatment of the matter, is no science at all—it is merely an ingenious form of propaganda. The question of values is *the* primal question of deterrence theory, and must continually be confronted; to sweep it under the rug so casually is to do society a major disservice.

VI. *Conclusion*

The ease with which the Academic Strategists leap from a world of inappropriate or unverified theorizing into the world of national policy augurs poorly for the future of the social sciences. No doubt a large part of the explanation of this phenomenon is the desire of

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certain persons to be influential, even at the cost of misusing their claims to professional competence. But I think something else must be added to this. One cannot read through the copious literature of deterrence without getting the impression that these writers genuinely imagine themselves to be unable to make meaningful statements unless these be cast in the form of scientific propositions which have either been in some sense verified or are soon to be so. The traditional tasks of the scholarly political analyst: to clarify alternatives systematically; to point to the underlying implications of common-sense statements, and the conjectural element in what is ordinarily assumed to be knowledge; to force the political actor to see that his simplified version of reality does not exhaust the possibilities; to separate the descriptive elements of a proposition from the ethical ones—such tasks seem no longer to interest those who would be practical physicists of the political realm.

The scholar without pretentions to "science" has not nearly as great a problem. He offers his advice as the limited wisdom of one whose only claim is to be more thoughtfully intelligent about such matters than the average man. But the "scientist," unwilling to believe that such limited forms of wisdom can be given analytical meaning, is forced to offer only the absolute wisdom of "science." However, the simple fact is that the new "scientists" of society have as yet no science or even the hope of one, but only the hope of the hope of one. Thus they are dangerously cast adrift, without a firm principle to guide them in the uses of an expert knowledge which is really extremely limited from a practical point of view. It becomes all too likely that some of them, having a strong personal interest in the fate of society, will put a distorted version of their knowledge and thus their professional reputations at the service of whoever can command their loyalty.

In the case of the deterrence strategists, the obvious dangers have been unhappily realized. The constant spurious references (the adjective is harsh but accurate) to a workable theory (or theories) of strategy can only have the effect of distorting genuine public debate. For when arguments are based on a "science" that is really non-existent, reasoned discussion is impossible. And there is a further negative effect on the public life of a democracy. The so-called "expertise" of these writers is inextricably bound up with a specific political posture vis-a-vis the Cold War —the posture, roughly speaking, of what Mills described as "the power elite." Now it is a fact of modern life that in a given area of knowledge "experts" command both more prestige and higher salaries than do "amateurs." Thus the temptation for those who are intelligent and interested in a given field is to become "experts" in it. If becoming such an "expert" requires not only a special education but also *the adoption of a particular political stance,* the potential effect on political life is both obvious and ominous. When supposedly scientific reputations are really based on a test of political acceptability, opposing viewpoints must more and more be arbitrarily blocked from getting a hearing.[18]

David Truman has argued in *The Governmental Process* that "ac-

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cess" to governmental decision-making organs, through available techniques of petition and pressure, is what chiefly defines the ability of different social groups to participate effectively in the democratic political process. The false attribution of expertness to an intellectual elite which is essentially a supporter of partisan policies, narrows rather than enlarges the channels of access. The pseudo-science of the deterrence experts is thus not only a disservice to the scholarly community; it is ultimately a disservice to the democratic process as well.

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1 "The War Thinkers," Joseph Kraft, *Esquire,* September, 1962, p. 103.

2 See especially Morton Kaplan, "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence," *World Politics* XI (Oct., 1958), pp. 20–43, and *Some Problems in the Strategic Analysis of International Politics,* Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 2, Princeton 1959; A. L. Burns, "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics* IX (July 1957), pp. 494–529; Daniel Ellsberg, *The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices,* RAND P-2183, 1960, and "Theory of the Reluctant Duelist," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 46 (Dec. 1956), pp. 909–23; Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37 (Jan. 1959), pp. 211–34 (and see Note 3 below); Klaus Knorr, "Foreword" to Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War,* and "Limited Strategic War," in the volume of the same name, ed. Knorr and Thornton Read, Praeger, 1962; and see also C. W. Sherwin, "Securing Peace Through Military Technology," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* XII (May 1956), pp. 159–64. This bibliography is of course highly selective; for a more thorough bibliography see the discussion by Richard C. Snyder, *Deterrence, Weapon Systems, and Decision-Making,* U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, October 1961 (distribution of which is unfortunately restricted).

3 Albert Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seers and Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 41 (April 1963), p. 478.

4 *Ibid.,* p. 468.

5 See Note 2 above; Snyder reference is to *Deterrence and Defense* (*Princeton* 1961).

6 Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Michigan, 1960); R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (Wiley, 1957); Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Communications and Control* (Free Press, 1963), ch. 4.

7 *Op. cit.,* ch. 5.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 120.

9 See, e.g., Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (Twentieth Century Fund 1961); and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Stability of Total Disarmament,* Institute for Defense Analyses Study Memo No. 1, 1961.

10 Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, "Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* VI (March 1962), pp. 52–76.

11 Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* I (1957), p. 316.

12 Glenn Snyder, "The Politics of National Defense: A Review," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* VI (Dec. 1962), pp. 371–2; Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics* XIV (Oct. 1961).

13 One writer, J. David Singer, has trenchantly criticized deterrence theory by using the theorists' own vocabulary and mode of reasoning to show that there are basic contradictions in the theory. This aspect of his work is useful, though without apparent public impact. However, when Singer attempts to put deterrence logic to his own uses as a "disarmament intellectual," its effect is entirely destructive, leading him to make a better case against reasonable proposals for nuclear disarmament than the one he makes for them. He thus unwittingly demonstrates the obvious fact that deterrence expertise was not designed to produce realizable disarmament proposals: the expertise remains tendentious, despite his efforts to neutralize it. [J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament* (Ohio State, 1962).]

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T. J. Ross

TEACHING POETRY IN THE PROVINCES

> *". . . Cram them full of noncombustible data, chock them so damned full of 'facts' they feel stuffed . . . 'brilliant' with information. Then they'll feel they're thinking, they'll get a* sense *of motion, without moving . . . Don't give them any slippery stuff like philosophy or sociology . . . That way lies melancholy . . . Don't let the torrent of melancholy and drear philosophy drown our world. We depend on you. I don't think you realize how important* you *are,* we *are, to our happy world as it stands now."*—Ray Bradbury, *Fahrenheit 451.*—

I

One afternoon, when I had finished a lecture on E. M. Forster at a university in the Southwest, a coed paused by my desk to ask, in all stammering earnestness, what I had meant by the inner l-life and the s-s-self. Coming from a senior, and an English major to boot, the query reminded me that the first law of teaching in this country is to take nothing for granted. I was led to consider the easy way one can go on about the Self and the Individual and Integrity from the somewhat creaky security of one's swivel chair. And I recalled the cautions of friends back East as I prepared to embark on this, my first teaching job: "They lack a certain dimension in personality down there. They're all boarded up. You'll find out." What I was to find out about my particular interlocutor was that in fact she came from New Jersey.

And lo! the other day as I referred in passing, though not so unwittingly, to Hamlet's *Weltschmerz* (in a Shakespeare course at a university in New Jersey), I was asked to explain what that was. I did so; the students seemed intrigued by the mood defined; and when, at the end of the hour, some came round the desk to check their notes on *Weltschmerz* further, I asked, in my turn, if this weren't, after all, a stock mood among adolescents. "You'd have to be *awfully* sensitive" I was told; it was agreed that though young people naturally have their "troubles," they are not nowadays sensitive *like that.* Did this mean that whatever nature Shakespeare was holding up the mirror to in his play, it wasn't theirs? And since we were reading the most popular play in a canon recognized by all authorities to be the most abundantly representative of the spirit and character of Western culture, where did this leave our class?

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Neither of these questions was actually raised, but we all had a sense of them, in the air, controlling the direction of what we did say. Since I had insisted on not doing Hamlet as a "crazy mixed-up" character, nor as one stuck in a single mood, nor as just another dread example of what happens to unrealistic spoiled boys, on whom we could peer down from some "mature" vantage point, we had had instead to stand our ground to the extent of this interesting—and disconcerting—confrontation. In squarely confronting the play's "strangeness," we were brought to see that if its strangeness were not ours, that fact did not make us any the less "strange" to behold—a usefully humbling lesson, I hoped, not so much on the matter of perspective (for students are, if anything, overconditioned to relativistic "approaches") but rather on the prerogatives of art, the past, and the self.

Not that students aren't usually humble; it's an unseemly paradox that in our land of super-democracy we so early become super-humble. How some popular brands of "humility" promoted in the schools block people off from what they've presumably gone to school to discover will be emphasized in the teaching experience I would like to consider here. I've put humility in quotes to suggest a common usage more discreet than accurate. The more telling word is: inhibition.

II

Some years ago, I taught a course in Modern Poetry in the "adult extension program" of a midwestern university. The class consisted mainly of elementary and secondary school teachers, most married, and all female, running in age from eighteen to sixty. Most of the group had degrees from schools of education and were in the course to gain additional credits for better pay. We met once a week in a grade school building located in a town in northern Michigan, where several of the members of the class themselves taught. I mention our meeting place because it was the materials displayed in our classroom which provided an initial eye-opener. Clipped from *Life* and other such educational "tools" and plastered all over the place were photographs of, and detailed news accounts about, Ted Williams, Lana Turner, Lana Turner's daughter, and the gangster who, some months before, had become celebrated after being slain in the star's residence. When our class had met a few times, I ventured to ask about this, and was told it was part of the Current Events Program of the children who met there.

> "I see. Ted Williams. But what about—"
> "This is the coach's homeroom. He teaches math, too."
> "—Lana Turner—and—"
> "He's a real bug on keeping his class up on Current Events. He brings in things and they bring in things. Sharing experiences as peers. He's such a hard worker! Not the quickest in the world but very serious."

One can guess whose features have adorned those walls since. Perhaps the most numbing aspect of the school atmosphere lies in the in-

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creasing similarity between its emphases and those of the world "outside." Differences between the two grow less as differences in mentality between teachers and television producers become invisible. It's a trend-wind, and the teacher who comes along in its wake will find steering an independent course rather than following lines of least resistance not easy.

We began with Emily Dickinson, and while I was glancing round at the pin-ups, a question about the poet's "morbidity" was raised—a standard opening gambit. I replied that yes, her hundreds of variations on the theme of dying show a morbid preoccupation which, though not the thing those of us busy in our own pursuits would normally be haunted by, is a central concern of the bigger poets, as of more serious clergymen, and so normal for anyone in either of those jobs. The gay brightness with which she asserts, and thereby controls, an inescapable fact of life allows her readers to confront that fact with greater consciousness and interest.

Still, students won't readily grant that such singular morbidities may be worth the candle. Doing a piece like Graham Greene's "The Revolver in the Cupboard" with freshmen, for example, will evoke cries of morbid, sick, mean and again, *not like us.* Well, he may be morbid, I said on one such occasion, but he's worth a million: he has motor boats, a fine family, is a devoted father and husband, and lives high off the hog; if it takes a morbid-powered fuel to get one up there, isn't it worth it? The majority reply without hesitation; no, it is not. Better the straight, narrow, and fairly sure than the speculative and subjective. This stiff-necked humility, or inhibition, as I've called it, is posited on "a fear of the dark," of those goads of self which can't be settled by the slogans of citizenship or pop psychology.

And so in the teaching of any of the arts whose "strength and purpose" as Stuart Hampshire puts it, is to "counterbalance and undermine the increasing burden of social utility and of social order" while restoring ". . . in some vivid form the memory of a private unconsenting self, a lost rebellion," one is continually on the defensive about the nature of one's subject. For many academicians the idea of so defending works which are, of course, their own justification, is outrageous and so they decline the gambit. The result is that their material is attended to as, paradoxically, nothing—but a part of the ordinary game—and then not seriously engaging.

The question inevitably following on "morbidity" has to do with "arrogance." Who do Dickinson (or Greene) think they are, anyway? In certain settings one can rapidly reply that "an understanding of her ironic mode will movingly reveal the 'essential humility' of Dickinson's vision as well as show her to be possessed of an endearingly homespun humor which she subtly injects into her compassionate metaphysic of Good and Evil," which redeems everything. Then everyone sits back in charmed passivity while you explicate levels of meaning like a magician pulling colored silks from a top hat. And after the show, with smiles

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and nods, everyone goes home. But this doesn't work too well with students who haven't yet learned that you must not say, "That poem stayed in my mind" but rather, "The skilled reader will be impressed by the symbolic resonance of the architectonic."

So I noted instead Dickinson's emphasis on spiritual power and agreed that she was arrogant. In any case, she goes over well. Granted her morbidness and arrogance, she wrote of books as being the best of "frigates" and mightiest of "prancing coursers"—an all-right attitude for the halls of education. There was also that parson in Philadelphia who seemed to have frustrated her in a way which provided a clear-cut motive for her strange activity; and she showed a due regard for God.

Not so Thomas Hardy who brought forward what, like most of my colleagues, I daintily called "loss of faith." To this, one usually appends some murmurings about an "ensuing crisis." Would the skies cave in, one wonders, if it were revealed that the loss of faith doesn't always entail a severe crisis? For Hardy it was surely more a shucking off than a loss; yet I refrained from observing that the tone of "The Oxen"—the anthology piece regularly used to show off a crisis-inducing discomfiture —is rather smug in its winsomeness.

As we breezed past this, none of us mentioned "atheism"; nor did we stop for any of the large and still pertinent questions Hardy asks about Christianity or for the larger questions they look toward. Critical views of religion are as unadmitted in education as in the other mass media. In the provinces, the mode of "communication" about religion and culture works on the tack of how the good Christians improved, or wiped out, the cruel pagans. Of course, the closest exegesis of Biblical allusions is standard; but even teachers sophisticated in expatiating on their material "in all its complexity" shy away from any other weaves in the complex. The quicker student, on the other hand, is concerned with the leading question most literate people are conscious of: Whether the Christian idea and ideals did not go up irredeemably in the smoke of the murder camps. The total evasion of such questions figures in the widely remarked student cynicism, "apathy," or "silence."

Indeed, if sex was the main Victorian taboo, ours is religion, a taboo which cuts across all brow-lines. A reason for the run on sex in fiction, one sometimes feels, is because it's the safest topic, the one a novelist can open up on without anyone minding. So too students are accustomed to their teachers' wry gags on sex—so long, that is, as Freud isn't referred to. Here we have a further evasion, for despite the amount of Freud-based scholarship in the journals, it is awesome to see how the thought of this "arrogant" figure is by-passed in the classroom.

It is to be expected that along with the lack of intellectual seriousness in the tone of our education, there will be missing too any sense whatever of aesthetic gaminess. Thus, a common complaint among professors of literature is their students' blankness toward irony. There are, of course, reasons for this which reflect on the complainers—like their blankness to any other playful aspects of art than official "modes" of ironism.

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III

This granted, it's still curious to observe how unfree students are to respond to the ironic or the gamy. Before we launched into the mainstream, I asked my class to write "cold" on the purpose-achievement-value of a piece they'd not before seen, Auden's "To an Unknown Citizen," which, the reader will recall, sets up rather a clay pigeon:

> . . . found by the bureau of statistics to be
> One against whom there was no official complaint,
> And all the reports on his conduct agree
> That, in the modern sense of the old-fashioned word
> he was a saint.
> For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.

and ends:

> Was he free? Was he happy? the question is absurd:
> Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.

The middle-aged teacher who'd told me about the Current Events Program wrote as follows:

> Here the author is writing about all the good characteristics of a citizen who has passed on. He seems to want to impress us with the citizen's good deeds. The author tries to have us remember nothing amiss about this one . . . He uses the reports of Industry, Psychology workers and others . . .
>
> The poem seems very different to me than Hardy's. His language appears trite.
>
> The last two lines of the poem, make one think that perhaps the author is afraid he has not proved his point up until then. He seems too anxious to be clearly understood.

The following is from a teacher and "active clubwoman":

> I feel that the poet's purpose in writing this poem is to show us that we do not need to be wealthy or famous to be happy. A person with an average income is perhaps the happiest . . .
>
> I think there is great value in this poem. Too many people who have a good job, a nice family, and the necessities of life are not happy. This poem should help such people . . .

Another of the teachers found this:

> . . . a memorial to the plain every day citizen I liked this poem as well as any we have studied . . . You could tell by this poem that this citizen was interested in country, home, and family and to me these are the things that make any country great.

Another enjoyed the poem because "there isn't any pessimism . . . I know quite a few men who would fit this description. Just doing the average things well . . ." Another teacher concluded:

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> Matthew Arnold said that poetry deals with idea rather than facts. In "The Unknown Citizen" the facts have served to bring out the idea that the ordinary citizen is free and happy.

Another meditated that "the citizens who are known are those who have done something wrong in Auden's opinion . . . However, I wonder if we should conclude that only wrong is known . . ."

Others got within better range, noting that ". . . Auden's attitude is satirical. He holds up a carbon copy of a man to ridicule," or "I had better get myself out of the shoes of the Unknown Citizen. Auden's language isn't as pretty as Housman's but his verse means more to me." This last was from a farm woman, a sometime reader (though not admirer) of Mickey Spillane, who had no teacher's college training so far. Saltier yet is the following, by a nurse:

> The author is evaluating the life of a citizen in an industrial state-controlled country; and showing the evils of such a state . . . the author gets his point across by using a kind of irony such as Hardy uses in *The Ruined Maid;* he uses humor in names and is witty. His closing line is very ironical—the question of whether he was happy or free doesn't ever come up—and again shows complete control of the state. They would have "heard" if he were not.

Few of my students got much beyond a skittishly personal reaction to the conformity-right-or-wrong business and on to the larger reference of the poem which has to do with the change in meaning from saint to "saint" and with the conflict of service to God or Community. Aesthetically conditioned by the mass media, they saw the poem as reassuring, or as detailing a specific "case" to be chewed over and psychologized about; they did not see it as presenting a criticism of general scope, or an idea. In like manner, they failed to note that Dickinson's most innocuous looking verses on books as frigates or locomotives as horses dealt actually with distinctions and grades of power—her favorite subject this side of death. Except for foreign affairs chat, the high and age-old questions of power, desire, conflict are kept muffled in our schools.

IV

A standard way of side-stepping such questions was suggested by the teen-age member of our class. In the most sublime of responses to Auden she found his poem "a wonderful tribute" to the American citizen, and so was perturbed by our subsequent discussion. She'd never heard of irony before; how could I be sure it was there? Besides, she'd been an A student in high school where they'd read lots of literature and loved it. On my asking what they'd read, she mentioned *A Farewell to Arms.* What had they said about the book? Talked about the characters. What about the characters? Well, you could see they were *crazy.* Had I seen the movie version? It brought that out very well; Jennifer Jones acted crazy all the way through, and was wonderful.

This response is clearly one of reflex rather than reflection; and the

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problem it raises is as clearly more a matter of native inhibition than of "native intelligence." Even more pervasive is the markedly inhibited tone of the following item, written by a new arrival to affluence, still teaching grade school on the side:

> Auden's purpose is to evaluate the citizen without saying anything critical about his character or ways of life. His opinions were of what was going on then, nothing of the past or future.

Which the writer finds commendable. The insistence is on living in the Current.

In the desire not so much to be a part of one's time as to be indistinguishable from it, one holds with passion to the rights of the Current. Any divergences are seen as weird, cute, or incomprehensible; and the two main divergences are craziness and pastness. As a freshman wrote on a theme shown me by a stunned colleague: "Unfortunately, I was not alive when Abe Lincoln was President, so I cannot speak with understanding about him." But means of this "I wasn't there, Jack" slant, one pays one's respects to, while holding at bay, the force of what otherwise might be imposing or discomfiting. The same holds for the most recent "news" as well—for once an event's or person's Currentness has been proclaimed and "explained" by the news media, he (or it) may be shelved as safely Past—and hence a mere matter of lore, and as suited to the attention of the lore-mongerer as batting averages or stars' lives.

Most writers on the arts assume that one cannot expect, in a mass society, any but a hip few to be seriously responsive to poetry. The irrelevance of this stock idea to the teacher in the liberal arts may need stressing here. Considering the ways in which students stumble over these arts, one must face the fact that the hue and cry about "innate capacity" and "proper background" begs the question—even though, by a pathetic irony, no one is more eager to join in the hue and cry than the undergraduate who hears so much about his lack of "proper background." More to the point now is the observable fact of current inhibitions: the suspiciousness or nervousness of students before such "universal" concerns as death, passion, danger, loneliness, sickness, hunger, luxury, pride, virtue, dream, fate. Which sums up as a curiously inordinate fear of life. In these remarks, I have observed this uniform fear in a few of its symptoms; I offer no catch-all solutions, nor want to.

The sense of student inhibitions may, however, remind us that it is not the teacher's first business to worry about "how the poet himself would read the poem," or how the Graduate School would read the poem, or how his wife reads the poem, but how his students read the poem. His aim, after all, is to get his subject across to them. How much inkling of the stuff gets through to how many will depend, among other factors, on its simply being made accessible. Alas, it is in the classroom, where "approaches" to the "mechanics of reading a poem" are daily rehearsed that the poem is least accessible; where, among Guidebooks and Toolbooks, the language of feeling shared and fed by ages past and passing is lost.

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Ronald Gross

TOWARD A TECHNOLOGY OF TEACHING

Factory workers who cringe under the Damocles' sword of automation might take heart by considering the college professor. This hardy laborer in the mills of knowledge has survived no less than four technological inventions, each of which should have rendered his primary work obsolescent. I mean the professor in his most familiar role, lecturing to a group of 25 to 30, or, as happens at institutions as disparate as Harvard and Hofstra, 250 to 300 students. The first technological innovation which should have made this kind of thing redundant was the invention of printing (1437). The second was the phonograph (1876), the third was radio (1920), and the fourth was television, which just may turn the trick. But the predominant portion of a student's education still comes directly from a teacher's larynx.

Which is all just a way of saying that the American academy is a technologically backward sector within a highly industrialized society. There aren't many machines on the campus.

This is about to change. Irresistible pressures are coming from three directions. First, soaring enrollments are pressing on limited faculty and facilities. Second, the surrounding society is demanding a radically more efficient system of higher education to meet the demand of technicians and administrators. Third, more effective methods of teaching are rapidly being perfected in the universities themselves.

Most faculty members simply refuse to see the significance of what is happening, because of their aversion to technical efficiency in education. Just as socialists characteristically confused the effects of capitalism with those of industrialism, so professors generally blame the growing regimentation of their institutions on an excess of administration and technology (the IBM phobia). They fail to consider that regimentation may be caused by the *lack* of really potent technology and administrative finesse. They fear that the need to run an even tighter academic ship is going to pervert the character of campus life. The question is: could they be wrong? Might it be that technology and increased rationalization of the academic enterprise offer the sole hope of maintaining the central values of liberal learning in an age of mass higher education? At a time when students come in "tidal waves," is it possible that the prompt and imaginative exploitation of technology and effective organization is the only way to *avoid* regimentation in collegiate instruction?

Industrial Revolution

A belated industrial revolution has

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been going on in the lower schools for the past decade. Despite the highly publicized "Great Debate," it is techniques rather than principles which have been changing. The influential reforms – teaching machines, televised instruction, national curriculum revisions by scholars and scientists, reorganization of the academic calendar and timetable–have vastly improved the schools' effectiveness in reaching the traditional goals of basic education.

Now higher education is coming in for the kind of criticism the lower schools have been exposed to since Sputnik. Criticisms of the effectiveness of collegiate instruction appear regularly in magazines and books–and this is no longer mere shoptalk, of interest only to insiders.

The reasons for public concern are obvious. The pressure of numbers is becoming terrific–college enrollments will double between 1960 and 1970, triple by 1980, and continue upward thereafter. The demand for highly trained professional personnel is growing rapidly. Increasingly the colleges are being recruited into the Cold War, with the job of producing "trained manpower." Finally, the colleges are under growing financial pressure. In the next decade public universities will have to show they are making efficient use of the increased tax funds they require, the larger private institutions will face inordinate demands on their resources, and many of the smaller private ones will undergo fiscal crises.

To meet these pressures from all sides–burgeoning enrollments, the demand for "brainpower," fiscal emergencies – the colleges will either have to increase the efficiency of their present techniques or adopt new ones. It is a fine question which course holds the greater danger of regimentation and deterioration of educational quality. Should colleges continue to rely solely on face-to-face teaching while the size of classes creeps upwards and small group discussions are slowly squeezed out? Or should they jump at once to mass instruction over television, and use the time thus conserved to provide intimate instruction?

I believe the campus will inevitably be "industrialized" to meet the demands being heaped upon it. But I think that, far from being the disaster some academics fear, this transformation of the college will lead to qualitative improvements in teaching and learning.

New Techniques

The quest for new techniques of teaching is one of the most pervasive and quietly powerful developments in the American academy today. Innovations no longer take the form of the experimental colleges of the late 1920's and 30's, the last great wave of change in American higher education. The current concern with improving the effectiveness of instruction (while taking its content and purpose largely for granted) gives a distinctive character to the kinds of change which are rapidly spreading on many college campuses.

What comprises the emerging technology of college teaching? First, television. A recent survey revealed that 16 of the 17 largest colleges and universities in the country are using some form of instructional television for credit. On campuses in nine states, students can take courses with leading professors at other schools via educational TV networks.

Many campuses are sensibly going

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on year-round calendars to make maximum use of space and facilities, thus serving more students without additional investment in plant. College administrators are eyeing management surveys and long-range plans for development as techniques of assuring orderly growth. The deployment of faculty is being altered in various ways, including the scheduling of different-sized classes for different instructional purposes. The use of teaching aids such as programed learning, audio-tapes for language teaching, and filmed lectures is widespread. Independent study is being introduced earlier nad in heavier doses, thus setting students on their own and freeing faculty members for other work.

A vision of the future, as these trends gather momentum, was offered last June in the *Atlantic,* in an article by Alvin C. Eurich, director of the Fund for the Advancement of Education. The author envisaged a typical university in the year 2000, in which instruction is carried on with the benefit of a wide range of electronic and mechanical devices. Individual students would be provided with programed learning materials, perhaps in a teaching machine, which would convey the essentials of each subject. Students would be taught in the mass over television. Only after they had mastered the rudiments of the subjects through teacher-surrogates, would they be exposed to live teachers. However, the time saved by presenting the elements of the subject through these packaged courses would be reinvested later to provide individual or very small group instruction for more advanced students. Thus, it is hoped, the students would receive a deeper education than can be provided by the present system.

Eliminating Waste

What is the significance of the developing technology of teaching? Most students and teachers would agree that much of American college education is wasteful and ineffective. Nathan Glazer recently pointed out that "a very large part of what students and teachers do in the best colleges and universities is sheer waste."

Consider, for example, the largest single category of instruction: those generally inept and dispiriting freshman and sophomore survey courses taught by struggling graduate students. Would it not be better to get one superb lecturer on television and bring him to all the freshmen, rather than putting them in the hands of academic novices justifiably preoccupied with their own fledgling research projects? ("Any teacher who can be replaced by a machine," says B. F. Skinner of Harvard, "should be.") Would it not be better to let students pick up the basics of a subject through some kind of mechanical presentation, if one could offer them truly first-rate tutorial instruction later, in small groups or private meetings?

The new academic technology promises to produce not only better teaching of the kind we have now (such as filmed or televised lectures more carefully prepared than classroom performances), but new forms of teaching. I. A. Richards has referred to programed learning, the basis of the teaching machines, as "curriculum on the cellular level"—a brilliant and suggestive metaphor. Once a course has been "programed," it is possible to measure its effectiveness in comparison with other presentations. One can also rearrange and revise specific parts.

Social pressures for improving the efficiency of colleges is so strong that

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these new techniques will certainly be used. The character of our campuses will inevitably change under their impact. It therefore becomes imperative to identify those essential qualities of academic life which are worth preserving. These must be distinguished from the amenities which are mere historical accidents of American higher education.

For example, consider the academic penchant for small classes. A series of studies at the University of Minnesota in the 1920s established once and for all that class size is a relatively minor factor in the effectiveness of college instruction. Of course, generous give-and-take between teacher and student is an essential part of any first-rate education. But the fact that a college has a low student-teacher ratio may merely mean that incompetent professors have the opportunity to "communicate mediocrity in an intimate environment." The value to be cherished is not minimal class size for all purposes and under all conditions. The essential value is personal contact with an able, inspiring teacher at a time when the student can benefit most from this contact. At other times, the student may do just as well—if not better—if brought into contact with a specialist via film or television, or with an expertly produced teaching machine program. By insisting that true education cannot take place unless the student is in the presence of a warm body, we frequently sacrifice the genuine values of effective instruction to the dogmatic demands of a cliche.

Controlling Technology

Granted, there is a danger here. Modern cultural history suggests that there is an inherent tendency for technology to run berserk; the railroad ends up riding on us. Can we be more sophisticated in education than we have been elsewhere? Can we exploit a system of instructional technology without becoming mere cogs in it ourselves?

Maybe, maybe not. But two attitudes can assure our domination by unguided technology. The first is the hope of most academics that this trend is not really going to prevail. Whether

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NOW IT'S ALL CLEAR . . .

"On page 3 this morning there is a review of 'Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933–1962,' the third and final volume of the history of the Ford Motor Company by Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill. Also in the bookstores is 'Timber and Men,' a biography of the Weyerhaeuser Company, by the Messrs. Nevin, Hill and Ralph W. Hidy. Common to both is a note in the introductory remarks that they were written under the supervision of Columbia University. What gives here?

" 'Oh, that's a device I perfected long ago,' said the cheerful voice of Professor Nevins over the telephone from the Huntington Library in California. 'The juxtaposition of a rich corporation with a poor author tends to arouse suspicion if moneys are paid directly to him. When the money is paid to an institution, which in turn pays the writer the usual academic salary and he gets no royalties, the suspicion is gone, and the writer keeps his independence. And it's history.'

"Professor Nevins said that particular poor author had no immediate plans for further contact with rich corporations, through a third party. . . ."

[New York *Times Book Review*, August 11, 1963.]

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we like it or not, the confluence of a new technology and a public demand for greater efficiency in education makes the drift towards the industrialization of the campus inevitable. The second dangerous attitude is that of the average administrator: that these improvements in technique have some intangible value in their own right, and that purposes worthy of them will develop automatically once they are installed. Here the mistake is in failing to realize that technology, that awesome but brainless beast, demands a rider who knows where he wants to go.

To respond to the prospect of the efficient college as a threat to liberal learning is unnecessary. What makes the technologizing of teaching seem ominous is the suspicion that, as new techniques are introduced on the campus, they will be used to reinforce the anti-liberal bias which prevails at most institutions. "The direction of educational thinking in America in the 1960s, as it has been in the 1950s, is conservative, restrictive, and reactionary," writes Harold Taylor, former president of Sarah Lawrence College. "The educational philosophy now dominant in American colleges and universities is not one in which the concern is with the liberation of talent within the student." It is *this,* not the use of more efficient organization and media of instruction, which constitutes the real threat to liberal learning today. Faculty members concerned about the survival of the richest traditions of university teaching will have to take their stand on essentials rather than on peripheral prerogatives if they want to have a voice in directing technology on the campus.

Technology enlarges the range of educational possibilities without revealing which of the new alternatives is most promising. It therefore demands of those who would use it fully and well, a firm grasp of their own basic purposes. Without such an understanding of what we are really about and why, the thrust toward the efficient campus could bog down in a morass of hardware and bureaucratic decrees. With it, the new technology of teaching just might lead to some radical improvements.

The PSYCHEDELIC REVIEW
VOL. I, No. 2 FALL, 1963

(1) J. K. Adams, "Psychosis: 'Experimental' and real." (2) R. E. Schultes, "Botanical sources of the New World narcotics." (3) T. Leary & R. Metzner, "Hermann Hesse: Poet of the interior journey." (4) J. Huxley, "Psychometabolism." (5) Editors, "The treatment of alcoholism with psychedelic drugs." (6) G. M. Fisher, "...dosage levels of psychedelic compounds for psychotherapeutic experiences." (7) F. Swain, *et al.,* "Four psilocybin experiences." (8) M. Barnard, "The God in the flowerpot."

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Thomas Hayden

CONTRA: IN LOCO PARENTIS

Several years ago, a number of students at Southern University in Baton Rouge were expelled for demonstrating against local segregation practices. In his letter of expulsion, President Feltin Clark invoked Rule 16 in the Southern University Student Handbook. The rule reads:

> *Lack of University Adjustment.* The University reserves the right to sever a student's connection with the University for general inability to adjust himself to the pattern of the institution.

For expelling these students whose fervor for freedom was inadjustable to the university pattern, President Clark was sharply criticized. Indeed, the attack on Negro college presidents generally has increased since student direct action began in 1960. The Negro college president, a recipient of state funds and an agent of the racial status quo, is loudly attacked by integrationists as a tyrant, a moral weakling, and an enemy of the hopes of a struggling generation.

Curiously, the attack on Negro college presidents is concentrated upon the issue of racial integration alone, and not on the issue of education that is also involved in Rule 16. Dr. Clark's actions are symptomatic of an educational philosophy and practice quite as undemocratic as, though less brutal and spectacular than, the philosophy and practice of racial superiority. What has "general inability to adjust to the pattern of the institutions" to do with acquiring a higher education in a democratic system? Why are our stylish social reformers, many of them college presidents and professors, not as critical of the paternalistic educational habits as they are of the "Uncle Tom" racial practices of President Clark?

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No part of the American university system is revealed more clearly by the Southern incident than the doctrine of *in loco parentis,* the key to an understanding of student extracurricular life. What exactly is this Latin phrase? According to the volume *College Law,* published by the American Council on Education:

> The power which the officers of a college may lawfully exert to restrict and control the actions of its students is based upon the fact that, in law, the college stands in the same position to its students as that of a parent—*in loco parentis* (in lieu of parents)—and it can therefore direct and control their conduct to the same extent that a parent can.

In fact, this means the university—that is, the incorporated institution run by the regents or trustees—circumscribes the form and content of student social life and academic pursuit. It is the moral guardian of the young.

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The historical origins of *in loco parentis* are ambiguous. Perhaps the doctrine evolved partly from the early English universities where faculty ownership was customary. This form of control, as Dean Kathryn Hopwood of Hunter College suggests, is "quite at variance with the genesis of the European universities, such as the ones at Bologna or Paris, where the students employed visiting scholars to teach them." In America, of course, ownership is removed from the hands of students and faculty, and the university is either a state agency or a private corporation.

If this tends to divest students and teachers alike of autonomy, certain other developments have led to the ascendency of *in loco parentis.* One of these, perhaps, was the decentralization of educational control and the establishment of a close relationship between home and school. The fact that many early American colleges were dominated by religious orthodoxies and dedicated to specific religious ends is probably relevant, too, in considering *in loco parentis.* Whatever historical events gave rise to the doctrine, it is by now deeply rooted in the American educational system. In one of the early colleges, for example, a master beat a student with a cane and the courts were asked to decide whether canings could go on outside the school buildings as well as within. The court said that the authority of the master extended beyond the limits of the classroom, a legal theory still relevant to the university and social action.

The doctrine of *in loco parentis,* however, is not a closed issue legally, as many deans would like us to believe. One student of higher education, Professor Gordon Klopf, acknowledges that while most legal precedent established the right of universities to serve *in loco parentis* "the real testing of this issue would vary from case to case and court to court." There is some evidence that state-financed universities are not necessarily responsible for the libelous material printed by their student editors. Or again, a recent Supreme Court decision involving Alabama State sit-in leaders indicated that due process is a right every student can demand: and if due process, what other constitutional rights? There are plausible grounds, furthermore, for claiming that first amendment restrictions, such as speaker bans, are not constitutional. These trends help to perforate the solid legal justification of *in loco parentis.*

The fact that *in loco parentis* has any legal base at all is not so much an index of its innate virtue as of university and community approval of the doctrine. When a dean dismisses anti-*in loco parentis* crusades by legalisms, he is evading the moral and educational issues. He is confusing the legally founded "right" of the university to act *in loco parentis* with the legally unfounded "responsibility" to do so. Moral and educational decisions must be made prior to invocation of *in loco parentis.*

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It is paradoxically discriminating that our vaunted "educational elite," the people that society places its best hopes upon, are subjected to greater social restrictions than most any persons of comparable age, save imprisoned convicts. To go to college involves a partial surrender of the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and often the freedom of privacy. It means arbitrary hours for women students and compulsory functions

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for both sexes. It means the "double jeopardy" of receiving punishments from the university for crimes committed in and adjudicated by the city. It means tolerating personal dossiers and students who spy for the dean of men or congressional investigating committees. It means the supervision and regulation of privacy. It means living under threat of punishment for "conduct unbecoming a student" or "inability to adjust to the university pattern." Margaret Mead had commented forcefully on the distinction between the work force and student force in the same age range:

> A handful of tugboat employees or flight engineers, because of their admitted rights in a complex system in which they are working members, can hold up a city or a country until their demands are met, but in some states students are not even allowed to vote.

And, unlike parents of students not in college,

> parents of studying children must both support them and, correlatively, retain control of their conduct or delegate comparable control to some quasi-parental educational institution. In either case the student is treated like a dependent child.

Needless to say, student extracurricular activities are organized with this dependent status clearly in mind. The philosophy of student activities is articulated by most universities as either the "preparation" theory or the "privilege" theory. The first and most important of these goes like this: college is a "preparatory" period when the student, through incubation, is equipped with the skills he will need later in life. "Preparation" means involving the students in a make-believe laboratory world of student activities where they can safely practice being a citizen. This process is affirmed by one dean of students in these terms:

> I propose a system whereby we use our decision-making processes as teaching tools, allowing students the opportunity to observe, criticize, and question, but not actually to exert direct control. The element of "let's pretend" has some value as a way of teaching.

Is this a serious educational philosophy? It is certainly a feasible way to remove substance from politics. It neatly sterilizes the content of debate and controversy. It is a convenient means of preserving the university status quo, maintaining harmony with legislators, rich alumni, and worried parents. And, nicely enough, all in the name of building democracy!

But does a student really learn from making decisions that can have no certain consequences, that are posed and controlled and subject to veto by the dean of students acting *in loco parentis*? Surely not. For any decision to constitute a useful learning experience, the individual must accept the responsibility for its consequences. And some decisions must affect the local status quo if decision-making is to be distinguished from the boredom of perpetual rehearsal.

Linked to this theory that college life is a preparation for democratic life is the administrative creed that attendance at a university is "a privilege, not a right." This follows the narrow line of argument that the student chooses to attend such-and-such a university, pays his tuition, enters a contractual relation, and must leave at the University's insistence. The student is essentially an outsider, someone who takes what he gets, or else. But if this be one's conception of the relation of the student to his academic community, then the academic com-

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munity will hardly obtain certain of its social and educational ends. Socially, the ends will be thwarted by the segregation of the student population (a population of children) from an educational community which should be whole and integrated. Educationally, the ends are thwarted by analogizing the university to a corporation or any form of business enterprise which produces "college graduates." The ideal, and the only ultimately practical, university is composed of a host of scholars, each of them students and each of them teachers to some degree, finding unity in the common task of leading the examined life. To designate some as members by "privilege" and some as members by "right" means that the former group has only a submissive role in the general search for knowledge and values. They can search, but not too boldly; they can inquire, but not into everything; they can participate, but not in the actual governance of the community. They can be forbidden certain associations. Their academic life habits can be regulated without explanation. They can be suspended, or expelled, for at any moment they might find themselves "unable to adjust to the pattern of the institution."

A devastating example of the "pretend" theory of learning can be found in an article in the University of Wisconsin *Daily Cardinal* (11/17/61). The author, in analyzing the student government constitution, finds that "Student Senate shall . . . legislate on any matter aiding in the planning, supervision, and coordination of student activities *in accordance with University regulations.*" The Senate "can thus vote only to uphold University rules. It is constitutionally mandated to maintain the status quo."

This does not mean that students are shackled completely at the University of Wisconsin. It simply means that they violate the constitution every time they do something creative; this violation gives the administration a "constitutional" excuse for veto every time an "unconstitutional" act is not to their liking. Incredibly, the government of laws coincides with the government of men. How many students in America share the mood of the student journalist's last brief paragraph:

> Rather makes the whole thing a farce.

Thus in American universities an anti-educational system of social control is ratified by narrow analogies to family and commerce. However warmly he is treated by the Administration, the student nevertheless is conditioned for continued subservience to the university and other bureaucratic organizations which will shape his life.

CHEKHOV ON THE HOOF

TIP FOR TONIGHT—Richard Boone returns to the Old West in a play, "The Hooligan," adapted from a story by Anton Chekhov on the "Richard Boone Show." Ch. 4, at 9.

—*Boston Globe,* Jan. 14, 1964

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A SPECIAL REPORT

Tom Kahn

PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

Tom Kahn was assistant to Bayard Rustin in organizing the March on Washington, and previously helped organize Youth Marches for Integrated Schools in 1958 and 1959. An active participant in the civil rights movement since his high school and college days, he wrote the pamphlet Unfinished Revolution *in 1960, is on the editorial board of* New America, *and now works for the Workers Defense League.*

The civil rights movement has entered a critical period. Without new tactics and fresh approaches, its future success is by no means assured. The struggle for freedom may be eternal, but specific movements never are: they adapt and prosper, or they falter into the graveyard of history.

If this seems too stark an introduction to an analysis of the civil rights movement, it may hopefully balance a contrary tendency. Immediacy and spontaneity are energizing attributes in both people and movements. But they must harmonize with, not undermine, long-range perspectives. Otherwise, there is a danger of sinking into a project-centered provincialism and, in the civil rights movement, a disinclination to discuss structural obstacles to Negro freedom.

Consideration of these obstacles is already viewed in some circles as alien to the pressing concerns of the movement. And to suggest that they are not surmountable by the civil rights organizations alone is viewed as an indirect way of asserting their insurmountability—hence as the latest guise of gradualism.

This last reaction springs largely from a vision of American society which, if lacking depth, has a certain validity. That vision sees the civil rights movement as the only dynamic force for social change in this country today. It follows, then, that the broad range of problems con-

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fronting the Negro must be solved by the civil rights movement—or they will not be solved at all. Militant optimism rules out the latter possibility and therefore dictates either a continued picture of an omnipotent civil rights movement or an evasion of the knottier problems it faces.

A major reason for this dilemma is the absence of a vital democratic Left in the United States. The "sit-in" generation was not affected by a militant labor movement struggling for social transformations. Rather it saw in the AFL-CIO an apparently overbureaucratized and complacent institution, itself tainted by racism. Nor did this generation grow up in an intellectual atmosphere enlivened by radical or socialist ideas. Rather it came to consciousness in the Eisenhower-McCarthy decade, when relative prosperity and the witch-hunt combined to enthrone mediocrity and discourage nonconformist thought. (How significant that so many sit-inners, seeking intellectual ancestors, turn back to Gandhi and Thoreau!)

We are far enough into the new decade to sense that it is qualitatively different from its predecessor. The intellectual blackout has lifted; critics of the "affluent society" seem to be more numerous; increasing technological unemployment has caused some stirrings in the labor movement; the Kennedy-Johnson administrations have been more sensitive to the need for reform.

All this would seem to bode well for the civil rights movement. But the problem is that the new atmosphere of the 60s is due primarily to the dramatic impact of the civil rights movement *itself*—not to a broad social-reform movement of which Negroes are part. Until now the Negro's struggle has proceeded in relative isolation.

This is not to say that the struggle lacks sympathy among other segments of the population. Sympathy it has. What it lacks is corresponding organization and movement. Unemployment among Negroes is at least 12%, but there is no mass movement of the unemployed with which the civil rights movement could forge mutually reinforcing links. The labor movement has so far failed to assume responsibility for "the other America." Similarly, the integration of schools and housing, especially in the industrial centers, is stymied by a complex of socio-economic problems for whose solution no powerful urban reform movement now exists. Fifteen per cent of the Negro labor force is still on the farms, but there is no strong organization of small farmers to cope with galloping agricultural mechanization and its miserable human consequences.

If substantially correct, the foregoing analysis would seem to justify either variety of social pessimism earlier described—a single-minded focusing upon a messianic civil rights movement, or an ostrich-like posture in regard to the structural obstacles to Negro freedom.

Actually, it poses a challenge. Most of all, it is a challenge to white Americans in the liberal, labor, and radical communities to rescue the Negro from isolation—not merely by sympathizing with his struggle, not alone by joining it, but by radically altering the context in which it takes place.

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I

Ever since the March on Washington, civil rights activity has been in a relative lull. A causal relationship may be suggested: energy for local protest activity was diverted into and exhausted by preparations for the gigantic March.

The March did sap up a lot of energy *and* frustration—enough to prevent predicted race riots. Actually, the Washington March stimulated local marches in several areas (Long Island, New Jersey, California, etc.), and the called issued by the national March office for a Day of Mourning following the Birmingham atrocity elicited impressive results on short notice. Moreover, the seeming quiet on the Southern front cannot be attributed to March exhaustion, since Southern participation was not that great.

No; the reasons for the lull are fundamental to the difficulties now being faced by the movement, and the evidence of these difficulties will remain even if the Spring brings a fresh outburst of demonstrations.

Nineteen sixty-three was a traumatic year for the civil rights movement, as the words March, Birmingham children, Medgar Evers, construction sites, rent strike, and Dallas suggest. This was to be "freedom year"—"Free by '63!" as the NAACP slogan had it. It was also a record year for civil rights legislation on the state level.

But measured in concrete gains, this "freedom year" was disappointing. In Birmingham a glorious movement, symbolized by hundreds of fearless children, failed in its objectives. In Cambridge, Md., whether or not the leadership's strategy was sound, there was defeat. Despite the unprecedented March on Washington (which did prompt addition of Part III and FEPC to the civil rights draft of the House Judiciary Subcommittee), Congress slumbered, the Attorney General compromised, and prospects for a strong bill dimmed. As the pace of school desegregation diminished in the South, the courage of James Meredith threatened to become a tokenistic mockery. Meanwhile, eleven freedom fighters gave their lives, while thousands were jailed and brutalized.

It may be argued that these specific disappointments are overweighted, that they are taken out of context, that they should be balanced by a recitation of victories. Granted, the picture is distorted if only defeats or failures are listed. The fact remains, however, that *in not a single city has the civil rights movement scored a breakthrough victory.*

With regard to the South, this is due at least in part to the higher stakes for which the movement is playing. Package demands—combining integration of public accommodations with jobs and/or school integration and/or biracial commissions—have become increasingly prominent in demonstrations, eclipsing the earlier single-demand approach associated with lunch-counter sit-ins. Victories are harder to chalk up because more basic demands are being made on the local white power structures. While the broadening of demands is a step in the right direction, it does not follow that local civil rights groups can themselves, through

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their usual tactics, generate sufficient pressure to win these demands. It appears that the Southern movement has entered a transitional phase whose outcome depends largely on national developments.

Frustration and Counter-revolution in the North

As for the North, it is unnecessary to list defeats. The trends are unmistakable and dangerous. While the South adjusts itself to the least discommoding forms of tokenism, the metropolitan centers of the North are becoming increasingly segregated with respect to housing and schools. As the nonviolent direct-action movement has fanned out of the South, it has been frustrated by the diffused yet deeply built-in character of discrimination and segregation in the big cities. Here the white power structure is a harder target to pinpoint. Often steeped in liberal rhetoric, it proclaims its impotence in the face of the "impersonal" and "objective" historical forces that are transforming our cities into ghettoes.

There is a sense in which many urban politicians are sincere in describing these forces as "objective"—i.e., the sense that these forces are set in motion not so much by the subjective racism of specific individuals, but have to do primarily with economics. And before the alleged mystery of economics, most Americans throw up their hands.

Again, the present lull may be over before these words see print. Still, the foregoing review suggests that its causes may persist. A similar impression is conveyed by the stock-taking now proceeding among many civil rights activists.

In strategic terms the crisis confronts the movement as a rising frustration in the Negro community, on the one hand, and a burgeoning white counter-revolution, on the other. The latter is perhaps the most distinctive development in race relations this year. It has manifested itself not only in Southern retaliatory violence but in the shifting attitudes of non-Southern whites as reflected in the Harris polls.

It is my contention that by tracing rising black frustration to its roots, we simultaneously bare the roots of the white counter-revolution. And their common soil is economics.

II

It takes a lot of running to stand still on the treadmill of this technologically advancing society. When you know you're running hard and everyone tells you you're moving at a fast clip, and yet the scenery around you remains the same, the most appropriate word to describe your reactions is . . . frustration.

Running fast to stand still is essentially the position in which the Negro finds himself today. This harsh fact cannot be obscured by dramatic progress in the integration of public accommodations. Lunch-counters, hotels, parks, and the like are the easiest targets of direct action and boycotts. There are enough of these establishments to accommodate everybody; in fact, overcrowding them is profitable. Once the sit-in movement in a city integrates all the lunch-counters, thus

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securing a given establishment from segregationist competition, lunch-counters enjoy a potentially larger consumer market.

Overcrowding in employment, housing, and schools has vastly different consequences. If the segregated lunch-counter is a hollow relic of the *ancien régime,* one which would inevitably topple at an early stage in the revolution, the more fundamental, institutional forms of discrimination appear quite compatible with modern socio-economic trends. This is the inescapable conclusion that emerges from an examination of the Negro's situation in employment, housing, and schools.

Jobs and Income

The median Negro family income is $3,233, or 54% of the white family's $5,835. Approximately two out of every three Negro families subsist on less than $4,000 annually, as compared with 27.7% of the white families. Only one out of five Negro families earns $6,000 or more, as compared with one out of two white families. In the whole country there are only 6,000 Negro families that can boast of incomes of $25,000 or more.

These figures become meaningful when compared to the 1945 figures. Between 1945 and 1961, the percentage ratio of whites who escaped from the below $4,000 category (63.3%) is almost double that for Negroes (33.1%), despite the fact that a larger percentage of Negroes were in that category in 1945 (90.1% as against 75.5% of white families). Similarly, whites entered the $6,000-and-over category at a faster rate than Negroes.

On the other hand, the percentage increase of Negro families entering the $4,000–$5,999 category seems very impressive when compared with the figure for whites. But the percentage gain is great only because the starting figure was so low.

Fisk economist Vivian Henderson emphasizes that while

> relative growth in wage and salary income of Negroes since 1940 has been greater than that of whites . . . the absolute, or *dollar,* difference has widened considerably. . . . People spend and save dollars. It is this dollar difference that counts. Pronouncements regarding economic progress which are confined to acceleration concepts and percentage change obscure the real predicament—*Negroes are losing ground rapidly in gaining dollar parity with whites.* The "dollar gap" trend . . . means very simply that earnings are increasing for whites at a faster pace than for Negroes. [*The Economic Status of Negroes,* Southern Regional Council pamphlet, pp. 12–13.]

There is perhaps a still more startling fact. Not only is the dollar gap widening, but the *relative* income gap has remained virtually constant for almost a decade. While the figures reported by statisticians vary slightly, they point to the conclusion of Herman P. Miller of the Census Bureau:

> In the last decade . . . there has been no change in income differential between . . . [Negroes and whites]. The median pay of the Negro

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worker has remained stuck at about 55% of the white. [N.Y. *Times*, Aug. 18, 1963]

The Negro's *relative* income gains were actually registered between 1940 and 1954, when Negro family median income jumped from 37% to 56% of the white figure.

Behind this gain was World War II (not the New Deal, after 8 years of which 25% of the Negro work force was still unemployed as against 13% of the white). War production created a shortage not only of skilled workers, but of semi-skilled and unskilled workers as well. Consequently, thousands of Negroes left the rural South and poured into the factories. Protected by a federal FEPC, needed by an expanding economy, and absorbed in large numbers into the CIO, they won higher wages than the farms could offer. Many acquired new skills. The base of the Negro lower-middle-class was considerably expanded.

After Congress killed FEPC in 1946, job discrimination surged up and many of the newly acquired skills were lost to the Negro community through lack of use. Still, in the relatively prosperous post-war years, the unemployment rate among Negroes was only about 60% higher than the white rate. *Since 1954 it has been 250–350% higher.*

The point to be stressed here is that the Negro's income gains were the result of peculiar employment opportunities that no longer exist. In part, as Michael Harrington observes, these gains were due to "economic geography rather than the workings of the society." They reflect the shift of rural Negroes to cities and Southern Negroes to the North. In these cases, the people involved increased their income by going into a more prosperous section of the economy as a whole. But within each area—Northern city, Southern city, agriculture—*their relative position remained the same:* at bottom.

Thus, masses of Negroes entered industrial production but were concentrated in unskilled and semiskilled jobs. And these are precisely the jobs now being destroyed by automation. The "bottom" is falling out of society; it is no longer needed.

"Invisible Army of the Unemployed"

Just as the dollar gap between Negroes and whites is widening, so is the unemployment gap. Whereas the unemployment rate from 1947 to 1953 never exceeded 8.5% for Negroes and 4.6% for whites, now it stands at 12.4% and 5.9% respectively. Not only have there been rising levels of unemployment since 1954, but—and this is of strategic importance—the Negro-white unemployment gap has tended to widen in times of high unemployment and to narrow in times of low unemployment. Historically it has been true that the Negro fares absolutely *and* relatively better the closer we come to full employment.

Both tendencies—rising unemployment and a widening unemployment gap—come into sharper focus if we replace the official figures with more realistic ones which take into account what Professor Charles C. Killingsworth of Michigan State University has called the "invisible

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army of unemployed"—"people forced out of the labor market some time ago who are willing and able to work, but have become too discouraged to search for jobs" and are therefore not counted as part of the labor force by the government. Professor Killingsworth carefully calculates the size of this "invisible army" at 1½ million. They would raise the national unemployment rate to 8.8%. Gunnar Myrdal, the eminent Swedish economist, likewise taking into account the number of persons who would re-enter the labor force if jobs opened up, put the figure at 9%.

While Killingsworth has not made a racial breakdown of the "invisible army," he has emphasized that its members are educationally disadvantaged. A disproportionate number are undoubtedly Negroes, many of whom support themselves in the ghettoes by means they are not likely to report to census takers. Labor economists believe the real Negro unemployment rate is probably close to 20%. In the words of the New York *Times,* "Unemployment of these proportions, were it general, would be a national catastrophe."

Especially ominous is the *long-term* unemployment rate among Negroes. For the long-term unemployed tend also to be the most frequently hit by unemployment, and the longer they are unemployed the less chance they have of ever finding jobs. They make up a swelling "underclass" that is daily becoming economically more obsolete. This "underclass" is composed mainly of Negroes, males 65 and over, young men, farm laborers, those in unskilled occupations and those with less than 12 years of schooling. For all of them, unemployment is worsening in frequency and duration. The mass unemployment of the thirties has yielded to a new "under-class" unemployment.

Within this "under-class," Negro representation is mounting. Vivian Henderson reports that

> In September, 1958, the average duration of unemployment for Negroes was 17.8 weeks and for white workers 13.3 weeks. The average length of unemployment in September, 1962, for Negroes was 18 weeks while that for whites had dropped to 13 weeks. Negroes accounted for about ¼% of all the long-term unemployed, but for only about 11% of the labor force. About 29% of the very long term unemployed in September, 1962 were Negroes compared with 21% in September, 1961. Long-term joblessness among Negroes results from discrimination in hiring and inadequate training and inadequate manpower development. [*The Economic Status of Negroes,* p. 16.]

Generally, the long-term unemployed are more likely to be the victims of technological change, while the short-term unemployed may be seasonal lay-offs, retrainees, or seekers of better jobs. What portion of long-term unemployed Negroes are victims "purely" of discrimination as against victims of automation is impossible to estimate.

Certainly, lack of training cannot explain the acute discrimination suffered by Negro college graduates. In fact the more education a Negro male acquires, the lower his lifetime earnings as a percentage of his

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white counterpart. The Negro male who finishes four years of college will earn less than a white male with only eight years of elementary school. While 22% of white college men become proprietors, managers, or officials, only 5% of Negro college men do. Negroes with some college training are found in service and laborer jobs in numbers five times greater than whites with similar training. Ten per cent of the Negro women who finish college end up as domestic workers!

Here is an obvious waste of skills that can be ascribed only to blatant discrimination and segregation. Nonetheless, college graduates constitute only 3.5% of the non-white adult population, and it is likely that, because of skilled manpower shortages, this group will make the most rapid progress in the period ahead.

Facing Economic Disaster

For the vast majority of Negroes, however, an economic crisis is in the offing. And overt discrimination seems less a part of it than the weight of centuries of past discrimination combining with portentous economic forces that are themselves color-blind. *It is as if racism, having put the Negro in his economic "place," stepped aside to watch technology destroy that place.*

As indicated above, most of the Negroes' economic gains in recent years were made in the period 1940–1953 and reflect their movement out of agriculture into mining, manufacturing, and construction, where they took up unskilled and semiskilled jobs. These blue-collar jobs in the goods-producing industries paid better than the unskilled and semiskilled jobs in the service-producing industries. But as it happens, they were also the jobs most hit by automation. Between 1953 and 1962, mining lost 25% of its jobs; in manufacturing, 1.6 million blue-collar jobs were lost (white collar jobs increased 900,000). Since 1957 construction jobs have remained at 2.9 million. Another million and a half jobs were lost in agriculture over the past decade, as mechanization hit the small family farm and hired hands.

The decline in the goods-producing industries was paralleled by a 6.2 million jobs increase in the service-producing industries. For the first time, in the mid-1950's, white-collar jobs outnumbered blue-collar jobs. In 1962 service-industry jobs numbered 36 million, as against 20 million goods-producing jobs (non-farm).

But while the percentage of whites in blue-collar jobs declined from 53.2% in 1950 to 50% in 1960, the Negro percentage jumped from 63.7% to 66.5%. Further, the greater part of this increase was registered in the "laborer" category. These are the figures for Negro males. More shocking are those for Negro females, an increasing percentage of whom are now in *blue-collar* jobs (15% in 1950, 17.2% in 1960; corresponding figures for white women are 22.3% and 17.3%).

The percentage of Negroes in white collar jobs is also increasing, though in percentage points whites gained more than Negroes in professional and technical jobs. Most of the Negroes' gains were in clerical

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jobs where wages are generally lower than in manufacturing. It is precisely in the professional and technical field that the job market is expanding most rapidly.

Herman Miller concludes that "In most states, the nonwhite male now has about the same occupational distribution relative to whites that he had in 1940 and 1950." But unless this occupational distribution is radically altered, disaster looms for the Negro community. For not only will the unemployment gap widen because of increasing automation in categories where Negroes are concentrated, but so will the dollar gap. As Vivian Henderson summarizes,

> Whites are acquiring the highest paying jobs in the higher occupational classifications. The benefit of general economic expansion and technology, therefore, have only trickled down to the Negroes, putting more of them into wage and salary jobs. These benefits automatically produced high acceleration in income change, but were restricted tightly to lower occupational classifications. Thus, despite the unprecedented growth of income among Negroes and the percentage gains made, the fact remains that *income progress of Negroes has leveled off.* The percentage of Negro families in lower income brackets is twice as high as whites, and *the differential in earnings of whites and Negroes continues to widen,* largely offsetting percentage gains. Accordingly, it is still difficult for Negroes to purchase health, education, and the amenities of life on the same level as other members of the population. [*The Economic Status of Negroes* pp. 12–13. Italics added.]

Still another trend has important implications for the future of American society. Not only are Negroes trapped in declining and stagnant job categories; they constitute a growing percentage of the total workers in these categories. Of all laborers (except farm and mine), Negroes were 27.6% in 1960 as against 21.2% in 1940; among operatives and kindred workers, Negroes constituted 11.6% as against 6.1%; among clerical workers, 6.7% as against 1.6%. While Negroes constituted a larger percentage of farm laborers and foremen in 1960 (23.6%) than in 1940 (22.5%), they make up a decreasing percentage of farmers and farm managers (8.6% as against 13.1%). The reason for this, of course, is agricultural mechanization, which has hit Negroes hardest. Between 1940 and 1959, the drop in the number of American farms was 39% but the number of farms owned or operated by Negroes was cut more than ½, from over 700,000 to less than 300,000. (Only 23% of Southern Negro farm workers own their own farms as contrasted with 60% of white farm workers. On the other hand, almost half of all tenant farmers and over 65% of all share croppers are Negroes.)

To recapitulate, then:

1. There is a widening *dollar* gap between Negroes and whites.
2. The *relative* income gap between Negroes and whites has remained virtually constant over the past decade.

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3. The industries and occupations where the Negro's gains have been greatest have either declined or shown relatively little growth over the past decade. This is true not only of blue-collar industries but of agriculture as well. In both areas the effect of automation is evident in the failure of production and wages to keep pace with rising productivity.
4. Negroes constitute a growing percentage of all workers in most of the declining job categories.
5. The unemployment gap between Negroes and whites has been widening.

These dangerous trends tend to be neglected in talk of "progress." Yet they are so fundamental that they must reassert themselves through any veneer of optimism imposed upon them. Status quo propagandists are desperately trying to serve up a "new Negro"—an upper middle-class professional type, urbane and bourgeois, an ideal next-door neighbor—to symbolize an alleged Revolution in American race relations. The image is not utterly unreal, and to the extent that it upsets humiliating stereotypes and whets the aspirations of Negro youth, it is desirable. But the image is mostly a galling sign of potential that is overwhelmed by a greater social reality. And it is from this social reality that most whites will draw their image of the Negro. The trend toward *de facto* segregation of Negroes in declining job categories can only reinforce the association between *Negro* and *failure.* The view that Negroes are racially inferior yields to a vaguer, but no less malevolent, conception of most Negroes as socially or morally incompetent to realize their potential. This confused view is one of the roots of the white counter-revolution.

III

If Negroes are frustrated by the disparity between image and reality, between the progress they are alleged to have made and the real condition of their daily existence, whites are similarly perplexed. They perceive no transformation in the Negro as a "social type." Yet a transformation is precisely what they have considered as the *sine qua non* of integration—whether as a precondition or as an aftereffect. In the eyes of most whites, most Negroes continue to exhibit the traits associated with poverty and social disorganization—traits rendering them "unworthy" of integration. To argue that all citizens are entitled to certain rights without exception is to pit an abstraction against sensuous, visceral attitudes. To change these attitudes requires changing the social references from which they are derived.

If we seem on the verge of a cliche, it's because we are. Institutions mold attitudes more than attitudes mold institutions. Institutional patterns of racism have scarcely been altered over the past decade, despite the increased militance of the Negro community. To put it differently, there has not been sufficient institutional change to support the changes in racial attitudes demanded by the new civil rights ideology. Indeed, present trends suggest a divergence of institutional patterns and ideology, in which the latter cannot long hold its own.

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Housing and Schools

Just as the technological revolution has adversely affected integration in employment, so has integration of housing and schools been adversely affected by population movements set off by economic changes. Where people choose to live is determined primarily by the location of job opportunities, just as where their children go to school is determined primarily by where the parents live.

Segregation is on the upgrade in Northern housing, despite a raft of open-occupancy statutes. The National Urban League estimates that by 1970 eighteen million Negroes will be living in the big cities. Meanwhile, Southern cities seem to be emulating their Northern counterparts: industrialization has undermined the comparatively integrated housing patterns.

Urban housing grows more segregated because our major cities are becoming vast racial ghettoes. According to William Whyte,

> Within 14 to 16 years, if present population trends are arithmetically projected into the future, Negroes will be in the majority in Detroit, Cleveland, Baltimore, Chicago, and St. Louis; and, in the decade following, in Philadelphia. [*Life*, November 18, 1963]

Thus, if present population trends continue, seven of the country's ten most populous cities will have Negro majorities—ringed by overwhelmingly white suburbs. To talk about more than token housing integration in these areas is chimerical.

Explanations of the suburban exodus as a flight of whites from Negroes—or from integrated schools—are insufficient. The suburban movement has been going on for decades and certainly predates the 1954 Supreme Court decision. What whites are fleeing is city life itself, which has become increasingly intolerable—overcrowded, underserviced, dreary, and filthy.

The flight to the suburbs reflects not only a racial separation but an occupational one as well. Most of the suburbanites are white-collar workers in the expanding service-producing sector of the economy, the sector in which relatively few Negroes are represented because of discrimination and lack of training. The blue-collar workers who live in the suburbs tend to be skilled workers protected by strong unions. Thus the technologieal changes in our economy have profoundly affected the composition and layout of our cities.

Not only discrimination but also strong economic reasons have prevented Negroes from moving into the suburbs. Trapped in decaying cities, the Negro becomes, in the eyes of whites, an integral part of the ugly urban scene being left behind.

The ugliness is evident in the housing itself. In New York City, for example, about half of the nonwhite renters and 40% of the nonwhite homeowners live in substandard housing. The figures for whites are but 20% and 10%, respectively. Nationally one out of every 6 Negro dwelling units is dilapidated, obsolete or otherwise substandard, as compared

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with one in 32 white dwellings. It appears, therefore, that the more urbanized Negroes become, the worse their housing conditions.

Within the cities themselves, segregation of the Negro community proceeds as part of what Michael Harrington describes as the segregation of poverty, one of the less happy consequences of urban renewal. At the end of 1961, the Urban Renewal Administration reported that 66% of those displaced under its programs—involving Federal grants of nearly $3 billion—have been nonwhites.

Public housing programs have also tended to encourage economic and racial segregation. High-rise low-income public housing has increased population density and racial homogeneity in the ghettoes. Forty-seven per cent of all public housing units in the country are occupied by Negroes, and more than 80% of all public housing is segregated. What do the tenants themselves think of public housing?

> Only four years ago, over one-third of all low-income families displaced by government action accepted the opportunity to move into public housing. Today, less than 15% choose public housing, and the experts see the percentage continuing to decline. [David B. Carlson, *Architectural Forum*, July, 1963.]

Largely in recognition of these facts, the Harlem Neighborhoods Association has fought for mixed-income as against low-income housing on the former Polo Grounds site. Class and caste have become so interwoven that a degree of economic integration implies corresponding measures of racial integration. Probably the only way to maintain attractive, racially balanced public housing will be to subsidize low-income families in middle-income housing.

Federally-aided private housing has been of relatively little benefit to Negroes. Of the millions of housing units whose mortgages were insured by the Federal Housing Administration since 1934 and the Veterans Administration since 1944, less than 2% has been available to nonwhite families.

Summing up the effect of present Federal housing programs on the Negro, Charles Abrams, President of the National Committee Against Discrimination, declares:

> Thus urban renewal which displaces minorities oppresses more than it benefits them and the requirement of relocation is no more than a frail pretext for appeasing conscience. FHA is a boon to the white middle class and the skilled worker but it carries with it the hidden sanction of exclusion as long as it continues to recognize local zoning practices. . . . Public housing benefits but is little more than a handout, and its benefits are miniscule as long as it confines itself to cities and offers only tenancy to minorities while excluding ownership. [*Equal Opportunity in Housing*, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, April, 1963.]

Because of the population movements of whites into suburbs and Negroes into the central cities, as well as intra-city tendencies toward segregation, more Negro children attend what are in fact segregated

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schools in the major cities of the North than attend officially segregated schools in urban areas of the South. The higher birth rates prevalent among the Negro rural immigrants to the city means a rapid growth in Negro school enrollment.

In Chicago, 87% of the Negro elementary school students attend virtually all-Negro schools. In Detroit, 45% of the Negro students are in public schools that are overwhelmingly (80%) Negro. In Philadelphia, 38 elementary schools have Negro enrollment of 99%. In Los Angeles, 43 elementary schools have at least 85% Negro attendance. In New York City—over ⅓ of whose one million public school pupils are Negro or Puerto Rican—there are 95 public elementary schools with Negro or Puerto Rican enrollments above 90%. In Manhattan, Negro and Puerto Rican children are 70% of the total elementary school population, and it is estimated that the figure will rise to 85% by 1980.

Segregated schools are inferior schools, North or South.

In Chicago, 81% of the children in the Negro schools were on double session as against 19% of the "mixed schools" and 2% of the white schools. Moreover, while the typical white school has 669 pupils, the mixed schools averaged 947, the predominantly Negro, 1,275.

In New York, only 50.3% of the teachers in the Negro and Puerto Rican elementary schools were fully licensed as compared with 78.2% in white schools.

The Question of "Bussing"

To reverse the trend toward urban school segregation, various techniques have been tried (permissive bussing, open enrollment, realignment of school districts, strategic location of new schools, etc.) with varying degrees of success. All seem artificial and desperate, especially bussing children to schools outside their neighborhoods—a practice that has evoked the hostility of many white parents and of some Negroes, too.

The problems of bussing are symptomatic of most efforts at school integration based on the residential *status quo*. White parents are justified in their reluctance to bus their children to Harlem schools. Slum schools—white or black—have always been inferior, robbing youngsters of motivation. While a handful of idealistic white parents may "take the chance," most, in a twist on James Baldwin, would ask, "Integrate into what?"

Bussing presents problems for the Negro community as well. What is the psychological effect on a Negro child who leaves the ghetto every morning for a bus ride through the tree-lined streets of the white neighborhood (where the "better," integrated school is likely to be), is taught by a "better" (read: white) teacher in an integrated classroom, and then returns to the ghetto in the late afternoon. How does the child relate to its family, to neighborhood friends, to the ghetto itself?

Other disadvantages have been cited in proposals for a "massive shifting of Negro and white children out of their own districts":

> Whatever possibilities might exist for closer parent-teacher contacts are

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practically eliminated for those who do participate in the open-enrollment program. Also, the child who has a long route home by bus from a distant school has less chance to participate in local after-school activities sponsored by the city and by the settlement houses.

Another comment I have heard from white parents and school staffs is that the children who are bussed to another school under this program tend to be the better students and their parents the more sophisticated in their community; thus, the sending school loses its better students and the local community is deprived of its best prospects for Negro leadership. [Joseph P. Lyford in *The Negro as an American,* Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.]

However much weight is given these arguments, it seems clear that the maze of criss-crossing bus routes required to achieve a racially balanced redistribution of urban school populations would be an elaborate thing indeed. The fact is that bussing and related devices may be well-intentioned, but they are makeshift, stopgap measures which raise more questions than they answer. Among them: *what judgment should be rendered of a society that would rather dislocate its children than reorganize its cities?*

Educational Crash Program

Recognition of the difficulties inherent in urban school integration has led to proposals to improve the quality of education available in the ghettoes. John Kenneth Galbraith recently declared that our best schools should be in our worst slums, where they are most needed. Accordingly, he called for the selection of 100 depressed areas, as a start, as centers of an educational crash program. "To the best of my knowledge," he commented, "there is no place in the world where well-educated people are really poor."

Galbraith is certainly right in emphasizing the importance of education. It will be the chief means for achieving upward mobility in our increasingly technocratic society. Gunnar Myrdal and others have pointed out that our economic growth will be stymied by a shortage of skilled manpower. Already, "the technical requirements of all high status jobs are such that a person who has failed to complete his [secondary] education has already lost out for a place in the society ahead." Yet ⅓ of all students who enter high school drop out before graduating—and this in a society one half of whose members will be under 25 by 1966. It is estimated that there are already 50% more school drop-outs than jobs for unskilled workers.

For Negro youth the prospects are especially bleak, since they constitute 21% of all high school dropouts. Among those graduating from high school in 1960, only 7% were Negroes. In the words of a leading sociologist:

> . . . failing a special effort to deal with the Negro education problem, the hard consequences remain: that by age 18 the overwhelming proportion of Negro children have already lost out in their chances for economic

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> advancement in the country. [Daniel Bell, *The Post-Industrial Society* (unpublished.)]

The unemployment figures for Negro and white youth are a frightening adumbration of the future. As late as 1948, unemployment among white youngsters (age 14–19) was worse than among Negro youngsters. But last summer, unemployment among Negro youth was 24% as against 9% among whites. Negroes constitute 50% of all unemployed youth between the age of 16 and 21, but only 15% of the total youth population. Moreover, since 1955 the jobless rate among Negro teenagers has risen faster than the rate for white teenagers—up about 60% among Negroes, compared with a 30% rise for white teenagers.

Dr. Conant, in *Slums and Suburbs,* reports that in one slum area,

> of 125,000 people, mostly Negro, a sampling of the youth population showed that roughly 70% of the boys and girls ages 16 to 21 were out of school and unemployed. When one considers that the total population in this district is equal to that of a good-sized independent city, the magnitude of the problem is appalling . . .

What is equally clear is that an educational crash program in 100 depressed areas is barely a pilot project when measured against the need. Between 1960 and 1970, high school enrollment will have grown from 10 to 15 million. College and university enrollment, now at 4 million, will triple by 1980. The present national commitment to education is totally inadequate to meet even these "normal" rates of growth, let alone the special needs of depressed areas. Beginning with elementary and secondary schools, the educational system will have to be overhauled if higher education is to be meaningful; vast outlays must be made for new physical plants, rehabilitation, teacher training, and salaries. An enormous social investment—in the billions—is required. So is extensive public planning.

Poverty Perpetuates Itself

Galbraith's proposal tends to treat education in a vacuum, ignoring external factors that impinge on motivation and aspiration. Studies have shown a correlation between drop-out rates and economic status: there is a higher drop-out rate among youngsters whose parents have low incomes. In this way, class poverty tends to perpetuate itself.

Poverty is not just an income figure. It is an environment, a culture: your clothes, your home, your manners, your friends. It is not conducive to motivation or to academic excellence. Educational reform, therefore, has to proceed hand-in-hand with a direct assault on poverty *per se,* even while the elimination of its causes is underway.

A student's motivation is conditioned not only by his present environment but also by his future prospects. It should be noted, for example, that in the North, where there are greater opportunities for white-collar Negro males, more Negro men than women are finishing college, whereas in the South, where teaching is the greatest employment

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outlet for Negro college graduates, Negro women college graduates outnumber men.

This raises a fundamental question: for which jobs should today's youth be trained? As one writer points out,

> Even when law or other pressure has brought racial discrimination under some effective control, the probability has to be faced that technological changes will soon make it impossible for 50% of our high school graduates, white or black, to find employment of any kind. The young people who take at face value current propaganda about the need for an education and are thus disappointed can hardly be expected to take the education of their own future children very seriously. [Joseph Lyford, *op. cit.*]

The technological revolution challenges our society at many points. It produces crises where traditional philosophies and social relations are most in conflict with the imperatives of technological progress. Then irrational relations and ancient prejudices conditioned by the old order must give way, or the society will plunge into crisis. The present crisis in race relations is a measure of the tenacity with which our society has clung to racism; our present economic crisis is a measure of the tenacity with which we cling to nineteenth century notions of "free enterprise" in the midst of forces that are only socially controllable.

To educate youth for tomorrow's jobs, we must know what tomorrow's jobs will be. Such knowledge, in the age of cybernation, is the fruit of planning. Negro youth have a vested, if unarticulated, interest in economic planning.

IV

The sad fact is that nothing even vaguely resembling a "master plan" has been set in motion to eliminate the twin problems of racial inequality and technological unemployment.

In a recent article against "discrimination in reverse," Secretary of Labor Wirtz cited the "three causes of minority group unemployment today":

1) "The present shortage of jobs in the economy as a whole for *all* workers" —for which he proposed no solutions.
2) "unquestionably the fact of lesser qualifications" among minority groups—a problem which the Manpower Development and Training Act would help meet in the short run, although in the long run we need a vastly improved school system such as could only result from the kind of Federal action embodied in the National Education Improvement Act of 1963.
3) "the harsh ugly fact of discrimination"—which Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 are aimed directly at eliminating. ["Toward Equal Opportunity", *American Child,* Nov., 1963.]

These remarks are an excellent point of departure for an evaluation of government programs in the field. I have no intention here of taking

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the Secretary to task, since his article did not require him to offer solutions to all the problems related to Negro unemployment.

The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 was aimed at retraining 400,000 workers within three years. A bill extending the program and adding 93,000 workers was signed by President Johnson in December. Even these inadequate figures are misleading. Dan Schulder, of the Manpower Development and Training Agency, told a Washington Conference of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in November, 1963 that

> one thousand seven hundred ninety-four projects, providing approximately 63,000 jobs, were approved last year. Yet 63,000 jobs is not anywhere near the 2,000,000 jobs which the Manpower Research Office estimates will be needed each year to offset advances in technology.

He went on to report that

> MDTA programs in the South in the first 8 months of operation have trained only 234 Negroes, according to the report of the Civil Rights Commission. That figure represents only 11% of the total MDTA trainees, while Negro unemployment in the South is 30%. Further, training has been offered to Negroes in only a few of the occupations provided by the Commission. In the clerical and sales categories, 90% of the Negroes were trained as stenograph-typists. In the service category, such jobs as *tailoring, typewriter-repairing were available to most of the Negroes.* Others were trained as waiters and waitresses. [!]

Under the original terms of the Act, one-third of the applicants under 25 were rejected on grounds of illiteracy—an added handicap for Southern Negroes, who have a disproportionately high illiteracy rate.* Racist state officials are a stumbling block, since the states are responsible for approving the training programs. Mississippi has not spent one manpower dollar because the state refuses to offer assurances that the program would be administered on a nonracial basis. Finally,

> the Act states that people cannot be accepted for training without "reasonable expectation of employment"; in the South this provision can be interpreted by state authorities to mean that since a white man will not want to hire a Negro for any job but a "Negro job" (cleaning, digging), there is not reasonable expectation of employment.

In short, the Federal retraining program is not only inadequate to begin with, but it is forced to accommodate to the dominant political and economic patterns within the states.

The National Education Improvement Act, while broad in scope, suffers similar disabilities. It would assist the states in undertaking their *own* improvements. In the late President Kennedy's words, the policy

* There are 8 million "functional illiterates" in the U.S., i.e. persons who have completed fewer than 4 years of school. The illiteracy rate among Negroes is four times that of whites. It has been estimated that one out of every 10 Negro men in the U.S. is completely illiterate!

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would be "selective, stimulative and where possible transitional." It scarcely represents the decisive Federal intervention in the school system that is required to deal with the national education scandal.

Titles VI and VII, legislatively outlawing discrimination in all government programs and establishing "complete equality of opportunity within the government and by government contractors," have already been put in operation administratively. Government policies in this area have markedly improved since the Eisenhower Administration. Still, "complete equality of opportunity" doesn't seem to be enough. A Spring, 1961 survey showed that although 10.6% of Federal employees were Negro—roughly equal to the Negro proportion of the population—these were heavily concentrated in the lowest salary grades. In Grades GS-12 to GS-18, Negroes held only 0.59% of the positions.

Actually, government enforcement of nondiscrimination provisions in its contracts is not likely to increase substantially the job opportunities available to Negroes. It does not affect the structure of the labor market or of the industries doing business with the government—certainly not as much as government spending policies.

It is in this light that one must therefore view the Department of Labor's new standards outlawing discrimination in the apprenticeship programs it certifies.

NAACP Labor Secretary Herbert Hill estimated in 1960 that Negroes make up only 1.69% of the total number of apprentices in the economy. This is the result of generations of systematic exclusion of Negroes from skilled trades. The segregationist practices of the craft unions are well known and among the ugliest chapters in labor history. Many of these practices persist and must be relentlessly extirpated.

However, the struggle against discrimination in apprenticeship programs, though vital, cannot solve the problem of Negro employment. Such discrimination is not a major cause of the present high levels of Negro unemployment. As A. Philip Randolph has pointed out,

> We complain because the building trades have no room for Negroes, but the real trouble now is that these unions are designed for profit through scarcity. If the crafts were open to us, that could not, in the present economy, create more than 40,000 jobs. [Testimony before The Committee on Employment and Manpower, July 25, 1963.]

Something of Randolph's view is conveyed by Peter Kihss in the New York *Times:*

> There are about 140,000 men in the city's construction industry. Nobody knows how many are Negroes . . .
>
> Last month, at the height of the construction season, there were 12,313 unemployed construction workers here . . .
>
> Governor Rockefeller has announced that $400 million in hitherto unscheduled state construction contracts will be awarded in the next 18 months. James J. McKenna, president of the Building Employers of New York State, says this will mean 4,000 on-site construction jobs—

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> statewide. A total of 27,593 construction men were unemployed last month. [N.Y. *Times,* October 13, 1963.]

From California the note is echoed by William Becker of the Jewish Labor Committee:

> It is not enough to prohibit discrimination in the apprenticeship programs which receive government assistance. It is important to take steps to provide for *more* apprenticeship training programs and *more* opportunities for the employment of apprentices. Equal opportunity is important, but at the present time it is scarcity of apprenticeships which is being shared. In California alone, for example, collective bargaining agreements are said to provide for about 100,000 apprentices, but employers are willing to employ only about 21,000 this year. Of these 21,000, over 4,000 are in the carpenters' program, so the opportunities in all the remaining 160 programs are very limited indeed! It would help if the government would stipulate that every federal contract must have joint labor-management apprenticeship training programs. ["After FEPC —What?" *Journal of Intergroup Relations,* Autumn, 1962.]

These observations are a salutary reminder of a fact obscured a few years when Herbert Hill's criticism of the unions was at its height: namely, that the labor movement does not control the economic mechanisms that determine employment patterns. Government and business play the larger roles—and at this point, the government's role is probably more potential than actual.

"Equal Opportunity" and "Preferential Treatment"

The Civil Rights Bill drafted by the House Judiciary Committee is in several respects inferior to the Subcommittee draft, thanks to the efforts of the Administration. One of the major disappointments is the toned-down fair employment provision. For the Subcommittee's recommendation of commission-enforcement machinery, the full Committee substituted a more costly, prolonged court-enforcement procedure. This Administration curtsy in the direction of the Southern judiciary and the states-righters must be fought not only for the unfair burden it places on victims of job discrimination, but as symbolic of a cruel willingness to compromise on a bread-and-butter issue. The right of Negroes to equal employment opportunities must be established as non-negotiable.

At the same time, it has become obvious that the "equal opportunity" principle is only a principle and not a formula for jobs. Even the most rigorously enforced FEPC would be inadequate to this end, as inadequate as "equal opportunity" in apprenticeship programs.

Twenty-five states already have laws against job bias; they cover 41% of the Negro population. If there is any correlation between enforcement of these laws and the Negro unemployment rate, it is likely to be inverse (major urban centers tend to have politically liberal administrations *and* high ghetto unemployment rates).

The operational sterility of the "equal opportunity" principle has

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given rise to the "preferential treatment" slogan. Other terms have been coined—"compensatory hiring," "positive discrimination," "the doctrine of the debt," etc.—all meaning essentially the same thing. The chief spokesman for "preferential treatment" has been Whitney Young Jr. of the National Urban League. It is not often that the slogans of the most conservative civil rights group are taken up with such gusto by the more militant activists. Young argues that

> This idea of temporary special help now being called for is not new to our society. We have generously—and with justification—given special consideration in employment, education, and welfare to Hungarian and Cuban refugees fleeing oppression. We have given preferential treatment to the G.I. after World War II—in the form of free education, reduced interest loans for homes and businesses, a ten-point advantage on civil service examinations and other benefits—because he had been out of the mainstream for four or five years. Even now we designate certain geographic areas as depressed and disaster centers, and their people entitled to special help because of joblessness and acts of God. Another reason for a special effort arises from historic considerations. A great many of the intense needs and problems evident in so many Negro communities are the results of exclusion based on racial discrimination. Apart from historical equity, a massive compensatory effort may well be the only means of overcoming the present results of past neglect. ["The Negro Revolt." *American Child,* November, 1963.]

The moral objections to "preferential treatment" have on the whole been flabby and pious. The real deficiencies in "preferential treatment" are on another level, and it is here that the essentially conservative nature of the National Urban League's social philosophy becomes evident. Young writes:

> For 18.7 million American Negroes . . . the problem is immediate and desperate.
>
> Federal action, however commendable, is still too little—and may well be too late. We believe the answer lies in effective action by responsible individuals and institutions—acting privately and in concert—who will undertake a massive program to close the intolerable economic, social, and educational gap that separates the vast majority of Negro citizens from other Americans. *(Ibid.)*

On the one hand, urgent indignation; on the other, an orientation toward the corporate structure. The 10-point domestic "Marshall Plan" Young calls for emphasizes massive aid to Negroes primarily by private sources—and it is clear that the "responsible individuals and institutions" referred to are the corporations and foundations from which the NUL has traditionally derived its support. One of the ten points is in fact an appeal to these groups for more financial assistance to the civil rights organizations.

The Negro revolt, Mr. Young seems to be assuring the NUL audience,

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> differs from many revolutions inasmuch as it is an attempt by an underprivileged element of society not to change the fabric of that society, but to "revolt" into partnership with it. *(Ibid.)*

It is perfectly legitimate and consistent for the NUL to have this orientation. The original Marshall Plan, however, was a government aid program, not a voluntary gift of U.S. corporations. Also, the European recipients developed new forms of social and economic planning to allocate the aid and to lay the foundations for relative full employment, while Americans continue to rely for their social services on private agencies to a degree unknown in any other contemporary society.

The real question is, what are the limitations on private economic action, to reduce the differentials in Negro employment, education, and housing? Who will benefit from "preferential treatment" in the absence of basic, government-spearheaded economic reform? Without such reform, can there be full employment—and can there be fair employment without full employment?

Speaking for the National Urban League, Mr. Young states,

> We do not advocate the firing of a white worker to employ a Negro—nor do we subscribe to the notion that until there is full employment for all Americans, the Negro must carry the brunt of the unemployment. [*Ibid.*]

Yes, he must. So long as we have class unemployment and Negroes are disproportionately concentrated in the lower job categories, only full employment can keep them engaged in the economy. This is not a notion to which one either subscribes or doesn't subscribe. It's an implacable economic reality which would not obtain if Negroes had the same occupational distribution as whites. Preferential treatment does practically nothing to alter this distribution. In fact, it benefits most those Negroes who need it least.

But if No Job Exists?

A Negro cannot be given preference over a white if no jobs exist for either of them. The demand for preferential treatment has been unsuccessful where labor supply exceeds labor demand (as in the New York construction industry). This is the situation confronted by workers with the least education because of the inadequate expansion of the unskilled and semiskilled occupations for which they are qualified.

Preferential treatment has benefited those Negroes who can qualify for the more skilled occupations. These are the occupations that are expanding most rapidly. The more education and training they require, the more they are characterized by an excess of labor demand over labor supply. Professional and technical occupations—the fastest growing part of the labor force—will have expanded 40% in the 60s, as compared with 15% for semiskilled jobs and no growth at all in unskilled jobs.

To list the companies most commonly associated with "preferential treatment" policies is to indicate expanding industries in need of

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skilled manpower. IBM is perhaps the most vigorous in pursuit of Negro talent, regularly visiting 17 Negro colleges to recruit engineers, mathematicians, scientists, as well as sale and managerial trainees. Others are: Radio Corporation of America, American Telephone and Telegraph, Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Lockheed, Western Electric, Goodyear, Pitney Bowles, Texas Instruments (electronics), Hughes Tool, etc.

Reports from the 115 companies participating in President Kennedy's "Plans for Progress" program are revealing. Of the 60,000 new workers hired by these companies between September and November of last year, 25% were Negroes, whereas previously the percentage of Negroes hired by these companies in any similar period ran only 3%. At the year's end, President Johnson announced that the employment of nonwhites in *salaried* posts has gained 23.5% in a *general* rise of 13.8% in nonwhite employment.

> Employment of nonwhites in management categories rose by 46.3% . . . and by 37.4% in professional and administrative jobs. In sales positions, the increase was 53.1% and in technical jobs, 31.6%.
>
> Mr. Johnson continued: "Within those companies whose reports have been received, the ratio of white salaried employees to nonwhite dropped from 65 to 1 at the beginning of the reporting period to 60 to 1 at the end. We still have a long way to go." [N.Y. *Times,* December 6, 1963.]

We have an even longer way to go before the bulk of Negroes can benefit from these forms of preferential treatment. This is not to say that mechanisms for preferential treatment should not be set in motion by expanding industries. At least theoretically, these mechanisms could eliminate the more glaring disparities in employment and income between Negroes and whites with comparable high-education backgrounds. For the 3.5% of the adult Negro population with college degrees, for the 240,000 Negroes presently enrolled in colleges and professional schools, and for numbers of Negro high-school graduates, preferential treatment could quicken the pace of their absorption into the occupations that are expanding with technological progress.

Not only do these Negroes constitute a relatively small portion of the Negro population; they are also the least disadvantaged. Their incomes are higher and their unemployment rates are lower. Preferential treatment is the most militant demand raised by the "black bourgeoisie."

Meanwhile, there is the danger that the emphasis on preferential treatment sows the illusion that Negroes can make progress in a declining economy, and diverts attention from the real nature of the unemployment problem. Moreover, while one may scoff at the abstract arguments against preferential treatment used by middle-class liberals, one cannot dismiss the fears it arouses among white workers, especially those whose own economic positions are marginal. The twenty-five percent job quota demanded by Negro pickets at construction sites in New YorK is known to have irritated the Puerto Rican community. Used functionally in negotiations with certain employers, preferential treatment can

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be advantageous; broadcast as a central slogan, it drives a wedge between Negroes and those whites who stand most to gain from a political alliance for economic reform.

Cannot Rely on Private Economy

Politics aside for the moment. The great majority of the Negro population is in the lower education categories and will continue to experience high, probably rising, levels of unemployment. Daniel Bell predicts that

> By 1970 with the demand for unskilled labor shrinking, relative to the total labor force, and the substantial majority of workers in white-collar or highly skilled blue-collar jobs, the relative disproportion between whites and Negroes in the low-skilled and service jobs—despite a rise in the levels of Negro education—may be even greater. For while the levels of Negro education are rising, they are not rising fast enough. [*The Post-Industrial Society.*]

There are three possible solutions:

1) massive education and training to qualify Negroes for the expanding occupations;
2) planned creation of unskilled and semiskilled jobs for which Negroes are already qualified;
3) direct financial relief.

Whichever approach is taken, the private economy cannot be relied upon. Corporations may contribute heavily to higher education, from which they reap the most immediate rewards, but they have little sense of responsibility toward elementary and secondary education, as witnessed by their frequent efforts to evade real estate taxes from which schools get their basic revenue. Yet expansion and reform of the elementary and secondary school systems is the *sine qua non* for raising the educational status of the general Negro community.

Moreover, while expanding sections of the private economy may be willing to apply preferential treatment in the acquisition and training of skilled personnel, even they are not concerned with *creating* new jobs. The demand for labor in the total private economy has remained virtually static in recent years. Underlying the current high levels of unemployment are the high-profit policies of the corporations. Largely because of automation, productivity (output per manhour) increased 20.2% between 1956 and 1962, while workers' purchasing power grew only 15.2%. The cost savings resulting from higher productivity have not been passed on to the consumer through lower prices or to employees through higher wages. They have gone into corporation profits, which reached a record $26.8 billion after taxes in the second quarter of last year. Because purchasing power has not kept pace with productivity, actual production has been limited, and so has the demand for labor. Corporate profits keep soaring, however, because corporations

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prefer to maintain high profit margins on a smaller volume of production than lower profit margins on a larger volume.

These unprecedented corporate profits have not been invested in the creation of new jobs. There is little reason to believe that a private economy characterized by high profits and high unemployment can generate the sense of social responsibility to undertake a "Marshall Plan" that would substantially improve the living conditions of the majority of Negroes.

The technological revolution, it has been said, is creating two Americas—the "affluent society" and the "other America." It is also dividing the Negro community, offering glittering rewards to the cream of the crop. The Negro technocrat may emerge as a social type—a new image perched on a narrow reality (but a reality all the same). Meanwhile, the majority of Negroes—trapped in ghettoes, under-educated, unemployed, underemployed, or unemployable—will be subject to new disintegrative forces, to new forms of racial-economic separation and alienation.

> If we correlate, roughly, the school drop-out rate with the skill requirements of the future labor force, then we can say—admittedly a vast simplification and perhaps overly dramatized in order to highlight the cases—that thirty years hence, *class society in the U.S. will be predominantly color society*. [Daniel Bell, *op. cit.*]

The civil rights organizations may be at an historic turning point. Toward which portion of the Negro community will they orient their policies and programs? The black bourgeoisie has been an important source of leadership, especially when legalized racism exercised a leveling influence and enforced a racial identification that transcended class. To be sure, the elimination of legalized racism does not plunge the Negro community into internecine class warfare, but it will tend increasingly to make the demands of the black bourgeoisie separate from the rest of the Negro community.

To prevent unnecessary cleavage, to maximize solidarity in the struggle, the civil rights organizations must speak to the real social and economic needs of the total Negro community and develop goals to which it educates the less needy members of the community.

Among these goals must be full employment, without which there cannot even be equality in unemployment. To be sure, full employment does not *guarantee* the equitable integration of the Negro into the economy, but it is a *precondition*. Preferential treatment, yes—but as A. Philip Randolph declares, preferential treatment for all the unemployed, the poor, the sick, the aged, disadvantaged youth—for the other America.

V

To this writer's knowledge, the civil rights organizations have produced no detailed studies of the Negro's economic plight as it relates to national trends. Not until the March on Washington did the move-

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ment project a clear set of economic demands. They were essentially correct but sketchy, and have since been pretty much forgotten. They need to be revived and popularized.

Several of the organizations, notably SNCC and CORE, have begun to recruit numbers of working-class and unemployed Negroes, many of them youths. Attracted by the militant direct-action of these organizations, the new recruits become restless when activity ebbs and then they often drift away. To a large extent, this will be a constant problem. Still, more intensive social-educational programs could certainly polish some rough diamonds and yield new leaders with deep roots in the community.

The task is not easy; it would be a pioneering effort in many ways similar to the worker-education programs developed by the early labor movement. Occasional area conferences are not enough. In techniques (though presumably not subject matter), the civil rights organizations might take their cues from some of the radical political sects. Infused with the spirit of the movement, continuous classes in politics, economics, Negro history, etc., might take on a meaning they never had in the formal classroom. These should be combined with practical training in leadership and organization skills (writing, speechmaking, stencil-cutting, mimeographing, etc.).

Again, the civil rights organizations will not ultimately be able to enlist and maintain the participation of the Negro masses on the basis of a middle-class integrationist ideology. Nor can they do so on the basis of abstract economic analysis. But such analysis can lead to—must lead to—the formulation of dramatic economic demands that express real needs, arouse popular support, and stimulate greater awareness of basic issues.

The civil rights movement, as a first step, should make its economic demands explicit. The March on Washington, I believe, points the way with its key demand for a *massive federal works program to put all Americans back to work.*

A number of proposals have been advanced to solve the problem of unemployment. While space does not permit extensive analysis of these proposals, the major criticisms of each may be briefly outlined as an argument for the massive federal works program.

1) *The Administration's proposed $11 billion tax-cut* is the centerpiece of the Administration's program to reduce unemployment to . . . 4%! One fourth of the dollars involved go to the corporations to stimulate investment. The remainder go to individuals to stimulate consumption. But corporate profits are already at an all-time high; why assume that tax savings would be invested when available capital is not? Besides, the Council of Economic Advisors estimates that 70% of current business investment in plant and equipment is for modernization and replacement (read: automation) rather than expansion.

Professor Killingsworth makes a more profound criticism of the tax-cut in terms of the structural or class character of unemployment:

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> Despite a steady (but slow) improvement in the average educational level of the work force, the change in the pattern of demand for labor has created a large surplus of poorly educated workers and serious shortages of certain kinds of highly educated workers. Because of the new employment patterns in the economy, a general increase in spending for goods and services by consumers and an increase in investment by business firms—which are the hoped-for effects of the proposed $11 billion tax cut—would soon result in acute shortages of many kinds of highly educated workers without greatly reducing the present surplus of poorly educated workers. The bottleneck in the supply of workers at the top of the educational ladder would seriously impede the continued economic expansion that is essential to reduce to tolerable levels the shocking rates of unemployment that we find today at the middle and bottom of the educational ladder. [Address before Conference on Employment Security, Michigan State University, October 26, 1963.]

Like Myrdal, Killingsworth emphasizes the need to improve the quality of the labor supply, and wryly observes that "While the Administration urgently presses for the $11-billion tax cut, we are actually spending around $100 million this year for manpower retraining."

2) *Manpower retraining and education* on a massive scale is indispensable to achieving and maintaining full employment in a technologically revolutionary society. But the immediate employment benefits of retraining are limited. Many blue-collar workers are beyond retraining, e.g., miners, laborers and other unskilled workers over 40. Nor are educationally disadvantaged youth likely candidates for training in skilled jobs. And for what jobs do we retrain service personnel, who will soon feel the impact of cybernation? Before retraining could reach maximum effectiveness, the primary and secondary school systems will have to be radically improved. Even then, large numbers of marginal workers will not be able to make the necessary adjustments.

3) *A shorter workweek* has been advocated by the labor movement, on the grounds that rising productivity means that fewer manhours are required to create an ever greater abundance of goods and services. Andrew J. Biemiller, director of the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, has estimated by purely arithmetical calculation that another million jobs would result from each hour cut from the standard workweek; hence, a cut to 35-hours would produce five million new jobs.

The problem is that "purely arithmetical calculations" are wide of the mark since manhours are not exactly interchangeable units. There are skilled manhours and unskilled manhours. How does the reduction of the workweek of an automobile worker create a job for a displaced miner? It could, in fact, create a job for a machine. In his study on cybernation for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Donald N. Michael writes that the shorter workweek approach

> is intended to maintain the ability of workers to consume the products of cybernation and, in the case of blue-collar workers, to maintain the

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> strength of unions. This would retain the consumer purchasing capacity for workers in those situations where the nature of the cybernation process is such that x men would do essentially the same work which x plus y men used to do. But when the task itself is eliminated or new tasks are developed that need different talents, shorter shifts clearly will not solve the problem. The latter conditions are the more likely ones as cybernation becomes more sophisticated. [*Cybernation: The Silent Conquest,* 1962, p. 25.]

The shorter workweek will doubtless be a concomitant or result of full employment, not the cause. Walter Reuther and other labor leaders most prominently associated with the shorter workweek demand have indicated that they do not consider it a full-employment panacea, but see it as part of a program including a tax cut, public spending, and a liberal monetary policy. Nonetheless, so long as the shorter workweek remains the labor movement's key demand, the AFL-CIO will be suspect of protective unionism and indifference to the plight of masses of unemployed workers.

By contrast, the demand for a massive federal works program can be a natural rallying point for virtually all the unemployed. Such a program would do what the others can not—attack class unemployment by providing job opportunities even for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Says Mr. Michael,

> If our understanding of the direction of cybernation is correct the government will probably be faced for the indefinite future with the need to support part of the population through public works. There is no dearth of public work to be done, and it is not impossible that so much would continue to be needed that an appropriately organized public works program could stimulate the economy to the point that a substantial portion of the work force could be absorbed into the private sector. That is, although the proportion of workers needed for any particular task will be reduced through the use of cybernation, the total number of tasks that need to be done could equal or exceed the absolute number of people available to do them. [*Ibid.*]

The civil rights movement should have a special interest in a massive federal works program because it can provide jobs and additional purchasing power for the unskilled and semiskilled categories in which Negroes are so heavily concentrated. No less important, Negroes will especially benefit from the fruits of public works: slum clearance, school and hospital construction, decongestant highway and road construction, new parks and playgrounds, carefully-planned public housing, etc. We can at least begin the rational reorganization of our cities.

Some economists object that a public works program would have a "make-work" or "handout" air that would demoralize workers. This need not be true. It depends upon the value society assigns to the work being performed. Certainly a public works program carried out by the

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guardians of the *status quo*—who regard poverty as a moral flaw and people on relief as chiselers—would have the predicted results. But under new political leadership genuinely committed to "getting America moving again," such a program could be cast in radically different terms: not as "make-work," not even merely as an assault on unemployment, but as a crusade for the physical and social reconstruction, literally the rebuilding, of the nation. If unemployment did not exist, a national face-lifting would still be needed to enable our social services, our very patterns of life, to catch up with Twentieth Century technology. In a rational and humane society, conscious of its own developing needs, participants in a reconstruction program would be accorded the respect reserved in the past for the financially successful.

If such a program is to succeed, in its economic or social goals, it requires democratic central planning. Which public projects, in which locations, will maximize unemployment? What kinds of financial control should be devised to assure independence from private banks and insurance companies? Prospective public housing tenants must have a say in determining where their new homes will be and what they will look like. Only intelligent planning can create neighborhoods that are racially, culturally, educationally, and economically integrated.

Fair and full employment through a massive federal works program —this is a civil rights demand. Vigorous agitation and direct action around it should become central for the movement.

Marches of unemployed youth are reported under consideration by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, at whose Washington Conference last Thanksgiving Bayard Rustin urged white students to concentrate more of their energies on the organization of unemployed whites. If these students can transfer to the unemployed (particularly the youth) a degree of the spirit they acquired in the Negro struggle, we may be on the verge of a new student movement. The civil rights movement would also be changed by the appearance of Negro-led interracial groups with programs and activities aimed at both the Negro and dispossessed white worlds.

To some Negro militants this course will seem to blur the special interests of the civil rights movement. It may appear to them as a white liberal trap to divert Negro militance into utopian fantasies. But the past year has shown that militance alone does not produce enough results, that it is no substitute for fundamental analysis, that it is not in itself productive of jobs, housing, and schools.

"Social dislocation," in Bayard Rustin's phrase, has been the Negro's most effective weapon in recent years. But as Rustin himself has recently emphasized, social dislocation is a *technique* of struggle, not a program. It is not sufficient in the present context to say "White man, move over," without having an answer to "Move where?" Nor is a program answering this question enough; allies must be won if the program is to be effectuated. The integration of lunchcounters was largely won by Negroes alone, using "social dislocation." But to win jobs will require a

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reorientation of national policies beyond the capacities of the Negroes alone.

Crystalization of the Negro's socio-economic needs in a campaign for a massive federal works program admittedly runs the risk of over-simplifying these needs or of overshadowing other concerns. Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the movement may have reached a point when it not only needs allies but must to a considerable extent call those allies into existence and help launch their programs. This is not an accommodation to liberalism-as-usual, but a *challenge* to it. What if the next AFL-CIO convention were confronted with a demand by the civil rights organizations that labor *really* press the fight for full employment—by mobilizing workers behind a political campaign for a public works program?

The Political Aspects

I spoke earlier of the relative isolation of the Negro struggle. A major reason for the absence of activity among the nation's dispossessed stems from the very nature of class unemployment. It tends to induce passivity, not revolt. Its effects are attritional, not cataclysmic. In contrast with the Great Depression, when masses of workers were more or less suddenly laid off, increasing numbers of today's unemployed are simply never hired. Many of today's youth will never enter into the productive process at all. And largely because our society has never guaranteed the right to work, most of the unemployed have not yet fully perceived that they are victims of social injustice. This, by contrast, is not true of the Negro. If the spirit and dynamic of his struggle can be injected into the white "other America," then the problems of both may be solved.

The increasingly obvious confluence of class and caste factors may set the spark and ignite a new movement. But there is little chance of such a movement effecting progressive social change without a profound reorganization of American politics. Speaking before the Washington SNCC Conference, Jack Conway, Executive Director of the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, asserted that

> wage earners, minority groups, middle- and low-income city people in general, older people—all of us who make up an overwhelming majority of the society—have a broad interest . . . in justice, in full employment, in social security, in a world at peace, in a community where there is no exploitation of one group by another. No party, not even the Democratic Party which elected President Kennedy, had finally brought these people together into an effective political party. . . . We have not yet created this broader based party we need so badly, and because we do not have this party, with its commitments reaching into every community of the United States, it is uncertain what way legislation and political events will go in the next year, and in the next four years, and perhaps in the following eight years.

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The nation can ill afford such uncertainty. The deepening racial and economic crises alone—not to mention international problems—require that we make fundamental decisions about our future and that those decisions be acted upon.

Our present political alignments render such decisions well-nigh imposible. Instead of illuminating the basic issues, the two major parties adopt similar platforms. The differences within the parties are sharper than between them. Consequently, party affiliation is practically no indication of political program.

Beneath the irrational surface of party politics are coalitions rationally designed to perpetuate minority rule. Despite the preponderance of Democrats in both houses of Congress, a coalition of Dixiecrats and conservative Republicans maintains effective control of Congressional machinery. The nation limps into the age of cybernation with 14 of the 20 standing committees of the House dominated by rural representatives, with 12 of 19 important Senate committees chaired by Southerners. The seniority system is only part of this archaic rules structure of Congress.

Nor are these rules merely a matter of parliamentary mechanics; they are a matter of politics. Seniority is determined along party lines, and the parties must take responsibility for those it elevates to power. So long as Eastland is senior member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, a Democratic majority in the Senate means he is chairman of that committee.

Responsible party government is impossible so long as Humphrey and Eastland are in the same party. A realignment of the two parties into distinctly liberal and conservative entities is a prerequisite for democratic social change. The alternative is the present political stalemate.

One impetus toward political realignment is the reapportionment of legislative districts, increasing the representation of liberal urban areas. Most important perhaps is the increasing tension between the Dixiecrat and liberal wings of the Democratic party. The separation of the Dixiecrats from the Democratic party would deprive them of the political power they wield on the national scene. The voter-registration drives of Southern Negroes will help undermine racist power at its source.

These tendencies should be explicitly and vigorously encouraged by the liberal-labor-Negro coalition in 1964, traditional party loyalists notwithstanding. Roy Wilkins' announcement that the NAACP will actively seek the defeat of Congressmen opposed to civil rights legislation is a potentially significant move in this direction. The test question for Congressional candidates should be:

If elected, do you pledge to vote against any candidate for a committee chairmanship who opposes the party's platform in the area of the committee's concern?

The determination of political allegiances on the basis of answers

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to this question might take us a long way toward the kind of principled politics without which we are not likely to achieve civil rights, or social justice, or economic reform.

This article is adapted from a larger study which will be published as a pamphlet by the League for Industrial Democracy.

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DISSENT is pleased to inform its readers that a second Art Exhibition and Sale was held in New York City under the direction of William Fitelson. This show took place in December, with forty-six painters contributing paintings. The editors of DISSENT wish to once again offer their sincere thanks to the committee in charge of the show (Meyer Schapiro, Thomas Hess, Robert Motherwell and Harold Rosenberg) and to the following list of contributing artists. From the standpoint of financial help to DISSENT the 1963 Art Show was even more successful than the first:

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

"Trotsky made history, and kept an eye on history. He was a man of heroic mold, entirely committed to the life of action, but he was also an intellectual who believed in the power and purity of the word.

"The selections have been made to provide examples of his analytic sweep and brilliance, his authority as a spokesman for the Marxist world-view, and his distinction as a writer."*

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